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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Topic and research questions 
The tax reform that came into effect in 1992 represents the most wide-reaching reform of the 
tax system in Norwegian history. The reform lowered the tax rates for both individuals and 
businesses drastically, cut down a whole forest of deduction schemes, and established new 
governing principles for tax policy. This instance of fundamental1 policy change is the subject 
of the present study. 
 
Since the tax system pays for the welfare system, the 1992 tax reform is part and parcel of the 
modern transformation of Norway’s social democratic welfare state regime. Yet, our 
understanding of the outcome of the tax reform is underdeveloped. Did these policy changes 
represent the death of egalitarian social democratic tax policy or rather its resurrection? 
Couched in more analytical terms, the first question posed by this study is: Did the 
Norwegian tax reform of 1992 imply a liberal policy shift or a rational updating of social 
democratic policy?  
 
Within the literature on institutional change in advanced political economies, a central 
argument is that these substantive outcomes of change are somehow contingent upon the 
process of change. Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen (2005) argue that liberalization is 
usually the product of small, incremental changes in policy. Conversely, one would expect 
that non-liberal reforms are most often the result of large changes in policy. 
 
This gives rise to the suspicion that the large scale of the tax policy changes in 1992 shaped 
the outcome of the reform, i.e. whether it led to liberalization or rational updating of policy. 
The second question explored by this study is thus: How was the outcome of the 1992 tax 
reform conditioned by the large scale of policy change? 
 
This potential relationship raises yet another question: What made large-scale reform 
possible? The institutionalist literature emphasizes the difficulty of such authoritative policy 
change, due to the status-quo bias of political institutions. However, I suspect that the 
                                                 
1
 To denote policy changes of large scale, I use the expressions ‘large-scale’, ‘fundamental’, ‘authoritative’, 
‘large’, ‘deep-seated’, ‘wide-reaching’ and ‘profound’ inter-changeably.  
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consensual Norwegian political system represents an institutional setting that is more 
conducive to fundamental policy change. Hence, the third and final question of this study is: 
What were the preconditions for large-scale tax reform? 
 
In other words, this study poses one descriptive and two explanatory questions about the 
Norwegian tax reform of 1992. The first question concerns the outcome of the reform, 
whereas the two latter questions are about the process that led to this outcome. 
 
Expressed more schematically, the first question is about determining the value of the tax 
reform on the dependent variable ‘outcomes of policy change’, which is either liberalization 
or rational updating of policy (or a combination of the two). The aim of the second question is 
to explore the linkages between the value on the dependent variable and the value ‘large-scale 
reform’ on the independent variable ‘process of policy change’. The third question takes us 
one step further backwards in the causal chain, looking to explain large-scale reform. This 
means both identifying which variables account for the reform and how these variables 
produced large-scale policy change. I look at structural, ideational and institutional 
explanatory variables. Figure 1.1 provides a simple illustration of the assumed connection 
between the major variables in this study.  
 
 
This study has a meso-level focus, as it investigates policy evolution in one particular area, 
that of taxation. I understand the more or less coherent set of policies in this area as a policy 
 
Process/scale 
of change 
Outcomes 
of change 
Political 
institutions 
Structural 
factors 
Ideational 
factors 
Figure 1.1: A model for studying reform 
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regime2. The tax system it treated as a whole, implying that the study is not limited to any 
specific part of tax policy or type of taxes, or to taxes collected at any particular level of 
government. This choice is justified by the ambition to examine the total outcomes of the tax 
system in terms of revenue-raising, redistribution and efficiency. Moreover, the different parts 
of tax policy are closely inter-connected, meaning that an analysis of one element in isolation 
can easily be misleading. 
 
At issue in this study is the transformation of Norwegian tax policy since the 1980s. The study 
focuses on the 1992 tax reform, as this was the most significant policy change of the period. 
To understand the background for the reform, we follow the development of tax policy back 
to the mid-1970s. My in-depth investigation of the political process concentrates on the years 
from the release of an important public commission report on taxation in 1989 until the 
passage of the reform in 1991. To shed light on the implications of the reform, the study also 
scans the developments in policy and outcomes from 1992 up until today. 
 
1.2 Substantive motivation 
The primary motivation for this study is substantive. The study springs out of an interest for 
the transformation of the Norwegian welfare state regime since the 1980s. Did Norway 
abandon its social democratic welfare state model during these decades, or was the model 
rather updated to the political and economic environment of a new era? This question has 
been widely debated, and some works have attempted to analyze the issue in its entire 
breadth. In particular, Dølvik (2007) offers a comprehensive analysis. Yet, somewhat 
surprisingly, one of the integral elements of the Norwegian welfare state regime has been 
neglected in both public and scholarly debate: the tax system. 
 
Simply, our understanding of how Norwegian tax policy has changed in recent decades is 
very limited. There is a dearth of political and political-economic research on the character of 
the major Norwegian reforms of tax policy, of which the 1992 reform was the most important. 
We do know that the 1992 tax reform virtually remade the entire tax system, but we are 
ignorant about the implications of these changes. Did the tax reform put an end to egalitarian 
social democratic tax policy and replace it with a liberal regime? This could be connected to 
                                                 
2
 This understanding of a ‘policy regime’ rests on weaker assumptions about coherence and stability in policy 
than the notion of ‘institutional equilibrium’ often employed in rational choice scholarship. 
9 
less redistribution, a weaker capacity to raise revenue, or more lenient taxation of business 
and capital. Such an evolution could have threatened the financial (and political) basis of the 
welfare state, providing pressures for retrenchment.  
 
Or did the reform rather represent a successful updating of social democratic tax policy to 
new political-economic realities? It is possible that fundamental policy changes were 
necessary for the tax system to better achieve its core objectives in an increasingly complex 
economy. If this were the case, the 1992 tax reform could be regarded as a prerequisite for the 
survival and return of the social democratic model. For instance, a reform that reinforced the 
capacity to raise revenue would be consonant with the maintenance or continued expansion of 
the welfare state. 
 
Thus, determining the outcomes of the 1992 Norwegian tax reform is the first goal of this 
study, expressed in the first research question. What does the existing literature tell us on this 
point? In Norway, tax policy issues have been treated almost exclusively by economists and 
law experts. As a consequence, the existing knowledge about the 1992 tax reform is limited in 
its perspective. While its legal aspects and economic effects are well covered, its broader 
political-economic implications are not. In the absence of such research, superficial analyses 
have shaped the perceptions of the 1992 tax reform.     
 
An oft-repeated view is that the tax reform produced a dramatic growth in capital incomes, 
which benefited the well off and thereby increased income inequality (e.g. Dølvik 2007:310). 
However, this understanding of the 1992 tax reform is not only incomplete, it is also 
fallacious. Firstly, it focuses exclusively on the direct redistributive effect of the tax system, 
while ignoring tax policy’s arguably more important function of generating revenue for 
redistribution in the welfare state. Secondly, the purported explosion in capital incomes upon 
closer investigation turns out to be a statistical artefact (Fjærli and Aaberge 2003).  
 
Neither does the broader literature on the Scandinavian welfare state regimes have much to 
offer on the issue of tax policy change. This comprehensive and highly prodigious literature 
has focused on transfers and services (e.g. Korpi 1983; Hatland et al. 2001; Kumlin and 
Rothstein 2005) and labor market questions (e.g. Barth et al. 2003; Kongshøj Madsen 2005), 
while according little attention to the role of tax policy. 
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Fortunately, there are a couple of excellent political-economic studies of tax reforms in 
Sweden (Steinmo 1993; 2002) and Denmark (Ganghof 2007). As the three Scandinavian 
countries implemented similar reforms at approximately the same time, these studies 
constitute a relevant frame of reference for my analysis of the Norwegian case. The findings 
from these studies have inspired my hypotheses about the outcome of the Norwegian tax 
reform. 
 
Steinmo (1993:165,171) finds that the Swedish tax reform of 1991 involved a shift in 
attention from equity goals towards efficiency concerns, and implied a downward 
redistribution of the tax burden. That is, the tax reform in Sweden represented a rupture with 
the old social democratic model and a shift in a liberal direction. Yet, in a more recent 
analysis of Swedish tax policy, Steinmo (2002) has revised this view. He finds that although 
“tax policy is most certainly adapting to the new political economic realities”, this has not 
meant “the end of redistribution” or the death of the Swedish welfare state (Steinmo 
2002:841). 
 
Steffen Ganghof presents a different analysis of recent tax reforms, based especially on the 
Danish case. He argues that reforms were primarily aimed at rationalization and upgrading: 
“The tax reforms did not fundamentally change the weighting of different tax policy goals 
(efficiency and equity) but tried to better achieve both goals” (Ganghof 2007:1066). Drastic 
changes in tax rules did not reverse the existing goals of tax policy; they were rather “a 
precondition for defending the underlying substantive status quo” of tax policy (Ganghof 
2007:1062).  
 
These alternative analyses give rise to my two hypotheses about the outcome of the 
Norwegian tax reform: ‘liberalization’ and ‘rational updating’. Put very briefly, liberalization 
would imply greater efficiency at the expense of equality, while rational updating would mean 
a better ability to achieve goals of both efficiency and equality. These two hypotheses are 
discussed in greater detail in section 2.1. To preview my findings, this study finds evidence 
for the latter hypothesis. The investigation shows that the Norwegian tax reform of 1992 was 
characterized by rational updating rather than liberalization. 
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1.3 Theoretical motivation 
Although this study first and foremost addresses a substantive issue, it is at the same time 
theoretically motivated. In different ways, the study seeks to contribute to three theoretical 
debates. The first is the general discussion about the relationship between processes and 
outcomes of change. The second is the debate about the impact of Nordic political institutions 
on reform. The third concerns the interaction between factors behind tax reform, and more 
generally, behind economic policy change. Here, I briefly sketch these debates and how I aim 
to contribute to them. The theory is discussed in greater detail in chapter 2.   
 
Firstly, the argument that substantive outcomes of change (i.e. liberalization or the lack 
thereof) are associated with specific processes of change (i.e. incremental change or large-
scale reform) is central in the literature on institutional change in advanced political 
economies3. What this relationship looks like is at the very core of current scholarly debate. 
(For the full discussion, see section 2.2.). 
 
Paul Pierson (2000) suggests that small, incremental policy change produces continuity in 
outcomes, while abrupt, large-scale change causes discontinuity in outcomes. Substantively, 
discontinuity in outcomes is often identified with liberalization or welfare state retrenchment, 
while continuity equals the lack thereof. Pierson’s view is challenged by Streeck and Thelen 
(2005), who argue that major discontinuities often result from incremental policy changes. 
They contend that liberalization is usually the product of small, gradual changes in policy.    
 
Conversely, one would expect that non-liberal reforms are most often the result of large 
changes in policy. Streeck and Thelen’s (2005) argument strongly suggests such a 
relationship, but they do not devote further attention to the type of policy change 
characterized by the combination of fundamental reform and continuity in outcomes. 
However, the can place the Norwegian tax reform of 1992 into this category, as I find that this 
large-scale reform led to a rational updating of policy. The Norwegian case thus provides an 
opportunity to explore the relationship between fundamental policy change and continuity in 
                                                 
3
 The notion of ‘institutions’ in this body of work encompasses ‘policy regimes’ as here defined. A policy regime 
can be regarded as a simple form of institution. The choice to conceptualize the Norwegian tax system narrowly, 
as a ‘policy regime’ rather than as an ‘institution’, reflects the particular character of tax policy. In the field of 
taxation, formal rules are all-important. Compared to other policy areas, tax policy can be identified more closely 
with tax rules. Therefore, we can avoid the more complex notion of ‘institution’. This also distinguishes policies 
from political institutions, discussed in section 2.4. 
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outcomes. The present study can potentially shed light on the mechanisms that underlie this 
relationship and thereby contribute to the development of theory on this point. 
 
Secondly, the literature on institutional change in advanced political economies emphasizes 
the difficulty of large-scale policy change. This is generally attributed to the status quo-bias of 
political institutions. Paul Pierson (2000) argues that increasing returns processes prevalent in 
politics generate growing barriers to fundamental policy shifts. Why the Norwegian political 
system was able to produce large-scale tax reform is therefore of theoretical interest.  
 
There is reason to suspect that the consensual Nordic political systems represent institutional 
settings that under some conditions are conducive to large-scale policy change (see section 
2.4). Tranøy (2000) argues that in times of crisis, the consensus-oriented Norwegian system 
can be expected to produce fundamental updating reform. But exactly how do Nordic political 
institutions potentially stimulate reform? By exploring the institutional mechanisms that 
contributed to large-scale tax reform in Norway, I seek to contribute to this discussion.  
 
Thirdly, there is theoretical debate about the factors that explain change, both in tax policy 
and in economic policy more generally. (For the full discussion, see section 2.2.) How 
important are institutional, structural and ideational factors, respectively, and how do they 
interact to bring about change? Traditionally, structural factors have been emphasized in 
explanations of economic policy regime change. Yet, lately, scholars that stress the 
importance of ideas as causal factors have challenged this materialist approach.  
 
Mark Blyth (1997; 2001) argues that structural explanations are incomplete, since structure 
can only account for the breakdown of an old regime, not the character of the new regime that 
replaces it. Therefore, economic ideas can be seen as “a key mediating variable between 
structural change in the economic realm and institutional change in the political realm” (Blyth 
2001:5). The present study addresses this general debate by investigating the interaction 
between structural, ideational and institutional factors in the process that led to the Norwegian 
tax reform.  
 
At the same time, the study speaks to the specific debate about the factors behind recent tax 
reforms. In the existing literature on tax policy change, structure, ideas and institutions are all 
regarded as sources of tax reform. Ganghof (2007) stresses the importance of domestic 
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structural factors, arguing that the structural problems of extant tax regimes gave impulses to 
fundamental tax reform in the 1980s and 90s. Others emphasize international structural 
factors, arguing that economic globalization has imposed major structural constraints on tax 
policy (e.g. Genschel 2002; Bretschger and Hettich 2002). Steinmo (2003), on the other hand, 
highlights the role of new policy ideas in accounting for the major tax reforms of the 80s and 
90s. Moreover, Steinmo’s (1993) seminal study of the evolution of tax policy in the USA, the 
UK and Sweden shows the deep impact of political institutions on tax policy change. 
 
1.4 A historical institutionalist research strategy 
The present study is based on a historical institutionalist (HI) strategy for framing research 
questions and developing explanations. This approach is usually juxtaposed to rational choice 
institutionalism. Basically, what distinguishes the HI strategy from rational choice modelling 
is the focus on large, substantive questions, as well as the construction of explanations that are 
sensitive to context and based on the combined effects of institutions and processes. 
 
Firstly, historical institutionalists address big, substantive research questions rather than 
theoretical questions (Pierson and Skocpol 2002:3). “Historical institutionalists are primarily 
interested in understanding and explaining specific real world political outcomes,” as Steinmo 
(2001) puts it. Accordingly, the main goal of the present study is substantive, namely to 
understand and account for major changes in Norwegian tax policy. HI research is inherently 
problem driven, in contrast to rational choice scholarship, which is usually more theory driven 
(cf. Shapiro 2005).  
 
Secondly, to explain political outcomes, historical institutionalists investigate the “combined 
effects of institutions and processes” in historical context (Pierson and Skocpol 2002:3; 
emphasis in original). The present study analyzes how different structural and ideational 
processes interacted with political institutions during a specific historical period to bring 
about tax reform. This approach to explanation differs from rational choice modelling, which 
will often investigate the effect of one specific institution and accord less attention to 
contextual conditions. Historical institutionalists usually understand institutions as intervening 
or structuring variables among a large set of explanatory factors, rather than as the sole 
variable that has impact (Steinmo 2001). 
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A third feature that distinguishes HI from rational choice institutionalism is the perspective on 
preference formation (Thelen and Steinmo 1992). Historical institutionalists treat preferences 
as endogenous, whereas rational choice modelling has often assumed exogenous preferences. 
This difference is not as clear as before, as the issue of preferences is at the top of the agenda 
for theory development within rational choice scholarship. Yet, it is fair to say that HI 
scholars treat preferences as endogenous in a more fundamental sense: “[T]he definition of 
interests and objectives is created in institutional contexts and is not separable from them” 
(Zysman 1994:244). The present study adopts this understanding. One of the core issues of 
the analysis is how the preferences of political actors were shaped within the Norwegian 
institutional setting. 
 
However, we should not exaggerate the differences between HI and rational choice 
institutionalism. For one, historical institutionalism is not incompatible with rational action. 
HI research – the present study included – is based on the assumption that “most people act 
rationally most of the time” (Steinmo 2001). Importantly, this refers to rationality in the broad 
sense of the word, not a notion of rationality confined to economic self-interest. 
 
For another, many HI studies incorporate elements from rational choice theory. Most 
importantly, “historical institutionalists have … taken on board the notion that institutions that 
solve collective action problems are particularly important in understanding political 
outcomes” (Thelen 1999:370). The notion of political institutions as systems that can generate 
cooperation is at the core of the present study. To explain how institutions contributed to 
collective political action, I borrow certain concepts and insights from more instrumental 
analyses. 
  
1.5 Research design and methodology 
The investigation of my research questions is designed as a case study. The case study design 
is appropriate, as it allows for in-depth investigation of both the outcomes of the 1992 
Norwegian tax reform and the process behind it. Understanding this specific case is the first 
part of the case study’s double ambition (cf. Gerring 2004). The other part is to draw general 
inferences from this case to a broader class of cases. But what is the Norwegian tax reform of 
1992 a case of? This question does not have one simple answer. Since my three research 
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questions refer to partly different bodies of theoretical literature, they give rise to different 
specifications of the broader class of cases.  
 
First, the Norwegian tax reform is a case of modern tax policy change, in particular in the 
Nordic countries, when it comes to understanding and explaining policy change (questions 1 
and 3). Second, it is a case of a broader theoretical category, namely policy regime change in 
advanced political economies, when the link between processes and outcomes of change is at 
issue (question 2). This is also the potential scope for arguments about the interaction between 
structural, ideational and institutional factors behind policy change (question 3). Third, the 
Norwegian tax reform provides a case of how Nordic political institutions affect policy 
change (question 3). 
 
Consonant with the historical institutionalist research strategy, this study takes a mechanism-
based approach to explanation (cf. Pierson and Skocpol 2002:6). The goal is to explore the 
causal mechanisms that connect initial conditions to outcomes, not to estimate causal effects. 
This approach “seeks to explain a given social phenomenon … by identifying the processes 
through which it is generated” (Mayntz 2004:238).  
 
The ambition to uncover mechanisms goes hand in hand with the methodology of process 
tracing. Process tracing implies close-up investigation of every link in the chain of events that 
led to the large-scale 1992 tax reform. This is crucial to examine the combined effects of 
institutions and historical processes. 
 
Specifically, this study relies on three main sources of data: qualitative interviews with 
policy-makers and experts; public documents; and secondary statistical economic literature. 
While qualitative interviews and public documents are used to trace the reform process, 
existing statistical economic studies are the main basis for the discussion of the outcome of 
reform. The research design and methodology of this study is discussed in detail in chapter 3. 
 
1.6 The importance of tax policy 
Finally, a brief introduction to the substance of tax policy is necessary to prepare the reader 
for the theoretical and empirical discussions that follow. Why is tax policy important, and 
what are its main functions? 
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The tax system represents an integral element of a country’s welfare state regime or welfare 
capitalism. The basic purpose of taxation is to finance the activities of the public sector. In 
advanced political economies, particularly in the Scandinavian countries, a large portion of 
public spending goes to welfare services and transfers. In 2008, social protection and health 
care accounted for 56,7 percent of Norwegian public spending, according to Statistics 
Norway. Simply put, taxes pay for the welfare state. Although this statement is fairly trivial, 
its implications are crucial for understanding the importance of tax policy. 
 
First, the capacity to raise tax revenue constrains the size of the welfare state. Since the tax 
system represents the income side of the welfare state, it also constitutes its budget constraint. 
The scope for welfare state spending is limited by two features of the tax system: first, how 
effective it is in terms of raising revenue, and second, how much taxes people are willing to 
pay. In other words, the government’s opportunity to conduct welfare policy will increase 
with both the effectiveness and the popular acceptance of tax policy. 
 
This is the case even for Norway, which benefits from large petroleum incomes. Taxes are 
necessary to make room in the real economy for the activities of the public sector. Through 
taxation, resources – such as human capital – are transferred from the private sector to the 
public sector.  
  
Second, taxation influences economic efficiency. Basic economic theory says that taxes entail 
efficiency losses, since they distort the incentives of firms and individuals4. More 
interestingly, the size of the efficiency loss varies with the type of taxation, since different 
taxes affect the economy in different ways. Therefore, how we tax determines the economic 
costs associated with raising revenue through taxation. The tax costs for the economy depend 
both on the chosen tax mix – i.e. the combination of different types of taxes – and on the 
specific design of each tax.  
 
                                                 
4
 Taxes that correct externalities constitute an exception, as they are meant to prevent efficiency losses by 
confronting firms or individuals with the social economic costs and benefits of production or consumption.  
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An important implication is that the economic cost of the welfare state5 is partly determined 
by how the tax system is designed (Lindert 2004). A more efficient tax system makes the 
welfare state less costly in economic terms.    
 
More broadly, tax policy strongly influences the working of the economy. Taxes affect the 
economic decisions of individuals and businesses. For individuals, taxes influence the choice 
between work and leisure, between consumption and savings, and between different forms of 
savings. While one tax system may give people incentives to work and put the money in the 
bank, another system may induce individuals to borrow money and buy real estate. For 
businesses, taxes affect both the decision of whether to invest or not, and the choices between 
different types of investments and between alternative ways to finance investments. One tax 
system may deter investments, while another may favor loan-financed investments.       
 
Third, tax policy has a redistributive function. Welfare policy and tax policy are alternative 
arenas for redistribution, since they constitute respectively the spending side and the income 
side of the welfare state. While benefits are distributed through welfare policy, tax policy 
distributes burdens. To achieve a desired level of redistribution, policy-makers can thus 
choose different combinations of welfare policy and tax policy. For instance, minimal 
redistribution in the tax system can be compensated by strongly redistributive welfare 
policies.   
 
Taxes have different effects in terms of redistribution, as they can be either proportional, 
progressive or regressive. Taxes are proportional if they represent the same proportion of 
income at all income levels. They are progressive if they take away a higher percentage of 
income from high-income earners than from low-income earners. Conversely, regressive 
taxes represent a larger proportion of income for those at low income levels compared to 
those at high levels of income. 
  
Importantly, the total redistributive effect of the tax system depends both on the chosen mix 
of taxes and the specific design of these taxes. Some types of taxes are generally more 
redistributive than others. Wealth taxes and regular income taxes are usually progressive, 
                                                 
5
 The term “cost of the welfare state” does not imply that the costs associated with the welfare state are greater 
than its benefits. It simply refers to the fact that the welfare state mainly has to be financed through taxes that 
distort economic choices to a smaller or larger degree. Taxes that are less distortionary will lower the total tax 
costs associated with the welfare state.   
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while consumption taxes and payroll taxes are often proportional or even regressive. For 
instance, a flat consumption tax will normally be de facto regressive, since low-income 
earners use a larger portion of their income on consumption than high-income earners. The 
specific structure of each tax also has distributive implications. Tax ceilings generally make 
taxes more regressive, while tax floors or standard deductions make them more progressive.  
 
Additionally, so-called ‘tax expenditures’ have considerable effects on redistribution (Ervik 
2000). Tax expenditures refer to the forgone revenues from taxing some assets more leniently 
than what is the norm in the tax system. These ‘expenditures’ normally take the form of 
deductions or low value assessments of assets, which may have highly asymmetrical effects. 
For instance, lenient taxation of owner-occupied housing privileges those with (large) houses.  
 
In sum, how tax policy is designed is important for three main reasons. First, it determines the 
revenue-raising capacity of the tax system, which constrains the size of the welfare state. 
Second, it influences the working of the economy and partly determines the economic costs of 
the welfare state. Third, it affects the distribution of income. 
 
1.7 Outline of the study 
The study is structured as follows: In chapter 2, I present hypotheses, theory and relevant 
existing literature. This chapter is divided into five sections. In the first section, I present the 
two hypotheses about the character of reform, liberalization and rational updating. In the 
second section, I sketch the theoretical discussion about the relation between processes/scale 
and outcomes of institutional change in advanced political economies. Section 2.3 discusses 
the existing literature on structural and ideational sources of tax policy change. In section 2.4, 
I address the workings of political institutions in the Nordic countries. Finally, I discuss the 
roles of key political actors operating within this institutional context (section 2.5). 
 
The third chapter is devoted to research design and methodology. In chapters 4 and 5, I 
present the results from my empirical investigation. The process that led to reform is the 
subject of chapter 4, while chapter 5 is about the outcome of reform. Chapter 6 contains the 
analysis, where I bring theory and data together to answer my research questions. Chapter 7 
concludes and suggests topics for further research. 
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Chapter 2: Theory 
2.1 Liberalization or rational updating? 
2.1.1 Two hypotheses about the outcome of the 1992 tax reform 
The first research question is descriptive and addresses the character of tax policy change: Did 
the Norwegian tax reform of 1992 imply a liberal policy shift or a rational updating of social 
democratic policy? In the literature on recent tax policy change there are two main views of 
the reforms of this era. The first is that tax policy was subject to liberalization, with attention 
shifting from equity to efficiency goals. The alternative view is that tax policy was rationally 
updated, as policy-makers found more effective means to achieve a fixed set of goals. These 
views are the basis for my two hypotheses about the Norwegian tax reform of 1992, since 
they suggest the two different paths tax policy could have taken at this crossroads.  
 
The hypotheses, which I refer to as ‘liberalization’ and ‘rational updating’, are also tied to a 
more general discussion in the literature on policy regime change in advanced political 
economies. In this section, I develop the two hypotheses, describing both their general 
features and their specific implications for tax policy in Norway. 
 
2.1.2 Liberalization   
The first and most conventional hypothesis is that of liberalization. Liberalization is regarded 
as a dominant contemporary trend both in works on tax policy change and in the broader 
literature on changes in advanced political economies. Generally, liberalization is often 
identified as a shift to a more market-based political-economic logic that involves larger 
freedom for private economic actors (e.g. Streeck and Thelen 2005).  
 
In the tax field, the discussion about liberalization is more oriented towards the balance 
between policy objectives of efficiency and equality, as well as the corresponding outcomes. 
In the tax reforms of the 1980s and 90s, some analysts see a “shift in policy paradigm” where 
the goal of efficiency was given increasing weight relative to that of equity (Swank and 
Steinmo 2002:643,651). Steinmo finds “an unmistakably common trend: Tax reform has now 
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come to mean the redistribution of existing tax burdens downward” (Steinmo 1993:156). That 
is, policy change in a liberal direction is identified with a shift from equity towards efficiency. 
 
Accordingly, I conceptualize ‘liberalization’ as a shift in policy objectives from equality 
towards efficiency and a corresponding development in outcomes. Liberalization implies 
greater efficiency at the expense of equality. Thus, I regard a weakened ability to generate 
economic equality as a necessary precondition for classifying a development as liberal. 
 
The proposed “big trade-off” (Okun 1975) between efficiency and equity constitutes the basis 
for this notion of liberalization. This basic tenet of neo-classical economic thought implies 
that stronger redistribution leads to lower efficiency, while higher efficiency means less 
redistribution. In this trade-off, liberalization can be equated with giving priority to the goal of 
efficiency over that of equality: Redistributive efforts are problematic since they hurt 
efficiency, and should therefore be reduced.  
 
More generally, this neo-classical view implies that government intervention should be 
limited, since it distorts the working of free, competitive markets, thereby impeding an 
optimal allocation of resources. Liberalization thus involves loosening the grip on private 
economic actors, so that they can make free economic choices that generate economic 
efficiency.   
      
What are the specific implications of this hypothesis for tax policy in Norway? On the policy 
regime level, the liberalization hypothesis corresponds to a shift from a traditional 
interventionist social democratic tax policy model to a liberal regime. 
 
Liberalization would change the weight accorded to different objectives of tax policy. On the 
one hand, liberalization implies a stronger concern for efficiency and the free operation of 
markets. More lenient tax treatment of business and mobile capital would be the logical 
consequence. Thus, the outcomes related to liberalization would be greater economic 
efficiency and a lighter tax burden on business and capital.   
 
On the other hand, a liberal tax policy regime would accord less weight to goals of 
redistribution. This applies both to the direct redistribution within the tax system and the 
indirect redistribution based on raising revenue for the welfare state. Thus, liberalization 
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would be related to outcomes of higher inequality, either because of a downward shift of the 
tax burden or a weakened capacity to finance redistributive welfare policy. 
 
To summarize, the first hypothesis is that the 1992 Norwegian tax reform changed policy in a 
liberal direction. In terms of policy objectives, this would imply a shift from equity to 
efficiency concerns. In terms of outcomes, liberalization would be associated with higher 
economic efficiency and a lower tax burden on business/capital, combined with greater 
inequality and a reduced ability to finance the welfare state.         
 
2.1.3 Rational updating 
The alternative hypothesis about how Norwegian tax policy developed is what I label rational 
updating. This hypothesis has two basic elements. ‘Rational’ refers to using more rational 
policy means to achieve a fixed set of goals. ‘Updating’ means adapting policy to new 
political-economic environments. Hence, rational updating of policy means to better achieve 
established objectives by adapting policy means to new political-economic realities. 
 
Though rarely stated explicitly, this hypothesis is anchored both in the general literature on 
changes in advanced political economies and in discussions of tax policy change. On a 
general level, Hacker (2005) and Streeck and Thelen (2005) provide a theoretical foundation 
for rational updating. The latter pair write that “institutions require active maintenance; to 
remain what they are they need to be reset and refocused, or sometimes more fundamentally 
recalibrated and renegotiated, in response to changes in the political and economic 
environment” (Streeck and Thelen 2005:24). The point is that policy changes are often 
necessary to better achieve the core objectives of a policy regime. Policy changes can be of a 
predominantly rational character, and do not necessarily imply changes in the substance of a 
policy regime.  
 
Paul Pierson (2001) also writes about rational reforms in his discussion of welfare state 
restructuring. He mentions ‘rationalization’ as one of two reform types under the general 
dimension of ‘recalibration’. Pierson defines rationalization as the “modification of 
programmes in line with new ideas about how to achieve established goals” (Pierson 
2001:425).  
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In the tax field, Steffen Ganghof’s analyses of modern tax reforms strongly suggest the idea 
of rational updating. He argues that reforms were primarily aimed at rationalization and 
upgrading: “The tax reforms did not fundamentally change the weighting of different tax 
policy goals (efficiency and equity) but tried to better achieve both goals” (Ganghof 
2007:1066). Policy changes were necessary to ensure continuity in outcomes. Drastic changes 
in tax rules did not reverse the existing goals of tax policy; they were rather “a precondition 
for defending the underlying substantive status quo” of tax policy (Ganghof 2007:1062). 
 
Steinmo’s recent analysis of Swedish tax policy also partly suggests the hypothesis of rational 
updating. His point is that although “tax policy is most certainly adapting to the new political 
economic realities”, this has not meant “the end of redistribution” or the death of the Swedish 
welfare state (Steinmo 2002:841). 
 
Whereas the hypothesis of liberalization implies a shift in objectives, rational updating entails 
continuity in objectives. Existing goals are not reversed or altered; only the policy means for 
achieving these goals change. Contrary to the first hypothesis, rational updating does not 
assume that there is a trade-off between efficiency and equality. The notion of rational 
updating implies that it is possible to better achieve both goals simultaneously, or at least to 
increase efficiency without hurting equality, and vice versa. 
 
Identifying ‘rational’ policy change is a challenging exercise analytically. For one, the term 
‘rational updating’ is defined by stability regarding objectives and amelioration in terms of 
achieving them. Can policy changes really be wholly neutral and rational? My answer would 
be that although changes can never be completely neutral, in some cases the continuity in 
objectives/outcomes will be more significant than the discontinuity. A notion of rational 
policy change is warranted, as we clearly do not want to identify all modern changes in 
economic policy as liberalization (cf. Pierson 2001:425). 
    
Yet, wouldn’t all policy-makers claim that their policies are rational, since they aim to better 
achieve goals? To meet this challenge, it is essential to base the evaluation of policy change 
primarily on outcomes. This study undertakes a thorough investigation of the outcomes of 
policy change to determine whether liberalization or rational updating characterized the 1992 
tax reform. 
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What are the specific implications of the rational updating hypothesis for tax policy in 
Norway? On the policy regime level, this hypothesis corresponds to replacing the traditional 
social democratic model with a modern social democratic tax policy regime.  
 
Rational updating implies continuity in the core objectives of tax policy. Such policy change 
would thus reconcile the goals of efficiency, revenue-raising and redistribution. Efficiency in 
taxation would not be pursued at the expense of equity. The outcome of rational updating for 
the tax system would be both greater economic efficiency and a greater total redistributive 
capacity. Increased redistributive capacity means a strengthened ability to finance the welfare 
state and/or greater direct redistribution within the tax system.  
 
To sum up, the second hypothesis is that Norwegian tax policy moved in a rational direction 
in the 1992 reform. This is associated with continuity in objectives. In terms of outcomes, this 
would imply greater efficiency combined with more effective revenue-raising and stability in 
the distribution of tax burdens. Table 2.1 summarizes the implications of the two hypotheses 
for changes in the outcomes of tax policy.  
 
Table 2.1: Implications of the hypotheses for outcomes of tax policy change 
 Hypothesis 
Outcome variable Liberalization Rational updating 
1. Efficiency Greater Greater 
2. Treatment of capital More lenient Same as before or tougher 
3. Capacity to finance welfare state Weaker Same as before or stronger 
4. Direct redistribution Weaker Same as before or stronger 
 
2.2 Linking outcomes and processes of change 
2.2.1 Institutional change in advanced political economies 
The second research question of this study – How was the outcome of the 1992 tax reform 
conditioned by the large scale of policy change? – is inspired by the literature on institutional 
change in advanced political economies. Substantively, this body of work has addressed the 
character and outcomes of the major changes that have taken place in various policy areas 
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and broader institutions since the 1980s. Theoretically, it has been concerned with 
understanding processes of change. However, it is the link between the two that constitutes 
the decisive point at issue in this literature. The argument that substantial outcomes are 
associated with specific types of institutional change represents the very raison d’être of this 
line of theoretical effort. 
 
Most scholars of institutional change support the proposition that there is a relationship 
between outcomes and processes of change. What this relationship looks like, however, is the 
subject of intense academic debate. The discussion about what type of institutional change 
gives rise to specific substantive outcomes is arguably the most important current debate in 
the field. There are two major positions in this discussion: the first associated with Paul 
Pierson’s work; the other most clearly represented by Kathleen Thelen and colleagues. I first 
present these two positions, before I go on to argue that the kind of change I find in 
Norwegian tax policy represents a related but distinct theoretical category that has been given 
little attention in this literature. 
 
2.2.2 Path dependence and the lack of retrenchment 
The first position is based on the work of Paul Pierson and others on welfare state 
retrenchment. The substantial question posed by the “retrenchment literature” is whether the 
welfare states of advanced democracies have been dismantled as a consequence of increasing 
strains. The main finding is that the welfare state has proven remarkably resilient to change. 
Although there have been cuts, most systems of social protection have resisted fundamental 
shifts. The result of increasing pressures has not been across-the-board retrenchment or 
liberalization, but rather limited restructuring of the advanced welfare state (Pierson 2001). 
Thus, the substantive outcome has been continuity rather than change. 
 
The retrenchment literature is, however, equally concerned with processes of change as with 
outcomes. Regarding processes, the dominant finding is that changes have been incremental, 
not abrupt. Taken together, “most reforms in most countries [have been] incremental rather 
than radical, and focused on restructuring rather than straightforward dismantling” as Pierson 
sums up an anthology on changes in advanced welfare states (Pierson 2001:420). 
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Paul Pierson makes the conceptual link between these two findings, arguing that the outcome 
of limited retrenchment is associated with a specific process of institutional change, namely 
incremental, path dependent change. Welfare state institutions have not been dismantled, 
because they tend to evolve according to a path dependent logic. As institutions develop along 
a particular path, processes of increasing returns are set into motion, which make it 
increasingly difficult to exist the existing path. These processes produce significant barriers to 
fundamental policy shifts. Change, therefore, will mostly be incremental, amounting only to 
adjustments and adaptations within the existing path. 
 
According to this view, the process of change thus accounts for the outcome of change, 
namely institutional stability. Simply put, incremental processes of change produce outcomes 
of institutional continuity. Arguments about path dependence account for institutional 
persistence. 
 
However, the outcome to be explained is not always institutional stability. Major institutional 
changes do indeed occur. The path dependence literature usually points to the concept of 
“critical junctures” to make sense of fundamental shifts of this kind. Critical junctures are the 
moments of creation or innovation “where the usual structural constraints on action are lifted 
or eased” (Mahoney and Thelen 2009), often caused by large exogenous shocks. During such 
critical moments, radical shifts from one institutional path to another are possible. 
 
A common theoretical view is that institutional development over long periods of time 
incorporates both the logics of path dependence and critical junctures. This is often called the 
punctuated equilibrium model. Institutional change is characterized by long path dependent 
continuities that are periodically interrupted by critical moments when radical shifts occur 
(Pempel 1998). In the stretches of time between these rare critical junctures, institutions 
develop in path dependent ways. 
 
Arguments about path dependence and critical junctures should not be conflated, as stressed 
by Pierson (2000). The two concepts point to diametrically opposite logics of change. Path 
dependence arguments emphasize the barriers to change that explain stability, while 
arguments about critical junctures stress the lifting of these barriers, which accounts for major 
ruptures. However, they give rise to complementary hypotheses about the relationship 
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between processes and outcomes of change. While incremental path dependent change 
produces institutional continuity, abrupt change (at critical junctures) causes discontinuity. 
 
2.2.3 Liberalization through gradual transformation 
Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen criticize this punctuated equilibrium model, arguing 
that there are “severe limits to models of change that draw a sharp line between institutional 
stability and institutional change” (Streeck and Thelen 2005:8, applies also to next quotes). 
Separating the analysis of institutional continuity and rupture, they argue, imposes a bias on 
our understanding of the relationship between processes and outcomes of change. This 
conceptual framework only provides for “either incremental change supporting institutional 
continuity through reproductive adaptation, or disruptive change causing institutional 
breakdown and innovation and thereby resulting in discontinuity”. 
 
Equating incremental change with continuity and abrupt change with discontinuity is 
misleading, they argue, since discontinuities can also arise from incremental changes: “Far-
reaching change can be accomplished through the accumulation of small, often seemingly 
insignificant adjustments”. To account for this possibility, they suggest that we distinguish 
clearly between “processes of change, which may be incremental or abrupt, and results of 
change, which may amount to either continuity or discontinuity”. This is presented in a two-
by-two matrix, reproduced under (Table 2.2). 
 
Table 2.2: Types of institutional change: processes and results 
 Result of change 
Process of change Continuity Discontinuity 
Incremental change 1. Reproduction by 
adaptation 
3. Gradual 
transformation 
Abrupt change 2. Survival and return  4. Breakdown and 
replacement  
Source: Streeck and Thelen (2005:9) 
     
This typology of institutional change maps out four possible combinations of processes and 
results of change. But the typology also represents four possible connections between the 
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character of the change process and the outcome of change. Cell 1 represents Pierson’s view, 
which conceives of incremental change as adaptive and reproductive, thus implying 
continuity. Cell 4 corresponds to arguments about critical junctures, where abrupt change 
causes institutional rupture. Taken together, the punctuated equilibrium model allows for 
institutional change of types 1 and 4. 
 
Streeck and Thelen, however, emphasize institutional change of type 3, which they term 
‘gradual transformation’. “In reality,” they argue, there can be “dramatic institutional 
reconfiguration beneath the surface of apparent stability or adaptive self-reproduction, as a 
result of an accumulation over longer periods of time of subtle incremental changes” (Streeck 
and Thelen 2005:8). They regard this as a frequent – maybe even the predominant – type of 
institutional change in the political economy of modern capitalism. But due to the dominance 
of the punctuated equilibrium model, these processes of gradual transformation are poorly 
understood. 
 
Their basic point is that institutional discontinuity is not necessarily the result of abrupt 
change brought about by exogenous shocks. On the contrary, major transformations of 
institutions are most often produced by series of small, seemingly insignificant changes. This 
represents an alternative view of the relationship between processes and outcomes of change: 
Major discontinuities result from incremental change.  
 
In the context of modern political economies, discontinuity is inextricably linked to 
liberalization. Streeck and Thelen’s argument is based on the observation that advanced 
industrial democracies have gone through a process of liberalization since the 1980s that has 
fundamentally altered their political economies. They thus present a rival view of the 
substantive outcome of the pressures put on advanced political economies. Contrary to the 
‘retrenchment’ and ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ literatures, which emphasize continuity and the 
lack of convergence, they stress the significance of the changes that have taken place. They 
see “a process of liberalization [that] involves a major recasting of the system of democratic 
capitalism as we know it” (Streeck and Thelen 2005:5).  
 
Liberalization, however, has not been produced by disruptive changes caused by exogenous 
shocks. Quite the opposite: “[A]n essential and defining characteristic of the ongoing 
worldwide liberalization of advanced political economies is that it evolves in the form of 
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gradual change that takes place within, and is conditioned and constrained by, the very same 
postwar institutions that it is reforming or even dissolving” (Streeck and Thelen 2005:4).  
 
The authors thus observe a relationship between the outcome of liberalization and incremental 
processes of institutional change. These processes of gradual but transformative change are of 
four kinds (Mahoney and Thelen 2009:15-17). First, displacement occurs when old rules are 
replaced with new ones, for instance when private institutions are introduced that compete 
with and eventually supplant public schemes. Second, layering implies that new rules are 
added to existing rules, thereby altering the logic of an institution. Third, drift describes 
processes where shifts in the context of policies alter the effects of policies that are not 
updated (Hacker 2005). That is, even if policies are not changed, changing environments can 
bring about significant changes in the outcomes of policies. For instance, public welfare 
schemes may decay because they are not tended to. Fourth, conversion occurs when existing 
rules are interpreted or enacted in new ways. Often, actors exploit the ambiguities of 
institutional rules, filling institutions with new goals or functions. 
 
Streeck and Thelen argue that gradual transformation processes of these kinds abound in the 
recent development of advanced political economies. This brings them to ask whether the 
connection between incremental processes of change and outcomes of liberalization is of a 
more general character: “Could it be that measures of liberalization are somehow particularly 
suited to being imposed gradually and without disruption?” (Streeck and Thelen 2005:33). 
They support this suspicion by pointing out that liberalization seldom requires political 
mobilization, as the typology of gradual transformative change suggests. Liberalization can be 
brought about without dismantling existing institutions, simply by doing nothing or by 
changing institutions from within.  
 
Streeck and Thelen thereby provide an argument about the linkage between processes and 
outcomes of institutional change that runs counter to Pierson’s understanding. While 
Pierson’s view is that incremental change causes continuity and lack of retrenchment, they 
argue that gradual change privileges discontinuity in the form of liberalization.  
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2.2.4 Fundamental changes, continuity in outcomes 
The possible linkages between processes and outcomes of institutional change are, however, 
not exhausted. Returning to the typology of institutional change in table 1, the punctuated 
equilibrium model corresponds to cells 1 and 4, while the model of gradual transformation 
occupies cell 3. What about the combination of abrupt change and continuity in outcomes 
(cell 2)? Streeck and Thelen note that “there often is considerable continuity through and in 
spite of historical break points”, tentatively referring to this type of change as ‘survival and 
return’ (Streeck and Thelen 2005:8). This category of institutional change is not given further 
attention, though.        
 
However, the kind of change that I find in the Norwegian tax reform of 1992 seems to fit this 
category. My empirical investigation reveals a remarkable stability in outcomes, despite – or 
perhaps because of – abrupt policy change. This type of institutional change appears 
compatible with the argument advanced by Streeck and Thelen. The criticism of equating 
processes of change with outcomes applies here as well: Neither does incremental change 
signify continuity in outcomes, nor does abrupt change imply discontinuity. Their claim is 
that liberalization often results from the gradual change generated by the failure to adapt 
policy to changing environments (see also Hacker 2005): 
  
“[I]nstitutions require active maintenance; to remain what they are they need to be reset 
and refocused, or sometimes more fundamentally recalibrated and renegotiated, in 
response to changes in the political and economic environment in which they are 
embedded […] Without such tending … they can be subject to erosion or atrophy 
through drift” (Streeck and Thelen 2005:24, emphasis in original)  
 
This argument, which underpins the claim about ‘gradual, but transformative’ change, also 
implicitly supports the type of institutional change characterized by continuity in outcomes 
through disruptive large-scale reform. In this view, liberalization often occurs due to the lack 
of major reform that updates an institution to a new economic or social environment. The 
logical implication is that major, updating reforms can indeed produce institutional continuity 
and deter liberalization. Ganghof advances the same point with regard to tax policy, arguing 
that “drastic changes in the legal status quo (policies) may be necessary to defend the 
underlying substantive status quo (outcomes)” (Ganghof 2007:1081).   
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This argument can be pushed even further: Could there be a connection between non-
liberalization and abrupt, fundamental reform? Again, this suspicion mirrors Streeck and 
Thelen’s speculation about a general relationship between gradual change and liberalization. 
While liberalization can easily proceed without mobilization, updating institutions to 
changing contexts is a more difficult task that requires mobilization. That is, liberalization 
does not depend on large reforms, while non-liberalization by means of recalibrating 
institutions does.  
 
“Non-liberal reforms in a market economy seem to require ‘political moments’ in which 
strong governments create and enforce rules that individual actors have to follow, even if they 
would on their own prefer not do so”, Streeck and Thelen (2005:33) write. As the authors 
suggest, organizing capitalism today may face far stronger collective action problems than 
liberalization within capitalism.  
 
However, their emphasis on ‘strong government’ as the only solution to these problems seems 
misleading. Broad, political coalitions behind reform represent a strong – and perhaps more 
viable – alternative. That is, collective political action by broad coalitions appears to be the 
most important condition for fundamental non-liberal reform. 
 
2.2.5 Summary of the discussion of outcomes and processes of change 
What is the relationship between processes of institutional change and substantial outcomes in 
advanced political economies? In the preceding discussion, I have presented two conceptual 
models, which each give rise to two types of institutional change. The punctuated equilibrium 
model suggests that incremental changes imply continuity in outcomes, while abrupt changes 
produce discontinuity. Pierson explains lack of retrenchment with the path dependent 
character of institutional change (‘reproduction by adaptation’). Major institutional 
discontinuities (‘breakdown and replacement’), on the other hand, are understood as the 
product of disruptive change at critical junctures.  
 
Streeck and Thelen present an alternative model, arguing that the connection between 
processes and outcomes of institutional change has the opposite sign. Discontinuity in the 
form of liberalization most often occurs through incremental changes (‘gradual 
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transformation’). Conversely, and based on the same logic, non-liberalization in the sense of 
updating institutions may require abrupt, large-scale reforms (‘survival and return’). My study 
of the 1992 Norwegian tax reform explores this type of institutional change, examining the 
linkages between fundamental reform and rational updating. 
 
2.3 Sources of change 
2.3.1 Structure and ideas as sources of change 
The previous section discussed the relationship between processes and outcomes of change. 
We now take one step back in the causal chain, examining the factors that give rise to changes 
in policy. Policy change can be regarded as the product of two elements: first, the sources of 
change – either structural or ideational – and second, the political institutions that process the 
impulses for change that emanate from these sources. This model is consonant with the 
historical institutionalist approach (see section 1.4). Change in a policy regime is regarded as 
the result of how outside historical processes – at both the international and national level – 
interact with developments within the policy regime itself, and how these potential sources of 
change are processed through decision-making institutions. 
  
This section addresses the sources of change, while political institutions are the subject of 
section 2.4. ‘Sources of change’ simply refer to the things that give policy-makers reason to 
change policy. This could be problems associated with existing policy or the prospect of 
better effects from new policies. Sometimes the sources of change are abrupt shocks (as wars 
or crises), in other cases features that have developed over a long period of time. Sources of 
change can be divided into two categories: structural factors and ideational factors. 
 
Traditionally, structural factors have been emphasized in explanations of institutional change. 
The basic contention is that changes in structure account for changes in institutions or policy 
regimes. Structural factors can be either international or domestic, and either external or 
internal to the policy regime in question. In this section, I discuss two potential structural 
sources of change in the Norwegian tax policy regime. First, in section 2.3.2, I address the 
internal structural problems of the existing tax system (which are also related to the broader 
economy). Second, in section 2.3.3, I discuss increased economic internationalization. 
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Yet, the last two decades this materialist approach has been challenged by scholars that 
emphasize the importance of ideas as causal factors behind institutional change in the political 
economy (Blyth 1997). That is, changes in policy regimes may in part be explained by the 
emergence and development of new economic ideas. This is a reasonable hypothesis also in 
the area of tax policy (see Steinmo 2003). Therefore, in addition to structural factors, I discuss 
the development of new economic ideas about taxation as a source of tax policy change in 
Norway (section 2.3.4).  
 
Before looking closer at these potential sources of tax policy change, a notion of the 
relationship between structural and ideational causal factors is necessary. Are material and 
ideational factors mutually exclusive or compatible? Mark M. Blyth (1997; 2001) presents a 
convincing argument for the latter. His main contention is that although structural factors are 
important, they can only bring us halfway in explaining policy regime change. “While 
structural factors may explain why a particular institutional equilibrium becomes unstable, 
such a model does not explain why the new equilibrium takes the specific form that it does” 
(Blyth 2001:4). That is, structural explanations of institutional change are incomplete, since 
they are “indeterminate regarding subsequent institutional form” (Blyth 2001:26) 
 
Therefore, ideas are essential components of explanations of policy regime change. While 
structure may account for the breakdown of the old regime, ideas will often form the 
substance of the new policy regime. Economic ideas often serve as institutional blueprints, 
since they not only define structural problems but also project the solutions that will resolve 
these problems. Therefore, economic ideas can be seen as “a key mediating variable between 
structural change in the economic realm and institutional change in the political realm” (Blyth 
2001:5).  
 
Thus, in accounting for change in Norwegian tax policy, the question is not only what the 
crucial sources of change were. It is equally important to determine how structural and 
ideational factors interacted or complemented each other in producing change.  
 
In the following, I present the existing literature on what is believed to be the important 
sources of modern tax policy change. This literature provides the theoretical foundations for 
the two hypotheses of liberalization and rationalization. I first discuss structural factors, both 
at the national and the international level, before I turn to ideational factors. Under each 
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heading, I start with the general theory, before zooming in on the theoretical discussion 
specific to the Nordic countries. 
 
2.3.2 Domestic structural factors: extant tax policy and economic context  
Which structural factors could have given impulses to tax policy change in Norway? In this 
sub-section, I discuss the existing literature on the structural problems of the old tax policy 
regime. This includes a brief look at the relation between the tax system and macro-economic 
performance. In the next sub-section, I discuss the international structural constraints 
represented by increased economic globalization.  
 
Any account of changes in tax policy must be based on a notion of the system that existed 
previously. That is, looking at the character and evolution of tax systems from the 1960s to 
the 80s is a precondition for understanding the subsequent changes in tax policy. Scholars 
seem to agree that the problems of the existing tax system gave important impulses to change. 
Some even argue that the character of the old tax policy regime prepared the ground for a 
certain kind of change. However, an analysis of the tax systems in the decades preceding 
reform can lend support to both the hypotheses of liberalization and rationalization. 
 
What characterized the old tax policy regime? Up to the 1980s, policy-makers generally 
regarded tax policy as a tool for achieving a large array of goals. In addition to raising 
revenue, tax systems were used to promote redistribution and manipulated to achieve various 
industrial policy ends, among other things. Tax policy was to a large degree interventionist, as 
policy-makers used tax incentives as a solution to virtually any problem (Steinmo 2003:215-
7).  
 
The resulting tax systems tended to be messy and complicated, presenting firms and 
individuals with a number of different deductions and loopholes. Thus, effective tax burdens 
rarely corresponded to formal tax rates. While nominal rates were often high and progressive, 
the real tax burden was modest, as corporations made use of different tax incentives and 
individuals claimed generous deductions. 
 
The tax systems of the Nordic countries represented no exception in this regard. Rather, these 
features were accentuated in the Nordic tax systems. While the Nordic countries had some of 
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the highest formal tax rates in the world, this was compensated by generous deductions and 
tax incentives (Ganghof 2007:1068). This owed, however, to a couple of features particular to 
the Nordic tax systems. For individuals, tax treatment of owner-occupied housing was 
extremely favorable. For firms, strong tax incentives to keep capital inside the company 
implied lenient taxation. These features had important implications for both the ability to 
achieve political goals through the tax system (outcomes) and the political-economic logic in 
the Nordic countries. 
 
The tax treatment of owner-occupied housing was perhaps the most important peculiarity of 
the Nordic income tax systems (Ganghof 2005:80-81). Tax rules for housing were extremely 
favorable, as the returns to housing investments were taxed lightly or not at all while interest 
payments were fully deductible. Interest expenses could be deducted against the highest 
marginal tax rate, so that those facing the highest tax rates had the greatest opportunities for 
tax deductions. 
 
The liberal rules for interest deductibility gave rise to several problems (Ganghof 2005:81). 
First, the revenue from personal capital income tax was low or even negative. The 
Scandinavian countries actually suffered revenue losses from personal taxes on capital income 
at times during the 1980s (Sørensen 1998:16). Ganghof sees this as part of an implicit tax 
differentiation between labor and capital income, where policy-makers concerned with growth 
sought to impose lower effective tax rates on the latter. He argues, however, that this strategy 
had gotten out of hand, the tax burden on capital income dropping way below what was 
rational (Ganghof 2007:1061). 
   
Second, the allocation of resources was inefficient and the savings ratio of households low. 
The tax rules induced people to borrow money and invest in real estate, instead of putting 
aside savings that could be invested in production. Third, formal progressiveness in the 
income tax led to little effective redistribution, since the biggest earners had the largest loans 
and therefore enjoyed the largest tax deductions for interest. Thus, this feature of Nordic tax 
systems undermined equity, efficiency and revenue goals alike. 
 
Moreover, this tax regime contributed to macro-economic instability in the 1980s. In Norway, 
the combination of generous rules for interest deduction and credit liberalization fuelled an 
uncontrolled credit expansion in the mid-1980s (Tranøy 2000: chap. 3). The boom years of 
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1984 to 1987 were followed by economic downturn, partly due to a tightening of tax policy in 
1987. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Norwegian economy was in a deep crisis, with 
negative growth and soaring unemployment. These serious macro-economic problems add to 
the other structural deficiencies of the old tax policy regime.    
 
Another particular feature of Nordic tax policy was the active use of tax incentives to direct 
the flow of capital. As such, tax policy was one element of interventionist industrial policy 
(Steinmo 2002:842). Specifically, Nordic tax systems provided corporations with incentives 
to lock capital inside the firm. Tax rules supported a logic of ‘retain and reinvest’, since 
capital owners avoided taxation if they left profits in the company instead of collecting 
dividends (Steinmo 1993). 
 
This political-economic logic promoted investments in production that could generate long-
term growth and employment. As such, it also provided stability for all the stakeholders in the 
companies. The main problem with the tax incentives for locking in profits, however, was that 
capital was not put to its most productive use. The allocation of capital was inefficient, since 
profits were reinvested in companies instead of flowing to where they would give the largest 
returns. Additionally, these tax incentives provided corporations with small effective tax 
burdens (Steinmo 1993:42).                     
 
How did experiences with the existing tax system influence tax policy change from the 
1980s? Primarily, the deficiencies associated with Nordic tax systems provide a theoretical 
foundation for the hypothesis of rational updating. Logically, the room for rational policy 
change will increase with the irrationality of existing policy. For instance, “the effective 
capital income tax burden that had developed up to the early 1980s was extremely low so that 
subsequent tax reforms could cut marginal tax rates on mobile types of capital income while 
increasing tax revenue” (Ganghof 2007:1059). 
 
Ganghof forcefully argues that tax systems of the 1970s and 80s suffered from serious 
deficiencies, which laid the ground for rational updating reforms. Reforms were primarily a 
response to these problems. Ganghof’s view is that the “tax reforms of the 1980s and 1990s 
were first and foremost efforts to rationalize the existing approach to differentiated income 
taxation,” which was feasible since “the pathological variants … that had developed up to the 
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late 1970s turned out to undermine efficiency, progressivity and revenue raising alike” 
(Ganghof 2007:1066). One might also add macro-economic stability to this list. 
 
This suggests continuity in the balance of policy goals. Since the existing system was largely 
inefficient in achieving its objectives, reforming it did not confront policy-makers with a clear 
trade-off between efficiency and equity goals. Instead, they could maintain all the core 
ambitions of tax policy. That is, “tax reforms did not fundamentally change the weighting of 
different tax policy goals (efficiency and equity) but tried to better achieve both goals” 
(Ganghof 2007:1066). 
 
However, the problems of the Nordic tax systems of the 70s and 80s can also lead us to expect 
liberalization. Some interpreted the deficient tax systems as proof that government could not 
effectively pursue redistribution or industrial policy through taxation (Steinmo 2003). Sky-
high marginal tax rates became a symbol for the trade-off between efficiency and equality. 
And the interventionist strategy of directing capital flows and locking profits into firms 
produced distortions in the allocation of investments that impeded growth and innovation. 
This provided a rationale for abandoning interventionist and highly redistributive tax policy. 
Thus, the problems of existing tax systems could bring policy-makers to shift the balance of 
tax policy objectives from equity towards efficiency. Leaving the structural problems of 
existing tax systems, we now turn to structural constraints on the international level.    
 
2.3.3 International structural factors: economic globalization 
Theory on the impact of economic globalization represents an important foundation for the 
general hypothesis of liberalization. Economic globalization can be identified as the 
increasing internationalization of the economy. At the heart of this development is the freer 
movement across national borders of mobile factors of production, especially mobile capital. 
According to globalization theory, this process has clear implications for tax policy. (For 
thorough discussions, see for instance Genschel (2002) or Hagen et al. (1998).) 
 
The standard argument is that internationalization increases the exit possibilities for mobile 
factors, thereby strengthening the bargaining position of these factors, most importantly 
mobile capital (Swank and Steinmo 2002). Since mobile capital can move around freely, it 
will – ceteris paribus – flow to the country with the lowest capital tax rate. This engenders tax 
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competition between countries, as governments have incentives to lower taxes to keep (and 
attract) mobile capital. This will set off a race to the bottom in tax rates on capital.  
 
There are thus two clear implications of economic internationalization for tax policy 
(Genschel 2002:247). First, it would make it more difficult for states to raise tax revenue, 
leading to a lower total level of taxation and a weakened capacity to finance the welfare state. 
Second, it would shift the tax burden from mobile to immobile tax bases, i.e. from mobile 
capital to immobile labor, consumption, and real estate. This means more lenient taxation of 
business and capital. It also implies a more regressive tax mix, which will reduce the direct 
redistributive effect of the tax system (Ganghof 2001; Hagen et al. 1998). Globalization 
theory thus predicts that the process of economic internationalization will provide strong 
structural impulses towards a liberalization of tax policy.  
 
There are, however, alternative theories about the impact of internationalization. Generally, 
they emphasize that globalization also creates other pressures that conflict with the race to the 
bottom-logic. Peter Katzenstein’s (1983; 1985) classical argument is that an open economy 
makes citizens more vulnerable to the adverse effects of external economic shocks. This 
increases demands for a social safety net, pushing the government to expand social protection.  
 
Swank and Steinmo (2002:646; Steinmo 2002:840) spell out the implications of this kind of 
argument for tax policy change. They argue that the need to maintain revenue in the context 
of rising needs, constrains the downward pressure on taxation of mobile capital. These 
conflicting pressures induce governments to pursue other policies than effective tax cuts or 
tax shifts from mobile to immobile factor. One solution is cutting statutory tax rates while 
reducing deductions. This makes sense since statutory tax rates on capital are important for 
determining where mobile capital is invested (Ganghof 2006). 
 
Swank and Steinmo (2002:646) predict that while the content of tax policy will change in this 
manner, there will be little room to alter relative tax burdens. That is, the conflicting pressures 
of internationalization produce changes in tax structure but continuity in the distribution of tax 
burdens.  
 
This argument clearly points in the direction of rational updating. Rather than leading to 
liberalization, economic internationalization would induce governments to find more rational 
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ways to raise revenue for social protection in this new economic context. The weighting of 
goals would remain virtually unchanged, as the growing political pressures for equity balance 
out the increasing economic concerns for efficiency. The impulse would rather be to design 
policies that better achieve both goals. 
 
As this discussion shows, the process of economic internationalization can be argued to give 
impulses to either liberalization or rational updating. This conclusion suggests that institutions 
at the national level will be crucial for shaping outcomes. (Although obvious, this point is 
underemphasized in the globalization literature, which tends to privilege structural 
explanations.) The policy response will depend on how these pressures manifest in the 
specific national political-economic context, and on how decision-making institutions 
perceive and process these pressures.  
 
What does the empirical evidence tell us about the impact of globalization on tax policy? One 
conclusion that emerges from this enormous body of literature is that there has been no clear 
“race to the bottom” in taxation of capital (e.g. Genschel 2002; Swank and Steinmo 2002). 
Although rates have gone down, the revenue from capital has not been reduced significantly. 
Genschel argues that the predictions from globalization theory find little support, as OECD 
countries have “neither suffered a dramatic decrease in total tax revenue nor experienced a 
clear shift of the tax burden from mobile to immobile bases” (Genschel 2002:246). In this 
sense, there has been no clear liberalization. 
 
However, some studies do find support for the prediction that internationalization will force 
governments to lower taxes on highly mobile assets. For instance, Bretschger and Hettich 
(2002) find a negative impact from globalization on capital taxes when measuring capital 
taxes by effective tax rates instead of revenue.  
 
Even if internationalization has not reduced the tax burden on mobile capital, scholars seem to 
agree that it has constrained national tax policy. Notably, tax competition has prevented 
governments from increasing taxes in response to growing needs and stronger calls for 
spending (Genschel 2002). There seem to be strong limits on how much revenue can be raised 
from taxes on mobile capital without hurting competitiveness.  
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However, this would depend on the existing tax system. Even if there are clear limitations to 
how much revenue can be raised from mobile capital, old tax systems did not necessarily fully 
exploit this potential. In the Nordic countries, the existing practice of implicit differentiation 
in income taxation implied a rather low tax burden on capital (Ganghof 2005; 2007). Even if 
the Nordic states were forced to cut rates on some types of capital income, they could 
“increase the tax burden on less sensitive types of capital income that had been taxed very 
lightly in the past” (Ganghof 2007:1067).  
 
Therefore, “adjustment to tax competition did not have to lead to revenue losses” (Ganghof 
2007:1067). “[T]he Nordic welfare states, among others, have managed to adapt to increased 
economic internationalization and increase capital income tax revenue” argues Ganghof 
(2005:86, emphasis in original). This point clearly backs up the hypothesis of rationalization 
with regard to the Nordic countries. 
 
2.3.4 Ideational factors: new ideas about tax policy   
So far we have discussed structural factors behind tax policy change. We now turn to 
ideational factors, namely the emergence and development of novel ideas about tax policy. 
How can new economic ideas influence policy? Diffusion is the key concept here, as ideas 
will have little influence if they are only shared by a group of university professors without 
connections to policy-makers. In democratic systems, ideas will often have deep impact on 
policy only if they gain popular acceptance. That means that they have to be transmitted not 
only from experts to politicians, but also from elites to the consciousness of regular people 
(Blyth 2001:237).  
 
What does the existing literature tell us on the subject of the new tax policy ideas that 
emerged internationally? What were their content, and to what extent and how did they gain 
influence?  
 
During the 1980s, ideas about what constituted ‘good’ tax policy shifted markedly. In the 
1960s and 70s policy-makers and experts alike had perceived of tax policy as a tool to achieve 
a large array of goals, and tax policy instruments were used as a solution for virtually any 
problem. The new tax reform doctrine that emerged in the 1980s, however, largely abandoned 
the belief that government could effectively use taxation for redistributive or industrial policy 
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ends (Steinmo 2003:219). In practice, the new reform ideas implied lowering tax rates while 
cutting tax deductions and incentives – so-called ‘rate reduction, base broadening’. 
 
Yet, ideas about policy don’t just appear out of thin air, they are “formed in political, 
economic and institutional contexts” (Steinmo 2003:228). How was this process of idea 
change related to the structural factors discussed in the previous two sections? Steinmo argues 
that new ideas about tax policy emerged mainly because of the negative experiences with 
existing tax systems: “[E]xperiences with poorly designed and implemented tax policies 
helped shape the attitudes and beliefs of politicians, economists and tax officials about what 
reforms were necessary and desirable” (Steinmo 2003:228). Policy ideas were thus first and 
foremost problem solutions.  
 
Moreover, the formation of ideas took place within the structural context of increasing 
international economic mobility. Although this shaped ideas, it did not determine them, 
argues Steinmo. Policy ideas were not just an instrument through which structure affected 
policy; ideas exerted an important independent influence on policy. Globalization rather 
appears to have opened the door for innovative ideas about taxation. The new policy ideas 
that emerged were crucial both for what policy was selected and for how policies spread 
(Steinmo 2003:207).      
 
This shift in tax policy ideas represents another theoretical foundation for the hypothesis of 
liberalization in tax policy. The new tax policy doctrine was conceived under the Reagan 
administration in the USA and first implemented in the 1986 Tax Reform Act. As such, it was 
part of the liberal ideological shift of the 1980s in the western world. Steinmo even suggests 
that “tax policy was the leading edge in this new political tide” (Steinmo 2003:217).   
 
The new ideas about tax policy clearly altered the weighting of policy objectives. There was a 
“marked shift in the concerns of academic tax experts from equity toward efficiency, ” as one 
observer puts it (McLure 1984:266). The goal of vertical equity disappeared from the agenda, 
while concerns about efficiency and growth came to the fore (Steinmo 2003:225).   
 
The ideas embodied in the American tax reform inspired reform of tax systems all across the 
world. Sandford speaks of a tax reform ‘movement’, claiming that “even more remarkable 
than the widespread nature of tax reform, has been the similarity across countries” (Sandford 
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1993:10). These reforms were all based on the principle of ‘rate reduction, base broadening’. 
Moreover, Steinmo (2003:221) argues that the diffusion of the new tax policy ideas led to a 
remarkable convergence in views. Key policy makers in advanced OECD countries – on both 
the right and left side of politics – came to share these ideas about what constituted effective 
tax policy. 
 
Steffen Ganghof (2005), however, challenges the interpretation that tax reforms worldwide 
were based on the diffusion of neo-liberal ideas. What tax reforms of the late 80s and early 
90s had in common, he argues, was a “shift towards less interventionist and simpler income 
taxation” (Ganghof 2005:79, emphasis in original). But within this broad wave, countries 
based their reforms on different principles for tax system design. “[T]here were in effect two 
different models or blueprints for how to make income taxation market-conforming: CIT 
[comprehensive income tax] and DIT [dual income tax]” (Ganghof 2005:79).  
 
The idea behind the comprehensive income tax (CIT) is to tax all forms of income jointly and 
according to the same rate schedule. The dual income tax (DIT) model, on the other hand, is 
based on the principle of systematic differentiation between the taxation of capital and labor. 
While capital income is taxed at a relatively low, flat rate, taxation of labor income is 
progressive with a higher top marginal rate (Ganghof 2005; Sørensen 1998). 
 
Although both models strongly emphasize market-conforming capital income taxation, they 
differ in the extent to which they imply liberalization. “[T]he CIT-blueprint fits better into 
‘neoliberal economic orthodoxy’ than the DIT-blueprint”, argues Ganghof (2005:79). The 
CIT model was most closely approximated in the liberal market economies, like the USA, 
New Zealand, and Great Britain.  
 
In the Nordic countries, however, experts and policy-makers developed the dual income tax 
model as an alternative blueprint for income tax reform (Ganghof 2005:80). The model was 
conceived in Denmark early in the 1980s, at the same time as similar ideas were discussed in 
Norway (cf. NOU 1984). In practice, Norway was the country that implemented the DIT 
model most consistently (Sørensen 1998:5), while reforms based on the DIT ideal were also 
implemented in Sweden and Finland. We should be careful not to overstate the Nordic 
exceptionality, though, as Nordic tax reforms followed principles similar to those that 
underlay reforms elsewhere in the OECD: reducing tax rates and broadening tax bases. But 
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abandoning the principle of comprehensiveness for that of duality certainly represented a 
“special novel feature” (Sørensen 1998:1). 
 
Why would the dual income tax model be less neo-liberal? Basically, the DIT model responds 
to efficiency concerns at the same time as it potentially strengthens the capacity to raise 
revenue and still allows for some redistribution. That is, the DIT model does not preclude the 
continued pursuit of these goals.  
 
First, taxing all types of capital at the same rate leads to efficiency in the allocation of 
investments. Second, although the direct effect of lowering nominal rates is revenue loss, a 
low, flat tax rate on capital makes it possible to increase revenue in other ways. For one, it is 
easier for policy-makers to include more types of capital income in the tax base, thus 
broadening the income base from which revenue can be extracted. For another, it reduces the 
tax rate against which interest expenses can be deducted, thereby limiting the loss of revenue 
(Ganghof 2005:81). Third, the differentiation between taxation of labor and capital income 
allows policy-makers both to raise larger revenues from wage earners and to maintain a 
progressive tax on labor, which represents an important element of redistribution. 
 
This means that reforms based on DIT ideals do not necessarily imply a shift in the balance of 
objectives. Rather, within the broad reform movement, the DIT model can be regarded as a 
foundation for the pursuit of established goals through new policies. This supports the 
hypothesis of rational updating. There is no clear shift from equity to efficiency concerns, as 
the principles behind DIT reform allow for continued attention to revenue-raising and 
redistribution.  
 
To sum up, the emergence of new tax policy ideas is the second process believed to have 
influenced tax policy change in advanced OECD countries. Many observers identify these 
ideas with neo-liberal ideology and regard their diffusion as the basis for liberalization of tax 
systems. However, the DIT model developed in the Nordic countries appears considerably 
less liberal and more consistent with rational updating. In the empirical investigation, the 
crucial issues will thus be exactly which ideas inspired tax reform, and to what extent these 
ideas were put into practice. 
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2.4 Political institutions 
2.4.1 The influence of political institutions on politics and policy 
The discussions of structural and ideational sources of tax policy change in the previous 
section show that liberalization and rational updating are both plausible hypotheses about the 
outcome of the 1992 Norwegian tax reform. Yet, whether these sources give rise to a liberal 
or a rational policy change will depend on political institutions. The institutional setting 
shapes both the perceptions of structural problems and constraints, the development and 
transmission of ideas, and the political processes of policy change. The topic of this section is 
how Norwegian political institutions influence processes and outcomes of policy change. 
 
To start with the fundamentals: What are political institutions, and how do they shape policy? 
I understand political institutions simply as a state’s legislative, executive and administrative 
bodies, and their regular practices. For instance, this definition encompasses work in the 
ministries, public commissions and regularized consultations with interest groups. The basic 
tenet of the institutionalist tradition is that political institutions shape policy by structuring 
politics. Different political institutions lead to different politics, which produce cross-national 
variation in policies. There is, however, less agreement on how and to what extent this 
happens.  
 
The present study leans on Sven Steinmo’s wide notion of how institutions structure politics. 
He argues that political institutions (1) define which actors dominate the policy-making 
process, (2) shape the strategies of these actors, and (3) influence their policy preferences 
(Steinmo 1993; 2002). Thus, the perspective of this study is that political institutions shape 
the dynamics and outcomes of policy change by structuring the participation, strategies and 
preferences of political actors. 
 
The Norwegian tax reform of 1992 was a case of large-scale policy change. Hence, this 
section continues with a general discussion of what kind of institutional settings are conducive 
to fundamental change. I then discuss specifically whether the Norwegian institutional setting 
is favorable to authoritative policy change. I argue that the consensual character of the 
Norwegian political system may be conducive to large-scale, updating policy change. I then 
sketch the main features of the Norwegian model of consensual policy-making. The final 
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section of this chapter (2.5) looks at the role of political actors operating within this 
institutional context.    
 
2.4.2 Political institutions and large-scale policy change 
To what extent do political institutions allow for authoritative policy change? And what kind 
of institutional settings favor such change? The institutionalist literature on change in 
advanced political economies has tended to emphasize the difficulty of authoritative policy 
change due to the high barriers to change represented by political institutions and actors. This 
conclusion is partly based on features of all political institutions, and partly on features of 
specific political institutional settings.  
 
In his famous article about path dependence and increasing returns, Paul Pierson (2000) 
presents a general argument about how the dynamics of politics make fundamental policy 
shifts difficult. His point is that increasing returns processes prevalent in politics generate 
growing barriers to fundamental policy shifts, which privileges incremental, path dependent 
change. Therefore, authoritative policy change is generally difficult in politics.  
 
Nonetheless, the difficulty of authoritative policy change is believed to vary between different 
political systems. Some institutional settings have a stronger status quo bias than others. 
Tsebelis’ (1995) ‘veto player’ framework is often used to model this variation. This theory 
says that the barriers to reform grow with the number of actors or bodies that can veto change, 
with the ideological distance between the actors, and with their degree of internal cohesion.  
 
Systems with many veto players or veto points will thus present high barriers to authoritative 
policy change. For instance, Hacker (2005) finds that the multiple veto points of American 
political institutions make fundamental, policy-updating reforms very difficult, and also gives 
actors incentives to pursue strategies that further heighten the barriers to change.  
 
Conversely, institutional settings with few veto points/players will be more conducive to 
large-scale policy change. In such settings, governments have greater opportunity to 
implement authoritative policy change on their own. Typically, the majoritarian political 
systems characterized by majority voting and few institutional checks represent this kind of 
institutional setting. Prominent examples are the UK, Australia and New Zealand. In these 
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systems, it is easier for the government to implement large-scale reform, since it usually 
controls an absolute majority in parliament. 
 
Yet, the veto player framework only provides part of the answer to when large-scale policy 
change is possible. As suggested in section 2.2.4, fundamental policy change is not 
necessarily the result of strong governments exerting unchecked power. It can also be the 
product of broad-based political compromise. That is, institutional settings characterized by a 
consensual style of policy-making may also be conducive to large-scale reform. The Nordic 
political systems represent this kind of institutional setting. 
 
Consensual systems do not really conform to the logic of the veto player framework. As 
political parties within these systems usually work together rather than against each other, the 
notion of ‘veto’ seems misleading analytically. Often, policy compromises include more 
parties than what is necessary for a legislative majority, so that determining which of the 
parties that have ‘veto’ power is difficult (and perhaps not very fruitful). This does not mean 
that change will automatically be easier in consensual systems. It simply suggests that we 
need other tools to analyze under which circumstances these systems are conducive to change. 
 
Putting more emphasis on institutional culture may give us greater analytical leverage on the 
consensual systems. The simple cultural argument is that in consensual settings, parties are 
more inclined to work together, which ceteris paribus makes it easier to agree on fundamental 
reforms. The government will invite the opposition to participate in policy-formulation, and 
the opposition will seek to influence the government’s reform proposals reform than to block 
them. 
 
2.4.3 Do Norwegian political institutions favor large-scale reform?  
Corresponding to the general discussion, there are two perspectives on whether Norwegian 
political institutions favor large-scale reform. The first view is that authoritative policy change 
is difficult in Norway because of the large number of veto players. Since the mid-70s, 
minority coalition governments and multiple parties represented in parliament have been 
typical features of the Norwegian political system. The argument is that this fragmentation of 
power has made it difficult for Norwegian governments to pursue fundamental reform (e.g. 
Christensen and Lægreid 2007:9). “Such conditions create problems with executive 
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governance; that is, with the central capacity to decide on and implement policies,” as 
Christensen (2003:169) argues. 
 
However, the present study rests on an alternative view. This view emphasizes that the 
consensual style of policy-making in Norwegian political institutions makes authoritative 
policy change possible. Or at least, consensual politics makes large-scale reform feasible 
under certain conditions.  
 
Tranøy (2000), drawing on Katzenstein (1983; 1985), argues that in times of crisis the 
consensus-oriented Norwegian system can be expected to produce fundamental updating 
reform. This contention is pertinent to this study, as the Norwegian economy was in crisis 
from the mid-1980s until the early 1990s, with first an uncontrolled credit expansion and then 
a strong economic downturn (see section 2.3.2).  
 
Tranøy argues that in the absence of crisis, the compromise culture will impede large-scale 
change. But in the presence of crisis, “the real strength of this culture and institutional set up 
as a system for producing tough decisions can be expected to come through … [I]n such 
circumstances elites can be expected to cut through what in good times appeared to be 
irreconcilable differences, redefine interests through learning and find new common ground” 
(Tranøy 2000:87).  
 
This argument not only posits a relationship between consensual political institutions and 
large-scale reform. It also suggests a link between consensus-based large-scale reform and 
outcomes of rational updating. That is, authoritative policy change that is founded on broad 
consensus – rather than on a strong government acting alone – may be more conducive to 
continuity in outcomes. In times of crisis, political actors in the Norwegian system come 
together to improve policy through fundamental but balanced policy revisions. This suggests  
rational updating rather than liberalization. Hence, the Norwegian institutional setting may 
constitute an important element in the explanation of the process of change and the substantial 
outcomes of the 1992 tax reform.  
 
In the next sub-sections, I discuss consensual policy-making in Norwegian political 
institutions. I first look at the link between politics and policy in the Nordic model of 
decision-making. Second, I discuss the three dimensions of consensus and the corresponding 
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implications for policy output. Third, I sketch the structural features and mechanisms that 
generate consensus in the Nordic systems.  
 
2.4.4 A Nordic model of decision-making 
In the literature, the workings of Norwegian political institutions are regarded as very similar 
to those of the other Nordic countries. Many scholars have argued that there is a distinct 
Nordic model of decision-making (e.g. Elder et al. 1982; Arter 1999; Hilson 2008). Not only 
do political institutions in the Nordic countries work in similar ways, they also diverge 
significantly from the political dynamics of other advanced democracies. For this reason, the 
following theoretical discussion concerns the Nordic model of government. Where the 
Norwegian political system differs from the others, this is pointed out.  
  
An attempt at summarizing this model would be that Nordic political institutions produce 
consensual politics capable of generating rational and stable policies. This definition touches 
both the character of politics, policy, and the link between the two. 
 
First, politics in the Nordic countries are predominantly consensual rather than adversarial 
(Elder et al. 1982). As opposed to conflictual systems like the British, Nordic politics are 
more about cooperation than confrontation. With reference to Steinmo’s conceptualization, 
Nordic political institutions allow a multitude of actors to take part in policy-formulation, 
provide incentives for cooperative strategies and generate convergence in preferences.  
 
Second, these consensual politics are connected to a relatively strong ability to produce public 
policy. That is, Nordic political institutions are more workshops than talk shops. The capacity 
to produce policy sets the Nordic political systems apart from the consensual but immobiliste 
systems of many consociational democracies (Arter 1999:147). 
 
Third, Nordic decision-making institutions arguably produce policies that are generally 
rational and robust. That is, decisions are both well founded – in the sense that they are based 
on expert knowledge – and stable, seldom being reversed by subsequent government of 
different political color. In this respect, the Nordic systems differ markedly from for instance 
the British political system, where policy tends to be less expert-based, and where a change of 
government often implies considerable policy shifts (e.g. Steinmo 1993). 
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These brief points place the Nordic decision-making model in a comparative perspective and 
suggest that Nordic political institutions may be expected to transform interests and 
preferences into policies in a specific way. However, exploring the specific mechanisms at 
work within these institutions is crucial for understanding how they might shape processes 
and outcomes of change.  
 
The concept of ‘consensual policy-making’ will necessarily be at the centre of a discussion of 
the concrete workings of the Nordic decision-making model. ‘Consensus’ implies that 
decisions rest on agreement among all the major parties to them. I will first explore the three 
dimensions of consensus in Nordic political institutions (sub-section 2.4.5), and then go on to 
show how ‘consensus’ has both a static and a dynamic component (sub-section 2.4.6). 
 
2.4.5 Three dimensions of consensus 
In Nordic decision-making, one can speak of consensus along three dimensions: (1) among 
political parties, (2) between politicians and experts, and (3) between government and 
organized interests. These three axes of consensus are important for several reasons. In terms 
of politics, they suggest both who the dominant actors in policy-making are (a multitude) and 
what kind of political strategies they employ (cooperative). But the three dimensions of 
consensus also give us a clue about the character of policy output.  
 
First, consensus along the purely political dimension implies that the political parties in the 
Nordic countries to a large extent are willing to work together to find compromises on 
important policy issues (Arter 1999: chap. 9). The result in terms of policy is often 
compromises that to some degree reflect the preferences of all parties behind them. A crucial 
point is that this consensus not only applies to a specific moment, but to politics over time. 
For instance, governments of different political color alternating in power may together carry 
out a coherent sequence of policy changes. More generally, the implication is that 
compromises tend to stick and that policy will exhibit greater stability. 
 
Second, the relationship between politicians and experts is marked by cooperation and mutual 
respect. Expert knowledge is generally regarded as a necessary foundation for efficient policy 
solutions to political problems. Observers have thus applied labels such as ‘technocracy’ and 
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‘social engineering’ to the Nordic systems (Lane 1992; Slagstad 1998). Most importantly, 
civil servants play a large role in the policy formulation process (e.g. Olsen 1980). But also 
experts on public commissions may have considerable influence on policy. Taken together, 
this suggests that policy emanating from Nordic decision-making institutions will be highly 
rational. With reference to the previous point, expert recommendations often constitute the 
basis for political compromise. The involvement of the bureaucracy also strengthens the 
stability of policy, since policy solutions will be firmly anchored in the bureaucracy. 
 
Third, government works closely with interest groups in the formulation of policy (Olsen 
1983; Nordby 1994). This practice is often described as corporatism. Most importantly, 
economic policy-making usually involves intense consultation with the central trade union 
and employer federations. There are especially strong ties between social democratic parties 
and trade unions on the one hand (Arter 1999:147), and conservative parties and employers on 
the other. These organizations are exceptionally strong in the Nordic countries and represent 
political players that cannot be ignored (Pierson 2001). Large changes in economic policy 
rarely pass without the consent of the industrial partners. Policy arrived at through 
consultation typically enjoys strong legitimacy among interest groups, which increases its 
robustness. The other side of the coin is the possibility of policy that caters to special 
interests.  
 
2.4.6 Structural features and mechanisms for consensus-generation 
Is consensus a structural feature underlying politics in the Nordic countries, or is it generated 
through political institutions? Nordic consensual policy-making appears to be a combination 
of the two. While the structural conditions clearly favor consensual politics, the ability to 
reach compromise is greatly enhanced by mechanisms operative in the political system. 
     
Structurally, the Nordic countries are small with homogenous populations that historically 
have enjoyed strong equality in economic and social terms. This has a couple of important 
implications. First, there is – in comparative perspective – little variation in values and 
attitudes, what Lijphart (1969) labels a “homogenous political culture”. Norms and values are 
widely shared, something that is reflected in the political system (Christensen and Peters 
1999). There is much common ground upon which political solutions can be founded. The 
political distance between the main parties is generally small – in certain areas minuscule. In 
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other words, there is relative initial consensus, which lays the ground for the politics of 
compromise and thus also policy compromises.  
 
A related point is that these structural conditions have contributed to high trust and social 
cohesion in the Nordic countries, including strong trust in political institutions. This appears 
to support compromise decisions, since the electorate is more confident that losses in one area 
will be compensated by gains in another.   
 
Second, the small size of the Nordic countries has given rise to strong personal relations 
within political elites. This personalisation appears to facilitate political cooperation. As Arter 
points out, “the christian-name relations between decision-makers has enhanced the tendency 
to ‘win some, lose some’ compromises” (Arter 1999:149). 
 
However, this is only part of the story. It is difficult to separate these structural preconditions 
cleanly from institutions, since the features they give rise to are constituted within political 
institutions and thus shaped by them. For instance, the idea of an initial consensus only makes 
sense within some kind of political-institutional context. This again suggests the importance 
of Nordic political institutions in general, and of the mechanisms for consensus-generation at 
work within these institutions in particular. We now turn to these specific mechanisms. 
 
The procedures for preparing public policy in the Nordic countries are generally very 
elaborate and deliberative (Arter 1999). On the way from registration of political problems to 
the implementation of policy, there are (at least) four major mechanisms at work that tend to 
generate consensus along one or more dimensions. 
 
The practice of appointing public commissions of enquiry to investigate major policy issues is 
usually the first step towards policy reform, and represents an important mechanism for 
consensus-generation (e.g. Elder et al. 1982). Commissions are either composed exclusively 
of experts – both bureaucratic and external – or incorporate politicians and representatives 
from interest groups as well. Commission work usually has a strong rational bias, as the 
appropriate basis for conclusions is ‘objective’ knowledge and arguments about what is best 
for society as a whole. The commission produces a joint report, usually with common policy 
recommendations, which lays the ground for the subsequent process towards policy change.  
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Public commissions potentially generate consensus by influencing both the strategies and the 
preferences of actors – along all three dimensions. For one, commission reports can produce 
convergence in political preferences, as initially diverging (or unspecified) views are revised 
(or formed) in the face of new arguments. This also concerns the politician-expert dimension, 
as expert knowledge is applied to concrete political problems and politicians are exposed to 
expert arguments.  
 
For another, the work of the public commissions can make it easier for political actors to 
pursue cooperative political strategies. Commission reports often serve as a neutral and 
rational point of reference for political compromise. Information about the positions of other 
players and a clear idea about a compromise outcome lower the costs of committing to 
cooperation for reform. 
 
The second mechanism for consensus-generation is policy work in the bureaucracy. Major 
policy proposals are usually based on intensive work in the ministries over a long period of 
time. During these processes, the political leadership and the bureaucrats work closely 
together. This interaction generates shared understandings of problems and solutions between 
politicians and experts in the public service. More specifically, the preferences of the 
incumbent party tend to shift in a rationalistic direction, as the political leadership in the 
ministries is exposed to expert arguments. Additionally, intense bureaucratic scrutiny seems 
to enhance the prospects for cooperative political strategies in the same way as commission 
reports. When a proposition is well researched, the opposition’s uncertainty about outcomes 
decreases, making it easier to engage in political cooperation. 
 
The third mechanism is the formal and informal consultation with interest groups as part of 
the policy process (Olsen 1983; Nordby 1994). Formally, a wide array of organized interests 
are integrated in policy-formulation through the remiss procedure. Informal consultations with 
the peak trade union and employer federations, however, are usually more politically 
consequential. This institutionalized practice influences the strategies of interest groups, 
giving them incentives to pursue a line of compromise inside the system rather than one of 
confrontation outside the system. Thereby, it strengthens consensus between government and 
interest groups.  
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Fourth and finally, parliamentary committees represent a strong mechanism for generating 
compromise between political parties (Arter 1999: chap. 9). In Norway, the real work in 
parliament takes place in the committees. Here, government proposals are subject to intense 
discussion and bargaining behind closed doors. The committee then delivers its opinion, 
which in many cases is unanimous, and in nearly all cases is passed by parliament without 
amendments. Parliamentary committees are thus bodies with both great discretion and an 
atmosphere for speaking freely and brokering deals. This induces political parties to pursue 
strategies of compromise, as the benefits from striking political deals increase, while the costs 
of abandoning earlier positions decrease. 
 
To sum up, Nordic political institutions shape policies by structuring politics. First, they allow 
a multitude of actors to participate in the formulation of policy. In addition to the party in 
government, bureaucratic experts have a strong role, and also opposition parties and interest 
groups potentially have considerable influence. Second, Nordic political institutions appear to 
induce actors to pursue strategies of cooperation. A number of mechanisms lower the costs of 
engaging in collective action to reach compromise. Third, institutional practices influence the 
policy preferences of actors, potentially generating convergence towards solutions based on 
expert knowledge and rational reasoning. Altogether, the institutional setting appears to favor 
stable, rationally founded policy compromises. 
 
2.5 Political actors: Labor and Conservatives 
2.5.1 Institutions and actors 
To think that political institutions alone could explain processes and outcomes of policy 
change, however, would be an illusion. Institutions and the organizations/actors that operate 
within them are in permanent interaction, shaping both each other and the policy output 
(North 1990). Even if institutions influence the preferences and strategies of actors, it is after 
all actors that think and act. Actors desire policy change or stability, decide whether to work 
with or against each other, and support or reject reform proposals. To account for the 
development of tax policy, therefore, we need a notion of the specific actors working within 
this institutional setting. That is, in the field of tax policy, what strategies could we expect the 
important actors within Nordic political institutions to pursue? 
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I focus on two specific actors: Labor and Conservative parties. The reason is that these two 
can be expected to be the crucial actors in economic policy-making in Norway from the 1980s 
onwards. The social democratic Labor party dominated Norwegian politics from the end of 
the war, while the blue wave of the 1980s brought the Conservative party to power. The 
question is then: Could we expect the Norwegian Labor party and Conservative party, 
respectively, to work for tax policy change in the 1980s and 90s? And if so: for what kind of 
change? 
 
In the literature on institutional change in advanced political economies, the structure of the 
political struggle within institutions typically accounts for change (or the lack thereof). This is 
usually a battle between the defenders and the opponents of the welfare state or the old 
political-economic regime. For instance, a coalition of the welfare state’s defenders block 
dismantling reform (Pierson 2001), or opponents of the welfare state let services decay by 
blocking recalibration reform (Hacker 2005). 
 
When it comes to Norwegian tax policy in the 1980s and 90s, however, identifying defenders 
and opponents is not straightforward. Labor and Conservatives alike would have had reasons 
for both defending and opposing the existing tax regime. Neither were their preferences clear-
cut, nor was the choice of strategy for pursuing them obvious. On the basis of these 
ambiguities, we can sketch out the alternative strategies for each of the parties. 
 
2.5.2 The Labor party 
The old tax policy regime can be considered as an integral part of the broader social 
democratic post-war economic model. There were high ambitions for both redistribution and 
industrial policy through taxation. Rates were strongly progressive, while tax incentives 
allowed politicians to direct capital to sectors or businesses considered important. Among 
Social Democrats, these ideas still had considerable support in the 1980s.   
 
On the other hand, the existing literature suggests that the old tax system was largely 
ineffective in achieving its objectives, both of equity, efficiency and revenue (Ganghof 2007). 
This likely worried many social democrats, especially since it threatened the welfare state, the 
very heart of the social democratic model. Not only did a malfunctioning tax system weaken 
the financial basis of the welfare state, it could also threaten its legitimacy. 
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The choice for Labor was therefore whether to scrap the tax policy component of the 
traditional social democratic model – including the great ambitions for redistributive taxation 
and active industrial policy – for the prospect of a better functioning but more market-based 
system. And more crucially: to what extent and in what manner should they conform tax 
policy to the economic logic of free markets? 
 
In his study of Swedish tax policy development, Steinmo discusses the strategy of the Social 
Democrats in this situation. Within the party and the labor movement more broadly, there 
were considerable divisions on the subject of tax reform. The Social Democratic Finance 
Minister, however, was a strong proponent of taking a more market-oriented course. In the 
end, this view prevailed. The Social Democrats struck a deal with the Liberal party, securing 
support for a tax policy reform that represented a clear turn in a more market-oriented 
direction (Steinmo 1993:185-191).  
 
Although Steinmo finds a case of strong social democratic reformism, his account also 
suggests that this course was not inevitable. Generally, Nordic social democratic parties 
appear to have faced situations of real choice. They could work more or less actively for 
reform, and they could pursue more or less market-oriented reform agendas.  
 
2.5.3 The Conservative party 
Likewise, we can reasonably expect that the Conservative party was ambivalent with regard 
to the existing tax system, albeit for different reasons. Conservatives were generally opposed 
to the high total level of taxation and high marginal tax rates on individuals.  
 
On the other hand, the existing literature suggests that some of the Conservatives’ core 
constituencies profited from the extant tax system. Because of all the tax incentives and 
deductions, certain sectors and businesses in practice paid little or no taxes. And liberal 
interest deduction rules favored those with high incomes and the ability to take up large loans 
(Ganghof 2007). Moreover, Conservatives profited politically from a tax system that worked 
badly. The greater the pathologies of the tax system, the more people identified with the 
conservative opposition to taxation.  
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This leads to an interesting discussion concerning the strategies of Conservative parties: First, 
a reasonable assumption is that Conservatives would work whole-heartedly for a purely 
liberal reform. But given the choice between some kind of reform and no reform, what would 
they choose? The preceding discussion suggests that the answer is not obvious.  
 
The crucial decision for Conservative parties thus appears to have been whether to work for 
reform or block reform. Hacker (2005) provides a thorough discussion of these alternative 
Conservative strategies in his study of US welfare state retrenchment. His point is that for 
Conservatives with the political goal of liberalization, working against updating reforms can 
be a more effective strategy than actively pursuing liberal reform.  
 
This point seems relevant for the politics of Norwegian tax policy in the 1980s as well. Not 
only was blocking tax reform potentially politically advantageous for the Conservatives. It 
could also have represented an effective assault on the welfare state. Without tax reform, both 
the financial basis and the legitimacy of the welfare state could wither away. However, 
whether the opposition to the welfare state was sufficiently strong among Norwegian 
Conservatives is questionable.  
 
Also, Hacker (2005:75) points out that a blocking strategy is especially effective when the 
barriers to institutional change are high. In Norway, Conservative parties were not strong 
enough to block reform by themselves, implying that Labor and centrist parties could have 
passed reform without Conservative support. For Conservatives, working against reform thus 
implied the risk of ending up with a reform they had had no influence over. The question 
remains, however, how actively and on what terms Norwegian Conservatives would 
participate in the tax reform process. As this marks the end of our discussion of theoretical 
issues, we now to the research design and methodology of the study. 
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Chapter 3: Research design and methodology 
3.1 A case study of the 1992 Norwegian tax reform 
How do I investigate the research questions? This chapter discusses the research design and 
the methodology I use to study the Norwegian tax reform of 1992. The present study is 
designed as a case study and takes a mechanism-based approach to explanation. It relies 
mainly on the methodology of process tracing, based on data from qualitative interviews and 
public documents. It must be noted that this methodological discussion concerns the 
explanatory part of the research question. To answer the descriptive part - what was the 
outcome of the 1992 reform? - I mainly rely on existing statistical studies. This method is 
commented under section 3.5.  
    
In this chapter, I outline my approach and discuss both the reasons for choosing it and the 
problems and weaknesses related to it. First, I present the double ambition of this case study 
(section 3.2). Then, I sketch the mechanism-based approach, and discuss it in terms of internal 
and external validity (section 3.3). In section 3.4, I outline the main features of the 
methodology of process tracing. Finally, in section 3.5, I discuss the specific methods and 
sources of data used, with particular attention to the qualitative interviews. 
 
3.2 The double ambition of the case study 
This piece of research on tax policy change in Norway is designed as a case study. It is “an 
intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) 
units” (Gerring 2004:342). At the core of this notion of case studies is their double function. 
Case studies are at the same time studies of something particular and something general. “The 
case study research design constructs cases from a single unit while remaining attentive to 
inferences that span similar units outside the formal scope of investigation”, as Gerring 
(2004:353) puts it. 
 
Thus, case studies aim both to develop specific propositions about the unit in question and to 
draw general inferences from these findings to a larger set of units. In other words, case 
studies have the double ambition of explanation of a specific case and generalization to a 
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class of cases (Gerring 2007:76). These two endeavours are closely related, as findings about 
the particular case constitute the empirical basis for making general inferences.      
 
This double ambition is fundamental in the present study. For one, this is a study of a 
particular unit in itself, that is, of tax policy change in Norway since the 1980s. The goal is to 
determine the outcome of tax policy changes and to explain what brought about large-scale 
tax policy reform. This includes the investigation of the specific interactions between 
variables. At the same time, this is a case study of a broader class of units. The aim is to 
generalize findings from this case across a larger set of cases.   
 
But what exactly is the Norwegian tax reform of 1992 a case of? As Ragin (1992) and others 
point out, this is a theoretical question. Since my three research questions refer to partly 
different bodies of theoretical literature, they give rise to different specifications of the 
theoretical universe. “[D]ifferent propositions within the same work commonly apply to 
different populations”, notes Gerring (2004:345). Also, arguments may have both a manifest 
and a potential scope (Gerring 2007:83). That is, a proposition may be clearly relevant for a 
limited set of cases, but also potentially applicable to a broader category. To handle this 
complexity, a differentiated definition of the theoretical universe is necessary. 
 
First, the Norwegian tax reform is a case of modern tax policy change, in particular in the 
Nordic countries, when it comes to understanding and explaining policy change (questions 1 
and 3). Second, it is a case of a broader theoretical category, namely policy regime change in 
advanced political economies, when the link between processes and outcomes of change is at 
issue (question 2). This is also the potential scope for arguments about the interaction between 
structural, ideational and institutional factors behind policy change (question 3). Third, the 
Norwegian tax reform provides a case of how Nordic political institutions affect policy 
change (question 3). 
 
3.3 A mechanism-based approach  
3.3.1 The search for social mechanisms 
How do I attempt to realize the double ambition of causal explanation (internal validity) and 
generalization (external validity) through the study of a single unit? I employ the approach of 
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causal reconstruction, or what some would call a mechanism-based approach. This approach 
“does not look for statistical relationships among variables but … seeks to explain a given 
social phenomenon … by identifying the processes through which it is generated” (Mayntz 
2004:238).  
 
My study is therefore devoted to the search for mechanisms, that is, “recurrent processes 
linking specified initial conditions and a specific outcome” (Mayntz 2004:241). The goal is to 
uncover both mechanisms that bring about large-scale policy change – institutional 
mechanisms in particular – and mechanisms that connect large-scale reform to substantive 
outcomes. This approach is closely tied to the method of process-tracing, which I will discuss 
in section 3.3. In this section, I start at the fundamental level, by presenting the ontological 
assumptions of this approach. I then discuss the approach in terms of causal explanation, 
before I turn to the question of generalization.  
 
3.3.2 Ontological assumptions 
Ontology is a set of assumptions about how the world works (independent of our perceptions). 
Ontological assumptions are fundamental in research, as “[w]hat one finds is contingent upon 
what one looks for, and what one looks for is contingent upon what one expects to find” 
(Gerring 2004:351). Ontologically, case studies occupy a middle ground between the extreme 
nomothetic and ideographic positions (Gerring 2004:352). Case study research is based on the 
assumption that units are neither entirely comparable nor non-comparable. If units were all 
the same, studying one case in particular would not make sense. If units had nothing in 
common, the concept of a ‘case’ loses its meaning. 
 
The approach of causal reconstruction is thus founded on the assumption that (some) 
sequences of real events have similar properties. These are referred to as causal mechanisms, 
which can be defined as “sequences of causally linked events that occur repeatedly in reality 
if certain conditions are given” (Mayntz 2004:241). In other words, mechanisms constitute the 
causal chain – the intermediate steps – between an initial cause X and an outcome Y. 
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3.3.3 Causal explanation 
How fruitful is the mechanism-based approach for causal explanation? Causal reconstruction 
constitutes an approach to causal explanation that differs markedly from correlational analysis 
in quantitative research. While correlational analysis seeks to establish the causal effect from 
variable X on variable Y, the goal of causal reconstruction is to find the causal mechanisms 
that connect X and Y. Whereas the former approach estimates the statistical relationship 
between variables, the aim of the latter is to find out why such a relationship exists. In other 
words, causal reconstruction means spelling out the causal chain that connects initial 
conditions to outcomes (Mayntz 2004:254). 
 
As a consequence, case studies based on causal reconstruction give us greater causal insight 
into mechanisms than effects (Gerring 2004:348). Case studies are usually unfit to determine 
the strength and probability of the effect of X on Y. They can, however, tell us a great deal 
about the causal chain through which this effect works. The basic argument is that detailed 
investigation of processes can bring the researcher so close to the empirical world that the 
distinct causal links leading to an outcome are rendered visible. Case studies – if well 
constructed – allow the researcher to “peer into the box of causality,” as Gerring (2004:348) 
puts it. In particular, close-up investigation often gives researchers the opportunity to examine 
the motivations of the actors involved. This insight into the intentions of actors is crucial for 
establishing causality. 
 
Moreover, George and Bennett (2005:22) argue that this approach is favorable for 
investigating complex causality. They contend that causal reconstruction is necessary to 
uncover complex interactions and allows for the modelling of such complex causal relations. 
Since the present study seeks to explore the interactions between structural, ideational and 
institutional factors, this represents an important reason for employing the mechanism-based 
approach. 
 
Yet, does the inability to ascertain causal effects make the approach of causal reconstruction 
inferior to correlational analysis in terms of internal validity? King, Keohane and Verba 
(1994), for instance, suggest that causal mechanisms are somehow less important to causal 
explanation than causal effects. George and Bennett (2005), Gerring (2004) and Mayntz 
(2004), however, all argue that the two elements are equally important, and complementary.  
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On the one hand, the search for mechanisms is usually based on an observed or suspected 
regularity or correlation (Mayntz 2004:253). Logically, the “what” question investigated 
through correlational analysis is prior to the “how” question studied through causal 
reconstruction. On the other hand, finding plausible mechanisms that connect X to Y is a 
necessary condition for moving from covariation to causation (Gerring 2004:348). As large-N 
statistical analysis offers “inherently limited representations of causal processes” (Mayntz 
2004:238), causal reconstruction is crucial to fill inn the large explanatory gaps. 
 
3.3.4 Generalization 
The second important question concerns the external validity of the mechanism-based 
approach. To what extent can we generalize the findings from a case study based on causal 
reconstruction? Traditionally, the view that one cannot draw general inferences from case 
studies has been common. The argument is that a single case does not tell us anything general 
about a larger class of units, since it is not representative of this class (e.g. Geddes 2003:134). 
Due to the problem of representativeness, case study research is relatively weaker in terms of 
external than internal validity (Gerring 2007:43). 
 
However, it would be wrong to conclude that case studies are worthless for generating general 
insights. Case study research relies on a different type of generalization, often labelled 
‘analytical generalization’ (Yin 2003:10). Although a single case can never be statistically 
representative of a larger population, it can be analytically representative. That is, the 
observed unit can be regarded as typical of a larger class of units (Walton 1992:125). 
Provided that the unit is indeed typical, findings from this one case will be relevant for the 
larger class of cases.  
 
Analytical generalization is therefore based on theoretical arguments about the similarities 
between cases. The validity of general inferences drawn from a case depends on our ability to 
define how the unit of observation fits into a theoretical universe. Importantly, this kind of 
generalization involves processes, not correlations (Mayntz 2004:238). The goal is to find 
general mechanisms, not general covariations. A case is analytically representative when we 
can expect the causal processes in this case to be similar to those that characterize a broader 
class of cases. When this is the case, our observations regarding the causal mechanisms in this 
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unit can increase our general understanding of this kind of causal processes (Walton 
1992:134-135).            
 
An important objection is that this kind of generalization does not allow for the falsification of 
theory. As single cases are not statistically representative, rigorous testing of theory is 
impossible. On the basis that confirmation or disconfirmation of theory is integral to the 
research enterprise, some would question the contribution of case studies do the progress of 
general theory. However, although case studies are generally unfit to confirm or disconfirm 
theory, they contribute to theory development in a broader sense (George and Bennett 2005).  
The mechanism-based approach implies detailed exploration of theoretical relationships, 
which may allow us to refine, elaborate or specify theory. 
 
In relation to this, it is important to note that the goal of case studies is usually to develop 
limited rather than broad generalizations. Arguments often apply to a specific region or a 
specific type of systems. As George and Bennett (2005:31) point out, “case study researchers 
generally sacrifice the parsimony and broad applicability of their theories to develop 
cumulatively contingent generalizations that apply to well-defined types or subtypes of cases 
with a high degree of explanatory richness”. This applies also to the present study, as the 
manifest scope of its arguments is a limited number of units. Yet, this does not exclude that 
findings can potentially contribute to a broader theoretical debate as well.  
 
3.4 A methodology of process tracing 
This study employs the method of process tracing (George and Bennett 2005; Gerring 2007) 
to investigate the research question. Process tracing involves the minute tracing of every link 
in the chain of events that led to a specific outcome. This is in line with a mechanism-based 
approach, as close-up empirical investigation of processes is crucial in the search for causal 
mechanisms. I investigate the process behind the 1992 Norwegian tax reform in detail, with 
the aim of determining which mechanisms generated reform. By tracing this process, I try to 
ascertain how structural, ideational and institutional contributed to large-scale reform. In 
particular, process tracing allows me to study the specific interaction between these factors.         
 
But what exactly does process tracing imply? I would describe this method as close-up 
empirical investigation focused on the pieces of reality that are part of a specific causal 
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process. In other words, it is the combination of in-depth study and focus on causal chains that 
characterizes this method.  
 
However, is getting really close to the empirical world a sufficient condition for identifying 
mechanisms? Gerring (2007:180) rejects this contention, arguing that process tracing relies 
heavily on general assumptions about the world, which can be either highly theoretical or 
commonsensical. Epistemologically, it is the combination of empirical study and general 
knowledge that makes it possible to determine the causal mechanisms behind an outcome. To 
make sense of the empirical observations of a process at the micro level, the researcher needs 
to assume a great deal about how the world functions. Gerring contends that “case study 
research usually relies heavily on contextual evidence and deductive logic to reconstruct 
causality within a single case” (Gerring 2007:172). 
 
To reconstruct causality, the method of process tracing in practice relies on a “counterfactual 
style of analysis,” Gerring argues (2007:182, emphasis added). When tracing a process, the 
“multiple links cannot be tested in a rigorous fashion. Usually, the author is forced to 
reconstruct a plausible account on the basis of what I have called Counterfactual Comparison 
(what would have happened if X1 were different?)”.  
 
This point is highly relevant for the present study. In my study, counterfactual reasoning is 
important in the construction of arguments about causal links. In particular, thought 
experiments of this kind help determine the necessary conditions for an outcome. I agree with 
Berman (2001:243), who argues that “counterfactual arguments [represent] a powerful tool in 
assessing the validity of different causal hypotheses”. 
 
3.4 Specific methods and data sources 
3.4.1 Methods: purpose, strengths and weaknesses 
This study relies on three main sources of data: interviews with policy-makers and experts; 
public documents; and secondary statistical economic literature. These types of data are used 
for different purposes. While interviews and public documents are used to trace the reform 
process, existing statistical economic studies are the basis for the discussion of the outcome of 
reform. I first briefly present my use of secondary literature and public documents, before I 
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give a lengthy discussion of the interviews, which deserve particular methodological 
attention. I discuss the reasons for using each kind of data, the specific method employed, and 
the related weaknesses and pitfalls. 
 
3.4.2 Secondary use of statistical studies 
To determine the outcome of tax reform, this study relies mainly on existing quantitative 
studies. These are statistical studies that estimate the effect of tax policy changes on key 
variables such as equality, efficiency, revenue, etc. Mostly, these studies are produced by 
researchers at Statistics Norway. My use of these sources amounts to interpreting their 
conclusions carefully and reporting the relevant results and the conditions for these estimates. 
In terms of validity, the main problem with relying on these data is a possible bias towards 
effects of reform than can be quantified. To reduce this problem, I have complemented the 
quantitative data with key actors’ interpretations of the consequences of the 1992 tax reform, 
as provided by the qualitative interviews.            
 
3.4.3 Reading of public documents 
The reading of public documents has been fundamental for understanding how Norwegian tax 
policy has developed. In particular, public commission reports (NOU 1984; NOU 1989; NOU 
2003) have provided invaluable insight, both into the objectives and workings of the 
Norwegian tax system and into the evolution of tax policy ideas in a Norwegian context. In 
addition, the official political documents from the years preceding the 1992 tax reform were 
part of the analysis of this reform process.   
 
However, this study uses the latter type of documents with caution. Relying exclusively on 
this kind of tax policy documents entails problems in terms of validity, as such documents 
mainly treat tax rules. In the tax area, the relation between rules and outcomes is often 
counterintuitive. For instance, high formal tax rates do not necessarily imply strong real 
redistribution. Thus, reading tax policy documents can give rise to wrong conclusions without 
an interpretation of how these rules work in practice. In this regard, the interviews played an 
important role.               
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3.4.4 Qualitative interviews with policy-makers and experts 
In this study, interviews with policy-makers and experts constitute the most important source 
of primary empirical data. In late 2008 and early 2009, I conducted interviews with 13 central 
policy-makers and experts in the tax area (cf. Table 3.1). The policy-makers interviewed were 
important figures in the development of Norwegian tax policy from the 1970s to the 2000s. In 
particular, I spoke to most of the central actors in the process leading up to the 1992 tax 
reform.  
 
Six former Norwegian Finance Ministers were interviewed. Between them, these politicians 
were at the head of the Ministry of Finance for 20 out of the 30 years from 1971 to 2000. In 
particular, I spoke to all three Finance Ministers in the ‘reform years’ from 1986 to 1992. 
Among the Finance Ministers interviewed, four were from the Labor Party, one from the 
Conservative Party, and one from the Centre Party.  
 
In addition, I interviewed the two Under-secretaries of State that were responsible for tax 
policy in the Ministry of Finance in the final years before reform – one belonging to the 
Conservative Party, one to the Labor party. I also spoke to the two Members of Parliament 
that were most involved in tax policy questions in the same period, and who were central in 
the political bargaining process that led up to the 1992 tax reform. One belonged to the Labor 
party, the other to the Conservatives. Additionally, I interviewed the two leading tax policy 
bureaucrats from the late 1980s onwards, plus an academic expert on tax policy. 
 
Table 3.1: Interviews with policy-makers and experts 
Name Position Party Period Date of 
interview 
1. Ragnar Christiansen Finance Minister Labor 1971-72 03.02.09 
2. Per Kleppe Finance Minister Labor 1973-79 14.10.08 
3. Arne Skauge Finance Minister Conservative 1986, 89-90 26.01.09 
4. Gunnar Berge Finance Minister Labor 1986-89 19.01.09 
5. Sigbjørn Johnsen Finance Minister Labor 1990-96 12.02.09 
6. Gudmund Restad Finance Minister Centre 1997-2000 02.02.09 
7. Trond Reinertsen Under-Secretary of State, 
Ministry of Finance 
Conservative 1989-1990 04.02.09 
8. Svein Harald Øygard Under-Secretary of State, Labor 1990-1994 13.02.09 
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Ministry of Finance 
9. Johan C. Løken Member of Parliament, 
Finance Committee 
Conservative 1983-93  09.02.09 
10. Thor-Eirik Gulbrandsen Member of Parliament, 
Finance Committee 
Labor 1981-85, 89-
93 
07.02.09 
11. Hans Henrik Scheel Head of Department for Tax 
Economy, Ministry of Finance 
 1993-
present 
02.02.09 
12. Thorbjørn Gjølstad Head of Department for Tax 
Law, Ministry of Finance 
 1989-
present 
02.02.09 
13. Vidar Christiansen Professor of Economics, 
University of Oslo 
  11.02.09 
 
The interviews were semi-structured, in the sense that they were based on a set of broad topics 
with corresponding questions. The interview guide is enclosed in appendix 1. The attention 
accorded to different topics varied, however, depending on the particular role and knowledge 
of the interviewees. The length of the interviews ranged from 45 minutes to three hours. All 
but two of the interviews were conducted face-to-face; the remaining two were done by 
telephone. The interviews were all personal, except for one double interview. The two 
economic bureaucrats were interviewed together, at their own request.            
 
The qualitative interviews served a couple of distinct purposes. First and foremost, they were 
used to trace the political-administrative process leading up to the 1992 tax reform. The 
interviews provided invaluable insight into the attitudes, motivations and actions of different 
political actors. Crucially, the interviews illuminated the knowledge and the political 
judgments upon which the actions of policy-makers were founded. They clearly suggested 
which factors were important for the movement towards reform and which were not. The 
interviews thus constituted the basis for the explanation of reform, by shedding light on the 
causal chain that led from initial conditions to the passage of reform. 
 
Second, the interviews illuminated the substantive development in Norwegian tax policy. 
They contributed to the understanding of how the tax system worked in different periods, and 
to the analysis of the substance of major policy shifts. In particular, the interviews with top 
bureaucrats and experts were important in this regard.             
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Problems of validity 
There are, however, important methodological challenges related to qualitative interviewing. I 
first discuss problems of validity, then the reliability of the interview data. The question of 
validity concerns whether the collected data shed light on the issue we want to investigate. In 
this regard, the selection of informants is of particular interest. The methodological problem is 
that an unbalanced selection of informants could bias my interpretation of the reform process. 
If I only spoke to actors of a certain type, or with certain political affiliations or attitudes, I 
would run the risk of only hearing one part of the story. This would weaken my ability to 
draw valid inferences about the causal process. 
  
Did I speak to the right people, or were important voices left out? I would argue that the 
selection of interviews is balanced both between different political views and between 
politicians and experts. First, both sides of politics, as well as different fractions within both 
left and right parties, are represented among the informants. Second, I spoke to both ‘pure’ 
politicians and ‘pure’ economists, as well as actors who had one foot in each camp. 
 
The absence of representatives from unions or employers among the informants, however, 
represents a possible bias. The reason for leaving them out was that the other informants did 
not point out these organizations as particularly important in the tax reform process. The 
possibility that this has biased my understanding of the reform process is reduced by the fact 
that I posed explicit questions about the role of organizations in every interview. There is little 
reason to believe that these actors would understate the role of unions and employers, as   
corporatist influence is widely regarded as legitimate in the Norwegian system. 
 
On a brighter note, the very limited number of policy-makers deeply involved in a technical 
field like tax policy made it possible to speak to pretty much all the central actors behind the 
1992 reform. Provided that data are reliable and the investigation properly carried out, this 
enhances the prospects for presenting a valid picture of the process. 
 
Problems of reliability 
The second question concerns the reliability of the interview data. Can we trust what the 
informants say? How can we know that they speak the truth? If the accounts offered by 
informants are systematically biased or imprecise, we could draw wrong conclusions 
regarding what caused reform. I first discuss three particular problems: biases for political 
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reasons, post-hoc rationalization, and group dynamics. Then I discuss the techniques used to 
verify statements. 
 
A first problem of reliability is that informants may distort information for political reasons. 
For instance, they may glorify the attitudes and actions of their own party, or exaggerate its 
importance in the reform process. To some degree, this is inevitable, as actors saw the process 
from different angles and cannot be expected to give a fully objective account of what 
happened. But more intentional misrepresentations are also possible. However, in this case the 
issue of investigation is not sensitive politically, as the reform process took place 20 years 
ago. None of the informants are any longer active politicians, which weakens their incentives 
to withhold or distort information. 
 
Likely, post-hoc rationalization represents a more serious problem to the reliability of the 
interview data. Looking back, actors may unintentionally present their actions as more 
rational than what was really the case. For instance, actors may easily forget their initial 
opposition to what turned out to be a good solution, or their initial support for a system that 
today appears to have been highly inefficient.  
 
This is a particular problem when trying to explain reform. The accounts offered by 
informants tend to emphasize that a particular reform was the only alternative or that “its time 
had come”. Although this may be true to some extent, the situation was likely less harmonic 
and the solutions less obvious at the time. This poses a serious challenge to the researcher. 
That the events at issue in this investigation occurred twenty years back (or more) likely 
exacerbates this problem. 
 
Group dynamics represent a third problem, and is particular to the key interview with the two 
leading bureaucrats. The concern is that group interaction may bias interview data by 
amplifying certain perspectives and suppressing others. In particular, it may generate 
conformity to ‘appropriate’ opinions. However, two features of the interview in question 
appear to reduce this problem. First, the two interviewees were on an equal footing. They 
were on the same level in the bureaucratic hierarchy and had equally long experience. Thus, 
none of them appeared to have the power to influence the views expressed by the other. 
Second, they were equally active during the interview, both of them interrupting the other to 
offer supplementary information or a slightly divergent view. 
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To deal with these problems of reliability, cross-checking information was crucial. I 
employed this technique actively, checking the statements of my informants both against each 
other and against other information. Regarding the latter, confronting interview statements 
with actual actions in the relevant period was an important technique to limit post-hoc 
rationalization. Challenging the informants’ statements in this manner often produced more 
nuanced accounts.  
 
The former was even more important, as informants from both sides of politics and both 
politics and bureaucracy made it possible to gather multiple views on key issues. This was a 
powerful tool for ensuring the reliability of data, as it revealed both issues where the 
statements of differently placed actors corresponded perfectly, and areas where opinions 
differed – often along the political dimension. Where different pieces of information were 
(partly) incompatible, I have noted the divergences and drawn my conclusions with great 
caution.  
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Chapter 4: The reform process 
4.1 The process in brief 
In chapters 4 and 5 I present the empirical data. Chapter 5 discusses the outcomes of the 1992 
tax reform. There, I find that the change in policy was characterized by rational updating 
rather than liberalization. In this chapter, I map out the process behind this reform. This is an 
analytical narrative about how large-scale tax reform became possible. It accounts for the 
crucial factors behind reform – structural, ideational and institutional – and the historical 
context in which they interacted. 
 
I begin by sketching the status quo ante, i.e. the Norwegian tax policy regime of the 1970s 
and early 1980s (section 4.2). This tax structure was characterized by high tax rates and 
generous deductions. In section 4.3, I discuss how key political actors regarded this tax 
system. While the Labor party had great concerns about its effects on equality, the 
Conservatives criticized the high rate-regime for discouraging work and business, but were 
reluctant to give up the deductions. Economic experts had yet another definition of problems. 
Inspired by new ideas about taxation, they emphasized the negative effects of the tax system 
on efficiency (section 4.4). In sum, there was demand for tax reform in the early 1980s, but 
both the strength of this desire and the rationale for change varied among the central actors. 
 
However, the boom and bust of the Norwegian economy in the mid-1980s – where tax policy 
played a major part – shook things up. Section 4.5 looks at the sequence of macro-economic 
events that precipitated a more fundamental remaking of tax policy. The tax policy ideas that 
were subsequently developed by the Aarbakke public tax commission provided the solutions 
necessary for such a reform (section 4.6). This blueprint served as the foundation for a tax 
reform compromise.  
 
Section 4.7 looks at the political-administrative process from the publication of the Aarbakke 
report in 1989 to the tax reform proposition presented in 1991. In this period, the alternation 
in power and the emergence of economist politicians stimulated the reform effort. The last 
section (4.8) concerns the final reform negotiations in parliament, where Labor and 
Conservatives cooperated closely to finalize the tax reform. Table 4.1 provides an overview of 
the most important tax policy events and the governments in the period from 1980 to 1992. 
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Table 4.1: Important tax policy events and Norwegian governments from 1980 to 1992 
 
Norwegian tax policy events Governments External 
events 
1980 > Labor tax reform proposal voted down 
by Conservatives  
Labor minority 
PM: Nordli 
FM: Sand 
 
Labor minority 
PM: Brundtland 
FM: Sand 
1981 > Appointment of Aune commission on 
personal taxation 
 
1982   
Conservative minority 
PM: Willoch 
FM: Presthus 
1983   
1984 > Aune report: recommends ‘rate 
reduction, base broadening’ reform of 
personal taxation 
Economic boom 
in Norway – 
credit expansion 
1985   
Bourgeois majority 
coalition (H/KrF/Sp) 
PM: Willoch (H) 
FM: Presthus (H); 
Skauge (H) 
1986  US tax reform 
1987 > Personal tax reform passed (gross tax 
reform 
Danish tax 
reform (DIT) 
1988 > Appointment of Aarbakke commission 
on corporate and capital taxation 
Recession in 
Norway 
Labor minority 
PM: Brundtland 
FM: Berge 
1989 > October: Aarbakke report: recommends 
reform of entire tax system based on DIT 
> October: Labor endorse Aarbakke 
conclusions in budget 
 
Bourgeois minority 
coalition (H/KrF/Sp)  
PM: Syse (H) 
FM: Skauge (H) 
1990 > May: Conservative white paper on tax 
reform 
 
1991 > April: Labor tax reform proposition 
> April-June: Negotiations in parliament 
between Labor and Conservatives 
> June: Tax reform passed 
Swedish tax 
reform (DIT) 
1992 > January: Tax reform enters into effect 
Labor minority 
PM: Brundtland 
FM: Johnsen 
 
Abbreviations: DIT – dual income tax model; PM – Prime Minister; FM – Finance Minister; 
Ap – Labor party (Arbeiderpartiet); H – Conservative party (Høyre); KrF – Christian People’s 
Party (Kristelig Folkeparti); Sp – Centre party (agrarian) (Senterpartiet)  
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4.2 The old tax policy regime 
4.2.1 Activist post-war tax policy  
In this section, I sketch the main features of the post-war Norwegian tax policy regime and 
how it evolved in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The structural problems of this system gave 
rise to demand for tax reform, as is discussed in sections 4.2 and 4.3. 
 
The Norwegian post-war tax policy regime is best described as activist. Politicians employed 
tax policy as a tool for achieving a large array of goals, notably objectives of equality and 
social policy, industrial policy and district policy. For one, ambitions for redistributing 
income and wealth through taxation were high. For another, policy-makers actively used tax 
policy instruments to spur growth in certain sectors and businesses. Government directed the 
flow of capital by influencing the relative profitability of different investments through the tax 
code. Tax rules both favored investments in some sectors and businesses over others and 
privileged a certain type of capital use. Specifically, tax incentives made it profitable for 
corporations to retain and reinvest capital in the company.     
 
4.2.2 A ‘high rate, large deductions’ regime 
This tax policy doctrine translated into a tax system characterized by high nominal rates and 
strong progression combined with a large number of tax deductions. Top marginal personal 
tax rates were between 75 and 80 percent, while the corporate tax rate hovered around 50 
percent. At the same time, the system allowed for generous tax deductions, both for 
businesses and individuals. Corporations could lower their tax burden or avoid taxes 
altogether if they channelled their profits into certain types of investments or funds that were 
exempt from taxation.  
 
Most important in personal taxation were the rules for deduction of interest payments. The 
value of interest deductions represented nearly half the total value of deductions in 1982 
(NOU 1984:50). The Norwegian interest deduction scheme was particularly generous, as the 
interest cost on loans could be deducted up to the highest marginal personal tax rate. That is, 
sufficiently large interest payments could lower a person’s tax burden to zero. The interest 
deduction rules were not balanced by income taxation of the returns from homeownership, 
either, as these taxes were relatively low. 
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During the 1970s, Norwegian tax policy evolved in a manner that further accentuated this tax 
structure. On the one hand, the Labor government increased formal tax rates. Adding to this, 
high inflation lifted large groups of people into tax brackets where they faced higher tax rates, 
as government lagged behind with adjusting cut-off points. The proportion of taxpayers facing 
a marginal tax rate of 50 percent or more increased from 4 percent in 1973 to 16 percent in 
1979 (NOU 2003:138).  
 
On the other hand, deductions for both businesses and individuals were expanded from the 
late 1970s onwards. First, as a response to the economic crisis in the 70s, the Labor 
government introduced a number of new tax schemes and deductions for corporations to boost 
investments and growth. However, the deductions were not removed when the economy 
recovered, and thus became permanent. Second, in the early 1980s the Conservative 
government implemented new rules for depreciation and capital placement in funds that 
implied lenient taxation of capital in businesses. Thus, tax deductions and incentives 
implemented for different industrial policy reasons accumulated over the years, resulting in a 
hollowed-out corporate tax system.  
 
The trend in personal taxation was similar. “All in all, there has been strong growth in the 
system of deductions,” concludes the Norwegian public commission report on personal 
taxation from 1984 (NOU 1984:65). Both the number of deductions and their value increased. 
The total nominal value of deductions increased by 130 percent from 1976 to 1982, while 
gross earnings grew by 92 percent in the same period. In particular, interest deductions grew 
dramatically. The nominal value of deductions for interest payments trebled (199 % increase) 
from 1976 to 1982.     
 
4.2.3 Mutually reinforcing dynamics    
Moreover, the processes of raising taxes and increasing deductions were mutually reinforcing, 
something which is emphasized by several informants and supported by the public 
commission report from 1984. Because of high formal tax rates, policy-makers had to expand 
corporate deductions further to achieve the industrial policy goal of growth. One informant 
describes this a political strategy of window-dressing: “Politicians hung on to high rates as a 
shining weapon for redistribution. But at the same time they reduced its effect by 
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implementing a number of deductions and favorable depreciation rules”. The same applied to 
personal taxation, where high marginal tax rates on an increasing number of taxpayers put 
pressure on politicians to make deduction schemes more generous.  
 
The other way around, larger deductions led to higher rates. Generous deductions implied a 
narrow tax base, which meant a lower capacity to raise revenue at a given tax rate. Therefore, 
to maintain (and increase) revenue, the expansion of tax deductions had to be compensated by 
a hike in formal tax rates. The Norwegian tax system of the early 1980s was thus 
characterized by high formal rates both for businesses and individuals, but a relatively narrow 
tax base because of generous deductions. 
 
What where the effects of this tax structure? Generally, the structure of high formal rates and 
large deductions led to a large gap between actual income and taxable income. How much a 
person or firm really earned corresponded weakly with how much was liable for taxation. 
Moreover, this gap was wider for some types of income than others. As we will see in the two 
following sections, the lack of correspondence between real and taxable income was a 
problem both in terms of equality and efficiency.  
 
Sections 4.3 and 4.4 discuss the deficiencies of this tax structure, as perceived by political 
actors and experts, respectively. While the equity effects of the tax system concerned the 
Labor party and the high marginal rates on work and business angered Conservatives (section 
4.3), experts emphasized the negative effects of the tax structure on efficiency (section 4.4). 
 
4.3 Political perspectives on the tax system 
4.3.1 Different tax policy views 
How did central political actors regard the old tax regime? This section discusses the 
problems of the tax system as perceived by the Labor party (and the broader labor movement) 
and the Conservative party (and its constituencies). I focus on these two parties, as they were 
the two main political forces in Norway in the 1980s and early 1990s in general, and in 
questions of tax policy in particular. A sketch of the tax policy views of these actors is 
necessary to understand their demand for reform (or the lack thereof) and their actions in the 
process that led up to tax reform in 1992.  
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The Labor party was largely critical of the tax system from the late 1970s, based on the lack 
of fairness and effective redistribution in the tax system. Their desire for tax reform was 
considerable already in 1980 and grew steadily through the decade. The Conservative party, 
on the other hand, opposed the high marginal tax rates on work and business. Yet, they were 
very sceptical to a tax reform that would imply deduction cuts. The Conservative leadership 
warmed to the idea of reform only in the late 1980s.   
 
4.3.2 Labor: equity concerns and demand for reform  
The Labor party’s criticism of the tax system was based on concerns about redistribution and 
fairness. This line can be drawn back to the early 1970s, as some policy-makers became 
aware that the many deductions impeded effective redistribution in tax policy. “The tax policy 
doctrine of fairness down to the smallest detail, covered over an ocean of unfairness,” as a 
Labor politician active at the beginning of the 1970s put it. 
 
This description is even more fitting for the Norwegian tax system of the early 1980s. The 
distance between the social democratic ideals of redistribution and the realities of the tax 
policy regime could hardly have been greater. The Norwegian tax system was ineffective in 
terms of redistribution both between capital and labor and among wage earners.  
 
First, capital was effectively subjected to much more lenient taxation than labor (NOU 
1984:12). Wage earners had to shoulder most of the tax burden, while the burden on capital 
owners was relatively light. Generous tax rules regarding depreciation and placement of 
capital in funds implied that businesses often had very little or even zero taxable income. The 
bias in favor of capital increased throughout the 1970s and early 1980s with the growth in 
such rules (NOU 1984:72). Very lenient capital taxation is thus one important feature of the 
Norwegian tax system of the early 1980s. 
 
Second, the tax system generated little effective redistribution among people at different 
income levels. Though formal progression in personal taxation was strong, real progression 
was weak (NOU 1984). The reason was that generous deductions strongly reduced or even 
erased the formal progression of the tax system. Tax deductions were overall regressive, as 
the value of deductions systematically represented a larger part of income for those with 
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higher incomes (NOU 1984:65). As a result, those with high real incomes often had modest 
taxable incomes.   
 
In particular, this was the result of the interest deduction scheme. Contrary to popular belief at 
the time, borrowing money was not primarily an activity for those who had little from before. 
In reality, the higher your income was, the larger were your loans. Since interest payments 
were fully deductible, this implied that the interest deduction scheme was strongly regressive: 
High-income earners facing high formal tax rates enjoyed relatively larger interest deductions 
than those with modest incomes (Ganghof 2006:95). 
 
The regressive character of the interest deduction scheme was reinforced by the unequal 
access to loans. The Norwegian credit-rationing regime generally implied that those with a 
strong personal economy most easily obtained loans (NOU 1984:65). Because they had 
greater access to loans, high-income earners could exploit the tax benefits associated with 
borrowing money to a larger extent than those with lower incomes.        
 
Moreover, the unequal ability of taxpayers to make use of the many deduction schemes of the 
tax system further weakened its redistributive capacity (NOU 1984:90). Those with the 
greatest economic resources had a greater capacity to study tax rules and find out how to 
benefit from them. The complexity of the Norwegian tax system further strengthened this 
bias, since it increased the information asymmetries between those with great economic 
resources and the rest. Additionally, the greater incentives (and possibilities) of those with 
high incomes to hide assets from taxation further limited effective redistribution. 
      
In the Labor party, awareness of the tax system’s negative effects on equality increased from 
the late 1970s onwards. In particular, the problems associated with the interest deduction 
scheme rose to the top of Labor’s political agenda. The dominant view within the Labor 
movement was that the value of interest deductions had to be limited somehow. Hence, 
already in 1978, Labor Finance Minister Per Kleppe prepared a draft for tax reform that 
would reduce the value of interest deductions by introducing a tax element against which 
interest payments could not be deducted. But this proposal was clumsily handled by Labor 
and had lost political momentum before it reached parliament in 1980. There, the opposition 
led by the Conservatives voted it down.  
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However, towards the end of its term in 1981, the Labor government took a more indirect step 
towards tax reform by appointing a public commission to evaluate and propose changes to the 
system of personal taxation (the Aune commission).  
 
The labor movement’s demands for a more just tax system increased in the following years, 
fuelled by a series of revelations about the real effects of the tax system. The criticism of the 
interest deduction scheme was coupled with the popular outrage over ‘non-taxpayers’, i.e. 
those who had large incomes, but paid no taxes. This group became the political symbol for 
the unfairness associated with the large gap between real and taxable income in the existing 
regime. 
 
It is safe to say that the entire labor movement shared the criticism of the tax system on equity 
grounds. Beyond this point, however, views diverged. Roughly, there were two basic attitudes 
regarding the tax system. The first was the traditional socialist view that forcefully denounced 
the lack of equality and redistribution in taxation, but supported the existing ‘high rate’ tax 
policy regime. This attitude was dominant at the grass-root level of the Labor party, in the 
Socialist Left party and in the trade unions. They believed that the problem was not the tax 
structure in itself, but the specific rules that privileged the well off. Tax policy should still be 
highly ambitious in terms of redistribution, and high tax rates and strong progression were 
necessary to achieve this end. This view remained strong throughout the 1980s on the left 
wing of Norwegian politics. 
 
However, more influential was the reformist attitude dominant among the leadership, the 
economists and the technocrats within the Labor party. This view rejected the tax policy 
doctrine of high rates and large deductions altogether. The rejection of the old regime was 
based on the negative experiences of the 1970s and early 80s with selective, interventionist 
tax policy. The reformists felt that the existing tax regime was at odds with the whole set of 
basic social democratic values, as it was ineffective in terms of both redistributing income, 
generating revenue, stimulating economic growth, securing macro-economic stability, and 
discouraging tax avoidance. This convinced Labor party elites that fundamental policy change 
was needed.  
 
Hence, Labor party elites desired and promoted tax reform throughout the 1980s. The 
sentiment that reform was necessary spread within the party from 1980 onwards. Importantly, 
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the reformist view also eventually incorporated the efficiency critique of the tax system, 
which was championed by economic experts (see section 4.3). However, it should be 
emphasized that among social democratic elites the primary rationale for tax reform was 
redistribution and fairness in personal taxation, while the concern about efficient corporate 
taxation was added only in the mid-1980s. 
  
4.3.3 Conservatives: traditional views and reluctance towards reform 
The Conservative party opposed the tax system on classical grounds. Tax rates were too high, 
both for individuals and businesses, they argued. In personal taxation, high top marginal rates 
and strong progression damaged the incentives to work. Likewise, high corporate tax rates 
discouraged productive activity in businesses. In other word, the predominant concern for the 
Conservatives was to provide favorable conditions for businesses and individuals who wanted 
to earn money, accumulate wealth and create economic growth. 
  
It must be noted, however, that Norwegian Conservatives’ attitudes to taxation were moderate 
in a comparative perspective. The Conservative party had contributed to the expansion of the 
welfare state and still supported the greater part of it. As they were fully aware that this had to 
be financed by large tax revenues, they were not contrary to a relatively high total level of 
taxation.  
 
Nevertheless, Labor’s policy of raising tax rates in the 1970s sparked fierce opposition from 
the Conservative party and business interests. Top marginal personal rates that hit 80 percent, 
whopping rates even on regular incomes (because of bracket creep), and the removal of the 
rule that limited total taxation to 80 percent of income constituted what Conservatives saw as 
a tax policy destructive to productive activity. 
 
In addition, Conservatives criticized the complexity of the tax system. The many different tax 
schemes placed an unnecessary administrative burden both on businesses, individuals and 
public agencies. Conservatives were also sceptical about Labor’s traditional tax policy 
dirigisme, of which specific tax incentives were the clearest symbol. 
 
However, at the same time as Conservatives fiercely opposed high tax rates, they were 
reluctant to remove the generous deduction schemes. In the eyes of conservatives, deductions 
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ensured that tax burdens under the Norwegian high rate regime were tolerable. And not just 
tolerable: many businesses faced effective tax burdens that were much lower than they could 
ever dream of under a ‘low rate, few deductions’ regime. Likewise, the interest deduction 
scheme was very beneficial to many high-income earners, virtually erasing their tax burden. 
As businesses and people with high incomes were the main constituencies of the Conservative 
party, Conservatives were naturally concerned with looking after their interests. Thus, the 
existing tax system’s rather lenient treatment of these groups shaped Conservatives’ attitude 
towards this tax structure. 
 
Even though they wanted to lower tax rates, the reluctance to simultaneously remove the large 
deductions led the Conservative party to oppose reform of the tax system in the 1980s. In 
1980, the Conservatives voted down Labor’s tax reform proposal that would limit the value of 
interest deductions, on the grounds that it was dangerous to abandon the principle of allowing 
deductions for expenses related to income-earning (Kleppe 2003). The Conservative party 
also torpedoed similar proposals put forward by the Aune public tax commission in 1984 
(NOU 1984), and likewise voted against the reform based on these proposals that was passed 
in 1987 (see section 4.5). 
 
The Conservative party’s negative attitude to tax reform represents the most basic reason why 
it took so long to fundamentally change the tax system. It is somewhat ironic that the 
Conservative party – for which opposition to taxation was a core issue – were de facto the 
strongest defenders of the basic structure of the old tax policy regime.  
 
The resistance towards tax reform owed to the dominance of very traditional ideas about 
taxation in the leadership of the Conservative party in the 1980s. Conservative party elites 
appear to have been more concerned about catering to business interests and the well off than 
about creating a well-functioning economy and an efficient allocation of resources. Apart 
from the basic economic argument that high tax rates discouraged work and production, ideas 
about economic efficiency (which are discussed in section 4.4) did not inspire the 
Conservative leadership. Throughout the 1980s, those in charge in the Conservative party 
were largely ignorant of more sophisticated economic theory about the effects of taxation for 
efficiency, as one informant pointed out.  
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It was not until the late 1980s that a more reformist and efficiency-oriented view gained 
influence in the Conservative party. This was associated with the emergence of ‘economist 
politicians’ within the party, and had important implications for reform, as I will discuss in 
section 4.7.  
 
4.4 Experts and the new ideas about efficiency  
4.4.1 The emergence of efficiency-based analysis 
The structural problems of the old tax policy regime were not only related to the lack of 
redistribution (as emphasized by Labor) and the disincentives to work and do business (which 
concerned Conservatives). In this section, we look at how experts became more and more 
preoccupied by the effects of the tax structure on economic efficiency. Among bureaucrats in 
the Ministry of Finance there was a general shift in thinking towards efficiency-based tax 
economic analysis, which was inspired by novel international ideas about taxation. The new 
ideas both improved the analysis of the tax system and influenced the tax policy priorities of 
policy-makers.  
 
Thus, this section is about the influence of economic ideas and the relationship between ideas 
and structural problems. I first sketch the shift in ideas about taxation, then look at the 
efficiency effects of the old tax policy regime.   
 
4.4.2 Novel tax economic ideas 
In the decades after the war, international economic research paid very little attention to the 
subject of taxation. It was only around 1970 that the field of tax economy emerged, as 
economists developed more sophisticated theory about the economic effects of taxation. 
Throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s, economists in this field produced advanced 
theoretical propositions, econometric models and methodological tools. This theoretical 
progress influenced the thinking of Norwegian economists working with taxation, both 
academics and bureaucrats. 
 
In Norway, macro economy had dominated the economic research agenda ever since the war, 
profoundly influencing Norwegian economic thought. Norwegian Nobel laureate in 
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economics Ragnar Frisch and colleagues developed sophisticated macroeconomic models that 
became an integral part of the government’s economic planning. On the other hand, micro 
economy and questions about resource allocation were to some extent neglected. As a 
consequence, Norwegian economists working with taxes were for a long time more concerned 
with redistribution than efficiency. This was the case both at the universities and in the 
Ministry of Finance. 
 
The emergence of ‘modern’ tax theory abroad, however, brought about a marked shift in ideas 
among economic bureaucrats during the 1980s. For instance, an interviewee who left the 
Ministry of Finance in 1980 was “struck by how much the bureaucrats’ attitudes towards tax 
policy had changed” when he returned in 1989. In this period, traditional thoughts about 
taxation as a tool for both social and industrial policy were gradually replaced by ideas that 
emphasized the effects of taxation on economic efficiency.  
 
In particular, economic bureaucrats came to emphasize the principles of neutrality and 
symmetry in taxation. Neutrality means that all types of capital income are subject to the same 
effective tax rate. This principle implies that the tax system should be neutral between 
different types of investments, different forms of ownership, alternative sources of financing, 
etc. Symmetry means treating incomes and corresponding expenses in the same way. When 
income is taxed at a certain rate, costs should be deducted against the same rate. 
 
Hence, within the Ministry of Finance, attention shifted to the ‘tax wedges’ and total 
efficiency losses associated with different types of taxes. Yet, it would be wrong to conclude 
that the economists in the ministry thereby abandoned goals about equality. Rather, efficiency 
concerns complemented equity concerns. As one politician pointed out, traditional ideals of 
social justice remained strong in the Ministry of Finance throughout the period.      
 
The influence of the new way of thinking owed mainly to the fact that practical economists 
found the new models useful. Bureaucrats’ negative practical experiences with the existing 
tax policy regime fit well into the new analytical framework. That is, novel theoretical models 
shed light upon features of the tax system that economists in the ministry suspected were 
contributing to economic problems.  
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4.4.3 The inefficiencies of the old tax policy regime  
Economic analyses in the early 1980s revealed that the Norwegian tax structure of high rates 
and generous deductions created large inefficiencies. Basically, the large and variable gap 
between real income and taxable income implied that what was profitable before taxation was 
not the same as what was profitable after taxation (NOU 1984:62). In other words, the tax 
structure distorted economic choices considerably. This concerned both corporate and 
personal taxation. 
 
Corporate taxation was far from neutral, as investments of certain kinds or in certain sectors 
were subject to more favorable tax treatment than others. This privileged economy activity in 
sectors where income was taxed leniently or not at all and expenses could be deducted from 
taxation (NOU 1984:62). It also directed capital to uses that were exempt from taxation or 
lowly taxed.  
 
In economic terms this was inefficient, since it influenced the relative profitability of 
investments. The investments that were most profitable before taxation were not the most 
profitable after taxation. This implied that capital was not allocated to where it would have 
given the highest returns. According to several informants, the lock-in of capital in businesses 
was a particular problem. Lock-in limited the returns to capital, since capital was reinvested 
(with variable returns) instead of flowing to the investments that would give the highest 
returns. In other words, the use of resources was irrational (NOU 1984:61).  
 
The tax system also distorted the economic decisions of individuals. Most importantly, tax 
rules strongly favored investments in real estate over financial savings (NOU 1984:73). The 
tax system strongly discouraged putting your money in the bank or in stocks. As a 
consequence, financial savings in Norway had actually been negative every year since the 
war. Conversely, tax rules – particularly the interest deduction scheme – strongly encouraged 
taking up loans to invest in houses. The Norwegian tax structure diverted capital from 
productive investments and into real estate. The macro-economic environment strengthened 
these incentives. As we will see in section 4.5, this became a huge problem in the mid-1980s, 
when high inflation and a nominal interest rate that was held artificially low contributed to 
negative real interest rates. 
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4.4.4 Reasons for reform 
New ideas about taxation were important because they improved the analysis of the existing 
tax policy regime, which had previously been somewhat neglected. This raised the 
consciousness about the deficiencies of the tax system, thereby providing a stronger rationale 
for reform. Moreover, the new ideas generated solutions that corresponded to these problems. 
 
The clearest expression of this is the report of the Aune commission published in 1984. This 
report thoroughly evaluated both the efficiency and the equity aspects of personal taxation, 
and showed that the tax system largely failed in both respects. The report concludes that under 
the existing tax policy regime the “main objectives of the tax system are not achieved in an 
effective way” and “taxation contributes too little to promoting the primary goals of tax 
policy” (NOU 1984:13,61).  
 
My informants - central tax policy-makers and bureaucrats in the 1980s and 90s - share this 
conclusion: The Norwegian tax system of the early 1980s was fundamentally flawed. “There 
were at least ten points where the absurdity burst into your eyes,” as one put it. Several 
describe the whole tax system as a giant Swiss cheese, where you could crawl into one hole 
and out of another without paying taxes. Or as another informant sums it up: “In terms of 
redistribution, the old system was ineffective, and increasingly so. In terms of efficiency, it 
was bad, going on horrible. It had simply reached the end of the road.” It is safe to say that the 
structural problems that concerned Norwegian policy-makers – and provided the reason for 
reform – were located within the Norwegian tax system, not at the international level. 
 
To deal with these problems, the Aune report proposed a larger tax element on gross income 
(i.e. income before deductions), combined with lower and less progressive taxation of net 
income and the elimination of a number of deductions. Yet, the political preconditions for tax 
policy change were not present when the commission released its report in 1984. The 
bourgeois government led by the Conservative Kåre Willoch left the commission’s 
recommendations dead in the water. The Conservative government did not feel that tax policy 
change was urgent. Thus, their reluctance was the direct reason that reform was not pursued. 
  
On a deeper level, the large gap between politicians and experts in the understanding of tax 
policy appears to have been a barrier to reform. In the mid-1980s, the new economic ideas 
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about efficiency in taxation had only just started to spread to the key political parties. Even 
though there were political actors - especially the Labor party - that supported policy change, 
the political milieu lacked politicians that were inspired by new tax policy ideas and ready to 
drive large-scale reform.  
  
4.5 The macro-economic middle-game 
4.5.1 Tax policy and macro-economic instability 
So far, we have discussed the effects of the old tax regime on equality and efficiency, which 
were predominantly negative and gave rise to a demand for reform among policy-makers. 
However, in the mid-1980s the tax system also contributed to serious macro-economic 
problems. This gave the issue of tax policy change greater urgency. The sequence of events 
that followed, led up to the tax reform in 1992. 
 
As we will see in this section, the generous interest deduction scheme contributed to the 
uncontrolled credit expansion during the boom years from 1984 to 1987. This triggered 
political action in the tax field, bringing policy-makers to pass a reform of personal taxation in 
1987, which gradually limited the value of interest deductions. However, the tightening of tax 
policy contributed strongly to the subsequent economic downturn. From 1988, Norway went 
into recession, which precipitated a fundamental structural reform of tax policy. 
 
4.5.2 Credit expansion and economic boom 
The tax system was one of the factors that contributed to the uncontrolled credit expansion of 
the mid-1980s (cf. Tranøy 2000: chap. 3). As you will recall from section 4.4, the tax rules for 
interest deduction made borrowing money very profitable. Interest payments could be 
deducted up to the highest marginal tax rate, which implied that the more you borrowed, the 
less you would pay in taxes. Combined with high inflation and an interest rate that was set 
artificially low, this led to a negative post-tax interest rate in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
(NOU 2003:63). For those with average incomes, the post-tax real interest rate hit bottom at 
minus 6 percent in 1981, only crawling up to zero in 1984, where it stayed until 1987.  
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As long as there was credit rationing, the profitability of borrowing money was mainly a 
problem in terms of equity, since those with high incomes would get loans more easily. But 
the credit liberalization of the early 1980s turned this into a huge macro-economic problem. 
People now had both the motive and the opportunity to borrow large amounts of money, and 
the result was a hyper-expansion in the Norwegian credit market from 1984 to 1987 (Tranøy 
2000:97). 
 
4.5.3 The 1987 personal tax reform 
The realization among politicians that the credit market was out of control – and that the 
interest deduction scheme was partly to blame – triggered tax policy action (Tranøy 
2000:188-191). Introducing a gross element in income taxation to limit the value of interest 
deductions had been championed by Labor since the late 1970s and clearly recommended by 
the 1984 Aune public commission on personal taxation. In the spring of 1987, at last, it 
became possible politically. 
 
A reform compromise was hammered out by Labor (in government at the time) and the centre 
parties (Fagerberg et al. 1990:86). The Conservative party also participated in the reform 
negotiations and influenced the chosen solution, but voted against the final compromise. The 
reform was passed anyway with the votes of Labor, the Christian People’s Party and the 
Centre Party. The reform introduced a surtax on high incomes, against which interest 
payments could not be deducted. At the same time it implied cuts in marginal tax rates every 
year until 1992, which effectively reduced the value of interest deductions. 
  
However, this was “too much, too late” (Tranøy 2000: chap. 5). Combined with falling 
inflation and high interest rates, the consequence of the tightening of tax policy was that the 
post-tax real interest climbed steeply, hitting 5 percent in 1989. This real interest rate shock 
stifled the Norwegian economy. It went into a recession in 1988, which soon became a 
depression (Tranøy 2000:191). 
 
4.5.4 The economic downturn  
Growth in Norwegian mainland GDP was negative both in 1988 and 1989, as shown in Figure 
4.1. The gravity of this economic crisis is evident from the fact that these are the only two 
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years of negative growth in Norway from 1958 up until today. Moreover, employment fell 
every year from 1988 to 1992, while unemployment skyrocketed from 2 percent in 1987 to 5 
percent in 1989, before reaching nearly 6 percent in 1992 (cf. Figure 4.1). 
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Figure 4.1: Growth in mainland GDP and unemployment rate for Norway 1980-1992  
Source: Statistics Norway 
 
 
The economic crisis laid the ground for more fundamental changes in tax policy. Remaking 
the tax system was regarded as a structural reform that was necessary to get the economy back 
on its feet, as one key policy-makers related. The crisis gave rise to a common sentiment 
among key political actors that something needed to be done to the tax system. “The time was 
ripe for reform,” as several informants put it.  
 
Yet, it is more accurate to say that the crisis precipitated reform efforts, than that it directly 
caused reform. In the context of economic crisis, the political-administrative complex moved 
determinedly towards reform in the period from 1989 to 1991. The process would likely have 
taken longer and been subject to greater political disagreement had it not been for the 
economic crisis. However, features of the reform process are crucial independent elements in 
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the explanation of the 1992 tax reform. Most importantly, the adaptation and development of 
tax policy ideas – by experts on the Aarbakke public commission and in the bureaucracy – 
provided the policy solutions for reform. This is the topic of the next section. 
  
4.6 The Aarbakke report: a blueprint for reform 
4.6.1 The importance of the Aarbakke report 
The importance of the Aarbakke report for the 1992 tax reform cannot be overstated. In the 
interviews, all the central decision-makers of the time emphasize the great influence of the 
work of this public commission. Not only did the 1989 Aarbakke report provide the substance 
of the subsequent reform. Its blueprint for reform also gave a strong impulse towards the 
political realization of fundamental tax policy change.  
 
In this section, we first define the place of the Aarbakke commission in the reform process. 
Second, we look at how the policy solutions of the Aarbakke report were the result of 
adaptation and development of new tax policy ideas. Finally, we discuss how the report 
affected the process towards tax reform.  
 
4.6.2 The issue of corporate taxation 
To understand why the Aarbakke report was so important for the 1992 reform, the distinction 
between personal and corporate taxation is crucial. Until the late 1980s, reform efforts were 
all about personal taxation. The 1987 reform, which was based on the 1984 Aune report, only 
concerned the taxation of individuals.  
 
The Aune commission suggested, however, that to create a well-functioning tax system, it 
was absolutely necessary to look into the issue of corporate taxation as well. Firstly, many of 
the structural problems of the tax system had their origin in the corporate tax regime. 
Secondly, the two parts of tax policy were by no means independent of each other. More and 
more economic activity took place in the blurry area between these two regimes, and 
sophisticated solutions were needed to deal with this.  
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Compared to personal taxation, corporate taxation is extremely technical and difficult to 
understand for others than experts. Thus, even though politicians had agreed on personal tax 
reform in 1987, what to do with corporate taxation was largely in the blue. This was the 
background for the Labor government’s appointment of the Aarbakke commission in March 
1988. The commission was exclusively made up of experts, and its primary task was to 
examine potential changes in the taxation of businesses and capital. The work of the Aarbakke 
commission should not be understood in isolation, though, as bureaucrats in the Ministry of 
Finance had already initiated the work with developing solutions for corporate taxation. 
 
4.6.3 The development of tax policy ideas 
The work of the Aarbakke commission (and the economic bureaucracy) was clearly inspired 
by the international wave of ‘rate reduction, base broadening’ tax reforms. The major US tax 
reform of 1986, the Danish tax reform of 1987 and the plans for tax reform in Sweden 
represented important examples for Norwegian experts. While novel tax economic theory had 
supplied Norwegian experts with a new way of thinking about taxation (cf. section 4.4.2), the 
tax reforms of the 1980s provided more concrete policy ideas. 
  
The tax policy doctrine of market-conforming, neutral and symmetrical taxation was actively 
promoted by the OECD. The organization provided documents and statistical databases to 
facilitate reforms of this kind in countries like Norway. By spreading this material, the OECD 
stimulated the exchange of ideas, knowledge and experiences across borders. “The steady 
flow of documents from the OECD was an important source of inspiration for the economists 
in the bureaucracy, ” as one informant recalls.  
 
Interestingly, the influence from abroad appears to have been much stronger in terms of ideas 
than structure. The ideas that were imported in this period first and foremost provided answers 
to the domestic structural problems of tax systems, not to international structural constraints. 
Economic internationalization had not yet become an important issue: “In the 1980s there was 
little talk of capital mobility. Policy-makers were not really afraid that businesses would move 
to other countries. This discussion is relatively new,” one expert observed. Accordingly, 
economic globalization was not treated as an important tax policy concern in the Aarbakke 
report. 
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How specific were the ideas from abroad that inspired Norwegian bureaucrats and policy-
makers? The interviews suggest that the tax reform movement mainly provided a general 
inspiration. Even though reforms around the world shared some fundamental principles, 
groups of countries chose different concrete policies to realize these principles. The broad 
range of examples – rather than any specific reform – inspired Norwegian experts. Nordic 
experiences were of particular interest, as they supplied examples of the opportunities and 
limits of reform in economies very similar to that of Norway. 
 
Although international tax policy ideas provided a framework for reform, their influence on 
the solutions proposed by the Aarbakke commission should not be overstated. The work of 
the economic bureaucracy and the commission is better described as policy development than 
imitation. International tax policy ideas were just the point departure, as Norwegian experts 
further developed, specified and adapted these to the Norwegian context. Experts drew on 
ideas and perspectives from abroad to design policy solution that could answer the specific 
problems of the Norwegian tax system.  
 
Although concerns about neutrality and efficiency guided the development of policy, experts 
were at the same time attentive to concerns about equality and fairness. It is fair to say that 
both the Ministry of Finance and the Aarbakke commission sought to develop variants within 
the frame of the international tax policy doctrine that were in line with equity goals. To a 
considerable extent this was possible, as for instance the principle of equal treatment 
represented a common ground for efficiency and equity goals.   
 
Important in this respect, the Aarbakke commission proposed a dual income tax (DIT) model, 
i.e. a tax regime that differentiated between a moderate, flat tax on capital income and a 
higher, progressive tax on labor income. To a larger extent than other reform blueprints, the 
DIT model aimed to reconcile efficiency concerns with objectives of revenue-raising and 
redistribution. The principle of dual taxation had already been suggested by the Aune 
commission report in 1984 and put into practice by the Danish reform of 1987. However, the 
Aarbakke report proposed the purest and most sophisticated version of the DIT model so far. 
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4.6.4 The political implications 
The report published by the Aarbakke commission in the fall of 1989 was an impressive piece 
of policy work. It proposed a total solution for corporate taxation, including a model for 
splitting personal and corporate income in small businesses. The Aarbakke report represented 
the culmination of years of effort by national experts in the field of tax economy. The work of 
the commission not only supplied the content of reform, however. The reform blueprint also 
generated convergence in policy preferences and made it easier for political actors to pursue 
cooperative strategies towards reform. 
 
Firstly, the Aarbakke report brought the tax policy preferences of politicians more into line 
with the views of experts. The thorough analysis presented in the report exposed political 
actors to economic reasoning about problems and solutions in corporate taxation. This 
directed political views on tax policy in a more rationalist direction. This also implied more 
compatible preferences in the Labor party and the Conservative party. Provided with a 
common base of ‘neutral’ information about the corporate tax system, more similar problem 
definitions emerged within the two parties. This contributed to political consensus. 
 
Secondly, the Aarbakke report facilitated political cooperation by giving politicians a 
blueprint for a consensus solution. This made it clearer to political actors what the final 
reform would look like if they were to pursue a strategy of cooperation. The concrete proposal 
of the commission reduced the uncertainty associated with pursuing such a strategy, and thus 
made cooperation a more viable alternative. This was especially the case for the Conservative 
party, which had so far been very reluctant to engage in tax reform action. The political-
administrative process towards reform that followed the Aarbakke report is the subject of the 
next section. 
 
4.7 Political relay towards reform 
4.7.1 Political institutions and the reform process  
The release of the Aarbakke report was followed by a remarkable political process towards 
reform. This section looks at the political relay that led up to Labor’s tax reform proposition 
in 1991, while section 4.8 is about the final reform negotiations in the Norwegian parliament 
– the Storting. The political process that led to large-scale tax reform was stimulated by 
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Norwegian political institutions. The institutional setting shaped the interaction between 
political parties and between politicians and experts in a way that favored cooperation, 
leading to a broad-based reform compromise.  
 
In this section, we first look at which actors dominated the reform process. Second, we see 
how the alternation in power during this period actually stimulated – rather than stifled – 
reform efforts. Third, we discuss how the reform was driven by the emergence of ‘economist 
politicians’.       
 
4.7.2 The dominant actors 
Which actors dominated the policy-making process that led up to the 1992 tax reform? The 
evidence on this point is unambiguous: The Labor party, the Conservative party and the 
bureaucracy in the Ministry of Finance were by far the most important actors in this process. 
The political control of the process shifted between Labor and Conservatives, while the 
economic bureaucracy (flanked by external economic experts) dominated the formulation of 
policy.  
 
How about the rest of the political parties? In 1987, the middle parties – i.e. the Christian 
People’s party and the Centre party (agrarian) – had been key tax policy players, as their votes 
ensured a majority for the personal tax reform. This time they only played a marginal role. 
Although they were present, as members of both the bourgeois cabinet and the Finance 
committee in parliament, these parties neither influenced the political process nor the 
substance of reform to any significant extent. Except for the few special areas of tax policy 
where they had strong opinions (e.g. agriculture), the middle parties mostly tagged along with 
the two larger parties. The Socialist Left party and the populist right Progressive party were 
even less important. 
 
As in any major issue of economic policy, the main union confederation LO and employers’ 
association NHO were consulted throughout the tax reform process. Within the labor 
movement, there were several rounds of discussions between Labor’s people in the Ministry 
of Finance and leaders and economists in LO. However, regarding tax reform LO was 
primarily a responsible conversation partner, not a strong independent voice.  
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The main reason was that Labor party elites and LO elites agreed on the basic definition of 
problems and the necessity of reform. Apart from certain absolute demands concerning the 
wealth tax, redistribution and specific issues of industrial policy, LO supported the reform 
effort. In particular, top LO economists and LO leader Yngve Hågensen came to share 
Labor’s ideas about remaking tax policy. Thus, they primarily cooperated in the search for 
appropriate tax policy solutions, rather than confronting the Labor party with strong particular 
demands.  
 
Neither the main employers’ association NHO played a particularly important role in the tax 
reform process. The Conservative party had regular meetings with NHO, but as one politician 
recalls, these were often of a “ritual” character. Regarding tax reform, NHO had little to say 
about the broad lines of reform, but had strong and detailed opinions in specific areas of 
corporate taxation. In some of these areas, NHO was heard, but generally they had little 
influence on the design of the tax reform. 
 
As the account up to this point suggests, tax reform was dependent on consensus along two 
dimensions: both between the two major political parties and between politicians and experts. 
For one, Labor and Conservatives, who had different problem definitions in tax policy, 
needed to reach agreement. Second, the solutions proposed by experts had to be linked to the 
problems perceived by politicians. 
 
4.7.3 Alternation in power 
The period from the publication of the Aarbakke report in the fall of 1989 to the Labor’s tax 
reform proposition in the spring of 1991 was characterized by frequent alternation in 
government. Surprisingly, this did not stifle reform efforts. Instead, Labor and Conservatives 
seized upon this opportunity to produce a series of important political documents. Thus, 
alternation actually facilitated the commitment to tax reform. The Norwegian institutional 
context contributed strongly to these positive dynamics.  
 
In Norway, the ‘conservative wave’ of the 1980s put an end to a long period of Labor 
government, and more generally to the post-war electoral dominance of the Labor party. From 
1981 onwards the electorate was more evenly distributed between the blocks. This ushered in 
an era of more frequent alternation in power and more unstable governments. In the late 
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1980s and early 90s, government shifted back and forth between the Labor party and the so-
called ‘bourgeois parties’, i.e. the Conservatives, the Christian People’s Party and the Centre 
Party (agrarian).  
 
In 1986, a Labor government led by Gro Harlem Brundtland took over from the centre-right 
coalition government headed by Conservative Kåre Willoch. The Brundtland government, 
with Gunnar Berge as Finance Minister, lasted until the elections in the fall of 1989. They 
were succeeded by a new Conservative-led ‘bourgeois’ coalition, this time under the direction 
of Jan P. Syse and with Conservative Arne Skauge as Finance Minister. This government fell 
apart after little over a year, giving way to a new Labor government in November 1990. 
Again, Brundtland was the Prime Minister, while Sigbjørn Johnsen took over as Finance 
Minister. 
 
Thus, three different governments were in power during the period from the release of the 
Aarbakke report in October 1989 until the tax reform proposition in the spring of 1991. What 
is interesting is that this instability actually stimulated the political process towards tax 
reform. Under alternating government, the institutionalized production of official political 
documents became a vehicle for reform. Labor and Conservatives used these documents 
actively to commit to reform as power shifted back and forth between them.   
 
In the fall of 1989, the outgoing Labor government endorsed the conclusion of the Aarbakke 
report in its budget commentaries. In May 1990, Conservative Finance Minister Skauge 
presented a white paper to parliament inspired by the report. Its content is well summarized in 
the title: “Guidelines for reforms of corporate and capital taxation, and consequences for 
personal taxation” (St.meld nr. 48 (1990-91)). This document sketched the basic principles for 
a revision of the tax system. The Labor opposition responded to the white paper with detailed 
comments, outlining a more concrete – and slightly divergent – proposal for reform. A few 
months later, Labor moved back into the Ministry of Finance, where they continued the work 
towards reform. In the spring of 1991, Finance Minister Johnsen presented the tax reform 
proposition to the Storting. This proposition was based upon the Aarbakke report and to a 
large extent in line with the Conservative white paper from 1990.    
 
One reason why alternation in power stimulated reform was that it brought politicians and 
experts closer together. Both Labor and Conservative politicians were put in touch with the 
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practical work and the way of thinking in the Ministry of Finance. Intense interaction between 
politicians and bureaucrats is typical of Norwegian political institutions. In this case, 
interaction within the Ministry of Finance exposed political actors from both sides to 
rationalist arguments about tax policy design. This generated convergence towards the views 
held by experts, both in the definition of problems and in preferences regarding solutions. 
“Because of the shifts in government, both parties had worked with the important questions, 
and there was a fundamentally positive attitude in both camps,” one informant related. Shared 
views provided a strong basis for politicians and bureaucrats in the ministry working together 
towards reform.  
 
Even more importantly, alternation in government gave Labor and Conservatives the 
opportunity to take crucial political steps towards consensual reform. Shifting power 
facilitated cooperation. “Through this alternation, a broad political ownership was built,” one 
central actor observed. Basically, the alternation in power triggered an institutional 
commitment mechanism. The institutional setting allowed the parties to credibly commit to 
the broad reform solution. 
 
Yet, it appears that commitment had a slightly different meaning for the two parties. The 
Labor party, which was almost unitary in the tax issue, intentionally used official documents 
to signal their positions. The Labor government with Finance Minister Berge actually rushed 
the release of the Aarbakke report (NOU 1989:11), so that it would have time to comment on 
its conclusions before leaving office. Likewise, Labor’s thorough and detailed response to the 
Conservative white paper was an intentional move to show their general support for the 
reform initiative, while at the same spelling out the points of disagreement. 
 
The conservative camp, however, was divided in the tax issue. It appears that the fraction of 
the Conservative party that controlled the Ministry of Finance (described in the next sub-
section) used official documents to commit the party to tax reform. Conservative Finance 
Minister Skauge worked hard to finalize the white paper, which was meant to both outline a 
credible Conservative position regarding reform and send the signal that Conservatives were 
ready to move towards a large-scale tax policy revision.  
 
These political documents reduced the other party’s uncertainty about where their political 
‘opponents’ stood, making it easier to make further moves towards reform. “It was possible to 
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calculate the opponent’s attitude in advance, since they had committed already,” one 
informant observed. The alternation in power thus facilitated cooperative strategies. 
 
4.7.4 The emergence of economist politicians 
During the same period, another important development stimulated reform efforts. This was 
the emergence of ‘economist politicians’ within both the Conservative party and the Labor 
party. The economist politicians were crucial as the drivers of the tax reform process. Their 
emergence both conditioned the positive effect of alternation in power on reform, and 
contributed to generating support for reform. 
 
In both parties, politicians that identified strongly with economic arguments won influence in 
the late 1980s. These ‘economist politicians’ were handed the central positions in economic 
policy-making. Most importantly, they gained control over the Ministry of Finance, but they 
also played an important role in the Storting. The emergence of economist politicians had 
impact on the tax policy positions of the parties, especially within the Conservative party. 
 
As discussed in sub-section 4.3.3, modern economic thought was surprisingly marginal 
among the Conservative leadership in the 1980s. It was really not until the bourgeois coalition 
won power in 1989 that politicians inspired by ideas about economic efficiency gained 
considerable influence. In the Syse government, Arne Skauge was appointed Finance Minister 
and Trond Reinertsen under-secretary of state. Both were strongly inspired by modern 
economic thought. As opposed to traditional conservative, they clearly rejected the existing 
tax structure, including the generous deduction schemes for businesses and individuals. They 
were convinced that fundamental tax policy reform was needed, as the existing tax structure 
could not produce efficient economic outcomes. 
 
Skauge did clearly not belong to the mainstream in the Norwegian Conservative Party. The 
label ‘economist politician’ fits Skauge well, as he put great emphasis on economic rationality 
and identified strongly with economists, those in the Ministry of Finance in particular. Some 
even describe him as “light blue” politically. Skauge had already served as Trade Minister in 
the early 1980s and a short stint as Finance Minister in 1986.  
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Under-Secretary Reinertsen was even more of an economist and less of a politician.  
Reinertsen had no political experience and had been a party member only for a couple of 
years. Yet, he was offered the job because of his economic expertise. Reinertsen had a Ph.D. 
in monetary theory from an American university, had worked in the Norwegian Ministry of 
Finance for five years, and was a business leader. A strong proponent of modern economic 
theory, Reinertsen felt a closer relation to the bureaucrats in the ministry than to the 
politicians in the party. 
 
Economist politicians also appeared within the Labor Party in the late 1980s, though in a less 
abrupt manner than in the Conservative party. Within Labor, the ‘economist politicians’ fell 
into two categories. First, there were the career politicians that had solid economic knowledge 
and were highly perceptible to economic arguments. Sigbjørn Johnsen – Finance Minister 
from 1990 – was the most important representative for this category. Johnsen had economic 
training and had been member of the Finance Committee in the Storting since 1980.  
  
Second, and complementary, there were the economists in supporting political positions, who 
provided important economic expertise. Bjørn Skogstad Aamo who served as Under-
Secretary in the Ministry of Finance from 1986 to 1989 was one such figure. Another social 
economist, Svein Harald Øygard, played an even more important role. Øygard was economic 
advisor for Labor in parliament from 1989 and then Under-Secretary in the Ministry of 
Finance from 1990. Øygard had little experience from politics, but had previously worked in 
the tax department of the Ministry of Finance. He thus provided the Labor party with crucial 
economic insight in the tax reform work6. 
 
The economist politicians controlled the Ministry of Finance in the crucial years from 1989 to 
1991 when government was alternating back and forth between Labor and Conservatives. 
Their ascent to power appears to have been a precondition for the rapid political process 
towards reform that ensued. The alternation in power made it easier for political actors to 
commit to reform. Yet, economist politicians at the head of the Ministry of Finance 
strengthened both the desire to move towards fundamental tax policy change and the capacity 
to work out such a reform. Their emergence forged a strong reform alliance between 
politicians and bureaucrats in the Ministry of Finance, based on shared views. 
                                                 
6
 In February 2009, Øygard was hired as Governor of the Icelandic Central Bank to stabilize the economy left in 
ruins by the international financial crisis.    
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The emergence of economist politicians at the head of the Ministry of Finance dramatically 
narrowed the gap in perceptions between experts and politicians. The economist politicians to 
a large extent shared the bureaucrats’ rational, economic analyses of problems and solutions. 
And they shared these views mainly because they had solid economic insight and in some 
cases had worked within the field of tax policy. The ability of the class of economist 
politicians to understand such a complex policy area proved crucial. Because of this, experts 
and politicians in the ministry did not only find common ground, they agreed on a 
fundamental level. Further, this shared basic analysis gave rise to a strong common feeling 
that the tax system needed fundamental reform.   
 
This engendered intense cooperation for reform between political leadership and bureaucrats 
in the ministry. The benefits were mutual. For civil servants, it was much easier to work 
closely with politicians who understood the basic problems and dilemmas of tax policy. Also, 
as there for several years had been a strong desire for fundamental reform among bureaucrats, 
they were happy to find politicians willing to pursue ‘their’ case. For politicians, the 
wholehearted support from a bureaucracy with great economic insight and work capacity 
provided crucial support for the political reform mission.  
 
In other words, a potent coalition was forged that made the Ministry of Finance a powerhouse 
for reform. Economic bureaucrats teamed up with the economist politicians of the incumbent 
party, first Labor, then the Conservatives, then Labor again. The strong political-
administrative consensus unleashed the policy-making forces of the Ministry of Finance. The 
years between 1989 and 1991 thus represented a period of intensive tax policy work in the 
ministry. 
 
The emergence of economist politicians also contributed to reform in another way. As they 
had one foot in each camp, these politicians helped bridge the gap between the economic and 
political spheres. The economist politicians undertook the crucial task of translating economic 
arguments about tax policy into political arguments. As one of them describes: “My role was 
partly to build bridges, as I had an ability to translate economics into terms that were 
politically comprehensible. Translating insights into examples and showing how things 
worked was crucial.”  
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This translation was essential for building broader political and popular support for reform. It 
clarified the connection between what people perceived as problems in the tax system and the 
solutions that experts envisaged. The political leadership in the Ministry of Finance put great 
emphasis on communicating this to party members at the grass-root level. In so doing, they 
generated a shift in preferences within the parties, winning over many traditionalists. This 
ensured acceptance – if not enthusiasm – for the reform proposal in the file and rank of the 
parties.  
 
The communication with the general public was equally important. The Labor party was 
especially active in this regard, staging a massive media campaign in late 1990 and early 1991 
to explain to people why the tax system needed fixing, and how their reform proposal would 
mend it. At the very least, this increased popular understanding and acceptance for some of 
the changes to come. 
 
4.8 The final reform negotiations 
The political relay described in the previous section led to the Labor government’s tax reform 
proposition to parliament in April 1991. This section concerns the final phase of the tax 
reform process, namely the reform negotiations in parliament. These negotiations were an 
outstanding example of political cooperation. Based on mutual trust, the Labor and 
Conservative representatives worked closely together to finalize the tax reform. The 
institutional setting shaped this cooperation, as mutual confidence was a function of 
interaction in parliament’s finance committee. This unique cooperation allowed politicians to 
pass the tax reform compromise quickly, which precluded the build-up of political opposition.   
 
In April 1991, Labor Finance Minister Johnsen could finally send a proposition for tax reform 
to parliament. The proposition was the result of intensive policy work in the Ministry of 
Finance based on the recommendations of the Aarbakke report. To pass the reform, Labor 
needed to strike a deal with the opposition in parliament. And to ensure that the reform would 
stick, Labor wanted as broad political agreement as possible.  
 
In practice, this implied reaching a compromise with the Conservative party. As these two 
parties together had a solid majority in parliament, the middle parties would have little other 
choice than to support reform. And as subsequent elections would most likely also produce a 
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majority for Labor and Conservatives together, a reform compromise between these two 
would be robust over time. 
 
In the Norwegian political system, the real political work of parliament is carried out in the 
committees. The final negotiations over tax reform thus took place in the financial committee 
of the Storting. On the committee, there were representatives from all the major political 
parties. But in practice, the tax reform proposition quickly became the subject of bilateral 
negotiations between Labor and Conservatives. Two members of the committee undertook the 
daunting task of hammering out the details of a reform compromise: Thor-Eirik Gulbrandsen 
from the Labor party (who formally led the committee’s work with the proposition) and Johan 
C. Løken from the Conservative party.  
 
Interestingly, these two did not belong to the caste of reformist economist politicians. 
Gulbrandsen had studied social economy, but was neither inspired by arguments about 
economic rationality nor familiar with modern tax policy ideas. Gulbrandsen did in fact 
belong to the more radical left wing of the party and was in opposition to the Labor party 
elite. His views regarding economic policy were moderate, however. Løken, on the other 
hand, was trained in forest economics and had great experience with economic policy-making 
from the financial committee. But politically he belonged to the traditional conservative 
mainstream, and he was sceptical of the modern tax policy ideas promoted by the former 
Conservative Finance Minister Skauge. 
 
Nevertheless, Gulbrandsen and Løken played a crucial role in finalizing the tax reform. The 
pair literally worked day and night to hammer out all the details of the reform compromise. 
Not only did they reach agreement on all points, so that Labor and Conservatives could 
present a common proposal. They also did so incredibly quickly, which ensured that the 
Storting could pass the reform before the long summer break. A delay would have given 
opponents of reform time to organize, which could have put the whole reform in jeopardy.  
 
The negotiations between Gulbrandsen and Løken were an outstanding example of political 
cooperation. “Our cooperation was unique. I don’t think anyone has worked the way we did, 
neither before nor afterwards,” as one of them put it. In the final phase, the two of them 
worked through a long list of issues where Labor and Conservatives had diverging views, 
dividing the issues between them. If Labor conceded on one issue, their view would prevail in 
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the next question. Through this pragmatic process of give and take, the final pieces of the tax 
reform were put into place. 
 
What made this kind of political cooperation possible? The fundamental precondition was that 
Gulbrandsen and Løken had the political backing or confidence of their respective parties. At 
this point, especially the Labor party, but also the Conservatives, were intent on striking a 
reform compromise. Through the preceding process the two parties had defined a common 
frame for tax reform, and within these limits they were willing to stretch far to reach a final 
specific reform agreement.  
 
The detailed negotiations between Gulbrandsen and Løken were instrumental to this end. This 
raises the question of how autonomous they really were. It appears that the Conservative 
Løken had a stronger independent role than Labor’s Gulbrandsen. For Labor, the political 
leadership in the Ministry of Finance held a tight grip on the process. This meant that even 
though Gulbrandsen was the one negotiating in the front room, there was someone in the back 
room making the important calls. 
 
Løken appears to have acted more on his own, which makes his role more ambiguous. On the 
one hand, he was extremely loyal to the party and determined to extract the best possible tax 
reform deal for the Conservatives. On the other hand, he acknowledged the strong need for 
reform and thus actively promoted the reform compromise to the Conservative leadership and 
the broader party. While some suggest that Løken was co-opted by the Labor reformists and 
‘betrayed’ the Conservative mainstream, others say that he maximized the Conservative’s 
influence on the final reform deal. 
 
One piece of evidence for the latter interpretation is that the final reform was more liberal 
than Labor’s reform proposition in a couple of important respects. Firstly, the model for 
splitting income into labor and capital components was loosened. As we will see in the next 
chapter, the ineffective income-splitting model became the greatest problem of the new tax 
system in terms of equality. Secondly, a tax amnesty for businesses’ capital reserves was 
included in the reform, after lobbying from the employers’ association (NHO). This allowed 
businesses to dissolve the tax-motivated capital reserves built up under the old regime when 
the new tax rules came into force in 1992.  
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The second precondition for the close cooperation on the committee was strong, personal 
trust. “Without mutual trust and confidence, we could not have landed the reform,” 
commented one informant. Give-and-take bargaining of the kind described was possible 
because the central politicians trusted each other one hundred percent. The cooperation 
between Gulbrandsen and Løken worked seamlessly because both trusted that the other party 
was sincere about his room for manoeuvre and would not balk on agreements. This mutual 
trust had two interrelated sources.  
 
The first source was institutional. Repeated interaction over many years in the Storting’s 
finance committee had produced trustful relationships between political opponents. Through 
day-to-day committee work, they came to know what they could expect of the others. The 
trustful relation between Gulbrandsen and Løken was based on the accumulated impressions 
from years of interaction on the committee. Their experience of the other party as honest and 
trustworthy allowed for close cooperation. Moreover, experiences with similar reform 
processes seem to have had an influence on the committee’s work. One informant points to 
the tax reform negotiations in 1987 as an important foundation for the political cooperation in 
1991. 
 
The second source was personal, as strong mutual trust was also a function of tight personal 
relations between central actors. Although this is typical of the Norwegian political system, 
relationships were especially tight in this case. That is, both Gulbrandsen and Løken were 
close personal friends of Finance Minister Johnsen. And Under-secretary Øygard had worked 
closely with Johnsen and Gulbrandsen in parliament for several years. It is beyond doubt that 
these personal relations facilitated the cooperation for reform. One informant described this 
well: “Political and personal relationships are essential in this kind of reform process. 
Personal chemistry comes into play. I have experienced in politics that when there are 
frictions on the personal level, everything becomes more difficult.” 
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Chapter 5: The objectives and outcomes of reform  
5.1 Shift or continuity? 
While chapter 4 looked at the process that led to the 1992 tax reform, this chapter is about the 
objectives and outcomes of the reform. Here, I present empirical data that shed light on 
whether the reform implied liberalization or rational updating. While greater efficiency at the 
expense of equality would indicate liberalization, a strengthened ability to achieve goals of 
both efficiency and equality would suggest rational updating (cf. section 2.1). The following 
discussion is based on existing studies of the tax reform and its effects, particularly statistical 
economic analyses, as well as the interviews with policy-makers and experts. 
 
First, I look at the objectives behind the 1992 tax reform (section 5.2). Then, I present the 
output of reform, i.e. the substantive changes in tax rules (section 5.3). In section 5.4, I sketch 
the consequences of the reform for the functioning of the economy. Finally, I discuss the 
outcomes of the reform in terms of efficiency and growth, treatment of business/capital, 
capacity to finance the welfare state, and direct redistribution (section 5.5).   
 
5.2 The reform objectives 
Did the objectives of tax policy shift from redistribution towards efficiency with the 1992 
reform? The interviews suggest that this was not the case. Equality and efficiency appear to 
have been equally important concerns behind the reform. There was a double rationale behind 
the main features of the reform. The reform architects sought to increase efficiency while at 
the same time strengthening the capacity both to raise revenue and redistribute directly.  
 
The goal of economic efficiency was clearly given much larger weight in the 1992 reform 
than earlier. But rather than crowding out other core objectives, it complemented them. The 
architects behind tax reform were more concerned about an efficient allocation of resources 
than before, but they were not less concerned with revenue-raising and equality. 
 
Generating revenue to finance the welfare state remained the core goal of tax policy, as it had 
been all through the post-war period. However, a central aim of the 1992 reform was to raise 
revenue more effectively. First, this implied raising revenue at a limited cost to the economy. 
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Second, it meant designing a tax system where revenues would grow automatically with the 
expansion of the economy. The goal was to bolster the long-term capacity to finance the 
welfare state.  
 
Equality was also an important concern behind reform, although it appears that policy-makers 
thought differently about this goal than before. For one, policy-makers were less optimistic 
about the direct redistributive potential of tax policy. The ideological belief that high taxes 
would produce strong redistribution had subsided. Instead, policy-makers thought more 
practically about which tax measures could bring about real redistribution at tolerable costs. 
The 1992 reform was thus based on more moderate – some would say more realistic – 
ambitions about direct redistribution in the tax system.  
 
For another, the question of horizontal equality received more attention. Horizontal equality 
implies equal taxation of individuals that are equal in economic terms. Thus, equal treatment 
and fairness became more important goals in the 1992 tax reform.      
 
5.3 The reform output 
5.3.1 Rate reductions, base broadening 
What kind of reform did policy-makers implement to realize these objectives? Just like other 
tax reforms of the era, the Norwegian 1992 reform was one of ‘rate reduction, base 
broadening’. However, its particularities are arguably more striking. Not only did the 
Norwegian reform go further than other reforms in cutting rates and broadening bases. It also 
applied the principle of neutral taxation more rigorously than elsewhere and introduced a 
sophisticated dual income tax model. 
 
In line with the international trend, the Norwegian tax reform of 1992 cut rates and broadened 
bases. This process had been in motion since 1987, with gradual reductions of formal tax rates 
and expansions of the tax base. The rationale behind lower rates was both to reduce efficiency 
losses and to remove the strong incentives for tax avoidance and tax planning. Base 
broadening was meant to ensure both a more efficient allocation of resources and greater 
fairness in taxation, as broader bases implied closer correspondence between actual and 
taxable income. 
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The Norwegian tax reform, however, went further than most other countries in both cutting 
statutory tax rates and broadening bases by removing deductions. On the one hand, formal tax 
rates both for individuals and corporations were cut dramatically. The top marginal tax rate 
for individuals (including social contributions) was lowered from around 70 percent in 1986 
to just under 50 percent in 1992 (Ganghof 2006:94). The corporate tax rate, which had been 
fixed at 50 percent until 1991, was cut to 28 percent in 1992.  
 
On the other hand, the tax base was expanded, meaning that more of the income of both 
persons and businesses became subject to effective taxation. This involved the elimination or 
limitation of a large number of deductions and other generous tax schemes. For corporations, 
this included the abolition of tax-favored funds and generous depreciation allowances. For 
individuals, the value of interest deductions was limited and several specific deductions 
removed or replaced by general deduction  
  
The Norwegian tax reform not only went further in cutting rates and deductions. It generally 
applied principles meant to ensure economic efficiency in a more rigorous manner than other 
reforms. In particular, the principles of neutrality and symmetry were implemented in almost 
all areas. Neutrality meant that all types of capital income became subject to the same 
effective tax rate. This implied a uniform effective tax rate, irrespective of the type of 
investment, the form of ownership, or the source of financing. Symmetry meant that incomes 
and corresponding expenses were treated in the same way. When income was taxed at a 
certain rate, costs could be deducted against the same rate.          
 
5.3.2 The dual income tax model 
Equally characteristic as its attention to neutral taxation, was the specific tax model 
introduced by the reform, namely the ‘dual income tax’ (DIT) model. This model explicitly 
differentiates taxation between labor and capital income. Although this was not the first dual 
model, it was the most pure and sophisticated of its kind. The dual income tax model was 
attractive since it reconciled the efficiency principles of neutrality and symmetry with other 
crucial objectives, notably redistribution and revenue-raising. “The overall objective of the 
1992 reform was to achieve a moderate taxation of capital income that is neutral in a very 
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broad sense, while maintaining the distributional role of a progressive tax on labour income,” 
as Christiansen (2004:9) points out.  
 
In the reform, this model was realized through the introduction of two distinct tax bases, 
‘regular income’ and ‘personal income’ (NOU 2003:59). ‘Regular income’ is calculated for 
both individuals and corporations. Included in regular income are all types of taxable income 
from labor, corporate activity and capital. Taxable income equals total income minus 
deductions. The 1992 reform introduced a flat tax rate of 28 percent on regular income, which 
has not been changed since.  
 
‘Personal income’, however, is calculated only for individuals. ‘Personal income’ includes 
income from labor and pensions, without deductions of any kind. This income is subject to 
social security tax and surtax. The social security contribution was set at 7,8 percent for 
salaried workers. In addition, a surtax of 13,5 percent was levied on incomes above a certain 
threshold.  
 
These tax rules implied different treatment of labor and capital income, which is the hallmark 
of the DIT model. While capital income was taxed at a uniform flat rate of 28 percent, the 
taxation of labor income was progressive with a top marginal rate of 49,3 percent 
(28+7,8+13,5) for a salaried worker. 
 
Differential treatment of labor and capital income, however, requires that you are able to 
distinguish between these types of income in practice. While this is simple in the case of 
regular workers or large corporations, it is prohibitively difficult when it comes to small 
companies and the self-employed. To deal with this problem, the 1992 reform introduced an 
income-splitting model meant to serve as a bridge between personal and corporate taxation. 
This model applied to sole proprietorships, partnerships and corporations with active owners, 
that is, the types of firms where the returns to labor effort and capital assets were by definition 
entangled. Basically, it implied that for firms with ‘active owners’, part of the income was 
counted as labor income and therefore taxed at a higher rate. An ‘active owner’ was defined 
as someone who owned at least two thirds of the firm. 
 
The single taxation of all kinds of capital income represented another important feature of the 
1992 reform. In this regard, the reform was extremely loyal to the principle of neutrality. To 
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avoid discrimination of corporate investment, the reform introduced rules to prevent the 
double taxation of the profits of shareholders, whether they were dividends or capital gains 
(Christiansen 2004:10). Two novel measures were important to this effect. 
 
First, for dividends, an imputation system gave shareholders full tax credit against the 
personal tax on dividends for profits that had already been taxed at the corporate level. 
Second, for capital gains, a method called RISK was to prevent double taxation between 
corporation and individual. This method implied adjusting the tax value of shares for profit 
retentions, so that capital gains that reflected already-taxed retained earnings would not be 
taxed again. 
 
The 1992 reform did not, however, extend the principles of symmetry and neutrality to all 
areas. The reform maintained the feature that most blatantly violated these principles, namely 
the favorable tax treatment of owner-occupied housing. The tax system continued to privilege 
income from housing capital over other types of capital income. In particular, the value 
assessment of houses for taxation remained far below market value (Christiansen 2004:11).  
 
5.4 The reform effects on the functioning of the economy 
The 1992 tax reform engendered major changes in the functioning of the Norwegian 
economy. Most importantly, more neutral taxation of capital income led to a freer flow of 
capital. Also, limits on interest deductions meant higher after-tax real interest rates, which 
influenced savings and investment decisions. 
 
A number of the reform elements contributed to more neutral taxation of capital income. First, 
the reform eliminated deduction schemes, made depreciation rules more realistic, and severely 
limited firms’ opportunities to avoid tax by putting profits in funds. Second, it introduced a 
uniform tax rate on capital income. Third, single taxation of all kinds of capital income was 
established. 
 
In this way, the 1992 reform effectively levelled the playing field. A free, competitive market 
for capital replaced the old regime of specific tax incentives and directed capital flows. This 
was indeed a radical shift. “The tax reform was a steam roller that rolled over stumps and 
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bumps with considerable brutality and evened it all out,” as one informant vividly described 
it. 
 
The former tax system was weak in terms of neutrality, meaning that it strongly favored 
certain types of investment over others. In particular, the tax system gave firms incentives to 
retain profits and reinvest them in real capital. This locked capital into the companies. The 
1992 reform, however, removed these incentives. Tax rules no longer increased the after-tax 
profitability of investments that were not the most profitable before tax. The new tax system 
was to a large degree neutral between different investments. Thus, capital owners were 
induced to channel their investments to where they would give the largest returns. The result 
was an increased flow of capital. Some see this as an important impulse to the growing 
financialization of the Norwegian economy in the 1990s and 2000s, as the reform stimulated 
the flow of financial capital. 
 
The unlocking of capital had a couple of important economic implications. First, it generated 
higher and more equal returns to capital, at the same time as investments in real capital fell. 
From 1991 to 1993, there was a strong increase in the returns to capital. Although this was 
mainly caused by a booming economy, it appears that the tax reform triggered a shift in 
capital returns to a higher level (NOU 2003:64). While there was a 13,3 percent return to 
capital on average in the period 1970-1991, the average between 1992 and 2001 was 18,8 
percent. Moreover, the freer flow of capital generated convergence in the rates of return in the 
economy (Christiansen 2004:12). 
 
While the returns to capital rose, the investments in real capital fell. Under the former tax 
system investments in capital were favored, giving rise to a very capital-intensive production 
structure. These incentives disappeared with the 1992 reform. As a consequence, the level of 
real investment as a percentage of operating profits shifted markedly downwards from the two 
decades preceding reform to the decade following reform.  
 
Second, the unlocking of capital triggered a sharp rise in distributed profits. While the former 
tax system strongly favored keeping profits in the company instead of handing them out as 
dividends, the new tax rules did not discriminate between dividends and capital gains. As 
mentioned, dividends were only subject to taxation on the corporate level. Thus, more of the 
companies’ profits were taken out as dividends and less as capital gains. Total dividends 
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increased exponentially through the 1990s. Partly, this was explained by the distribution of 
old profits that had been hidden in tax-free funds. But it was also a direct consequence of 
more neutral capital taxation.  
 
Moreover, the 1992 reform reduced the gap between the real interest rate before and after tax 
by limiting interest deductions. This implied increased neutrality between saving and 
consumption, and led to a higher savings rate. Also, the new tax rules were neutral between 
the alternative ways of financing investments (loans, retained profits or equity capital). As a 
consequence, the part of investments financed through loans decreased, while the equity 
capital in Norwegian corporations increased.      
 
5.5 The reform outcomes 
5.5.1 The outcomes of reform in brief 
The three preceding sub-sections have treated the objectives of reform, the output of reform, 
and the consequences of reform for the workings of the economy. However, the most 
important question remains: What were the outcomes of the 1992 reform?  
 
In terms of efficiency and growth, the 1992 reform can be described as a considerable 
success. A better allocation of resources appears to have generated higher returns to capital 
and a gain in total welfare. Also, the reform likely had dynamic effects that contributed to 
strong economic growth in Norway in the 1990s.  
 
However, this did not imply more lenient treatment of capital. Tax revenue from corporations 
as a percentage of GDP increased considerably in the years after reform. The main reason was 
that capital income that had previously been hidden was made visible and liable to taxation. 
More generally, the reform strengthened the long-term capacity of the tax system to finance 
the welfare state. The elimination of deductions put an end to the revenue leakages of the old 
system, and the introduction of dual income tax model ensured high revenues from labor 
income. 
 
In terms of equality, the 1992 reform was partially successful. The reform neither led to a 
clear increase in inequality nor much stronger redistribution. The contribution of taxation to 
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income redistribution increased from before to after reform, but did not fully match the 
increase in pre-tax income inequality. In particular, the income-splitting model represented a 
problem in terms of equality. 
 
In the following, I present the detailed discussions of the reform outcomes on each of these 
variables: efficiency and growth, treatment of business/capital, revenue-raising capacity, and 
equality. The discussion is primarily based on a survey of statistical economic analyses. 
 
5.5.2 Effects on efficiency and growth 
The 1992 tax reform was clearly a success in terms of efficiency and growth. Not only did a 
more optimal allocation of resources increase total welfare. Experts also believe that the tax 
reform was an important factor behind Norway’s strong economic performance in the 1990s.  
 
As discussed in sub-section 5.4, the tax reform freed up the flow of capital, leading to higher 
and less dispersed returns to capital. Thus, it seems clear that the reform generated a better 
allocation of resources between sectors and businesses. A more optimal use of resources 
meant a welfare gain for the Norwegian society as a whole. The estimate of the most 
comprehensive empirical study is that tax reform led to an increase in total welfare equivalent 
to a 0,75 percent growth in private consumption per year (Holmøy and Vennemo 1995). Other 
studies find an increase of between 1 and 2 percent (NOU 2003:62).  
 
However, Holmøy and Vennemo’s estimate is conservative, as it does not incorporate 
dynamic effects. This likely underestimates the effect on economic growth, as the tax reform 
affected the behavior of economic actors, both regarding savings, investment and work. As 
discussed in section 5.4, savings went up, while the investments in real capital fell. Studies 
also find a certain increase in labor supply (cf. NOU 2003:67).  
 
Experts generally believe that the dynamic effects of the reform provided an important 
stimulus to economic growth (cf. NOU 2003; van den Noord 2000). The tax reform coincided 
with the beginning of a period of strong economic performance in Norway. Although this 
growth is mainly attributed to the positive business cycle, tax reform probably also played a 
significant role. In particular, the growth from 1992 onwards was not nearly as capital-
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intensive as it had been earlier. Thus, it appears that the tax reform generated a growth within 
Norwegian businesses that was based on other factors than intensive capital use.            
 
5.5.3 Effects on the treatment of business/capital 
Increased efficiency can be interpreted both as an expression of liberalization and 
rationalization. To determine if the tax reform primarily represented the former or the latter, 
an important additional variable is how corporations/capital were treated. Did the 1992 tax 
reform imply more lenient treatment of capital, as the liberalization hypothesis predicts?  
 
At first glance, this seems to be the case. In 1992, Norway cut the corporate tax rate to a lower 
level than in other countries and abolished the double taxation of dividends (van den Noord 
2000:14-15). The 1992 reform also included a tax amnesty for corporations, allowing them to 
dissolve old capital reserves free of tax. Distributed profits increased exponentially in the 
years following reform, generating enormous incomes for wealthy capital owners. This 
explosion in dividends did, however, only to a limited extent reflect a real growth in capital 
incomes, as we discuss in the next sub-section. 
 
Yet, the development in the total tax revenue from corporations does not match the hypothesis 
of liberalization. Tax revenue from corporations actually increased considerably in the years 
after reform, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of GDP. While the corporate tax take 
made up between 2 and 2,5 percent of mainland GDP in the period 1977-1991, it increased 
rapidly in the years following reform, hitting over 5 percent in 2000.  
 
Although some of the increase is explained by income shifting to the corporate tax base, the 
main reason for the revenue growth is that capital income that had previously been hidden 
was pulled out into the light. Under the old regime, large profits were kept inside corporations 
and the corresponding increase in value channelled to owners as capital gains that were 
neither taxed nor registered (Fjærli and Aaberge 2003:399). The new tax regime made these 
incomes visible and liable to taxation.  
 
The growth in tax revenues from corporations clearly suggests that the treatment of capital did 
not become more lenient. Rather, the tax reform seems to have stimulated growth in 
businesses while at the same time increasing their effective tax burden. The combination of a 
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low corporate tax rate and few deductions proved far more effective than the old tax regime in 
generating revenue from corporations. 
 
5.5.4 Effects on the capacity to raise revenue  
Raising revenue to finance the public sector is the fundamental objective of tax policy. 
Arguably, paying for the welfare state is also the tax system’s most important contribution to 
redistribution, as welfare transfers account for about three fourths of total redistribution in 
Norway (St.meld. nr. 9 (2008-2009):111). Therefore, to determine whether the 1992 tax 
reform implied liberalization or rational updating, its consequences for the ability to raise 
revenue are of utmost importance. Did the tax reform strengthen or weaken the long-term 
capacity to finance the welfare state? 
 
In absolute terms, tax revenues increased rapidly after 1992. Even though there has been a 
strong increase in GDP, tax revenue as a percentage of GDP has since remained stable or even 
increased marginally. This suggests that rather than limiting the growth of the welfare state, 
the tax system has allowed its continued expansion. 
 
As a revenue-raising machine, the post-1992 tax system appears to be much stronger than the 
old one. Importantly, the elimination of deductions put an end to the enormous leakages of the 
old system. This broadening of the tax base made it possible to raise a larger amount of 
revenue with much lower statutory rates.  
 
Also, the reform ensured that revenues grew automatically with the expansion of the 
economy. That is, larger revenues were generated by default and did not necessitate continual 
political adjustments. The reliance on flat rates with few exceptions – like the 25 percent 
value-added tax and the 28 percent tax on regular income – was crucial to this end.  
 
Moreover, the dual income tax (DIT) model introduced by the tax reform appears to have 
been particularly effective in terms of raising revenue. The different rates on labor and capital 
income have allowed the government to raise larger revenues from labor than they could have 
with a comprehensive income tax (CIT). And as we saw in the previous sub-section, corporate 
tax revenues have also increased despite much lower statutory rates. In sum, the 1992 reform 
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strengthened the ability of the tax system to finance the Norwegian welfare state. This 
supports the hypothesis of rational updating.  
 
5.5.5 Effects on equality 
Finally, what was the outcome of the 1992 tax reform in terms of economic equality? A 
common perception is that the tax reform ushered in an era of higher income inequality in 
Norway. And indeed, when we employ the standard definition of income, the statistics reveal 
that income inequality soared during the 1990s. The Gini coefficient increased from 0,224 in 
1986 to 0,255 in 1996 and 0,276 in 2000, a total growth of 23 percent (NOU 2003:70).  
 
The observed increase in inequality is almost entirely explained by an exponential growth in 
capital incomes after the tax reform, especially in dividends and profits from realization of 
stocks. The total value of these two types of capital income increased tenfold from 1991 to 
1996, rising from about 2 to nearly 20 billion NOK (2006 value) (Fjærli and Aaberge 
2003:401). Inequality increased since it was almost exclusively high-income households that 
received these kinds of capital income. For instance, the top 10 percent in the income 
distribution received 90 percent of dividends. If dividends and profits from stocks are 
excluded, inequality measured by Gini coefficient is unchanged from before to after the 
reform (NOU 2003:71). 
 
However, these statistics likely overestimate the growth in inequality. A considerable part of 
the observed increase in inequality is due to the fact that capital incomes were made more 
visible after the tax reform (Fjærli and Aaberge 2003). Before reform, the tax system gave 
owners incentives to keep profits in the business rather than collecting dividends. Instead, the 
returns to capital were taken out as stock profits that were tax-free and did not appear in 
official statistics. This changed with the tax reform, as it implied equal treatment of all types 
of capital income. As a consequence, more of the profits in businesses were handed out as 
dividends. Also, new rules for taxing stock profits meant that a larger portion of these gains 
was made visible. Therefore, the registered increase in capital incomes and the corresponding 
growth in inequality are largely a statistical artefact, and they do not reflect the real 
development in incomes.  
 
112 
Statisticians have employed an alternative income definition to get a more correct estimate of 
the development in income inequality, understood as the differences in the possibility for 
consumption between households7.  
 
Contrary to the results from the standard measurement, the alternative estimates show only a 
marginal increase in income inequality in the period around tax reform. The Gini coefficient 
increased from 0,233 in 1986 to 0,243 in 1996 and 0,242 in 2000, a total growth of only 4 
percent (NOU 2003:72). Further, the estimates show that this growth in inequality is not 
explained by higher capital incomes for the wealthy, but by developments at the bottom of the 
income spectrum (Fjærli and Aaberge 2003:407). Thus, the contention that the 1992 tax 
reform led to a strong increase in inequality based on large capital incomes for the wealthy, 
finds little support in these data. 
 
But what exactly was the effect of the changes in tax policy on redistribution? An analysis of 
changes in the tax burden on different income groups suggests a more progressive 
distribution. From 1986 to 2000, the effective tax burden decreased marginally for the bottom 
60 percent of households in the income distribution, while it increased a little for the top 40 
percent (NOU 2003:72-73). Also, estimates from Statistics Norway (2002) show that the 
contribution of taxation to income redistribution increased from the period before reform to 
the period after. The tax system made the increase in income inequality – which was mostly 
driven by the wage development – less severe. 
 
However, when also taking the development in pre-tax income into account, Thoresen (2002) 
finds that the real progressiveness of the tax system decreased from 1991 to 1999. The reason 
is that the inequality in the distribution of income before tax increased, without a 
corresponding increase in the inequality in the distribution of the tax burden. In other words, 
the tax system did not cancel out the increase in pre-tax income inequality. An important 
reason for this appears to have been that the DIT model’s wide gap between the tax rates on 
labor and capital motivated income shifting. This allowed high-income earners to lower their 
tax burden. Yet, the 1992 tax reform in itself only accounts for a small portion of the decrease 
in real progressiveness. Subsequent adjustments in the income-splitting model and lack of 
                                                 
7
 Instead of measuring the dividends or stock profits that are realized in a given year, they estimate the long-term 
consumption possibilities from capital investments. For details, see Fjærli and Aaberge (2003). 
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index regulation of benefits are more important factors for explaining this decrease (Thoresen 
2002). 
 
A reasonable conclusion would be that the 1992 tax reform neither led to a clear increase in 
inequality nor much stronger redistribution. On the one hand, the contribution of taxation to 
income redistribution increased from before to after reform, preventing a large increase in 
inequality. On the other hand, the stronger progressiveness in the distribution of the tax 
burden did not fully match the increase in pre-tax income inequality. On balance, the result of 
the 1992 reform appears to be continuity in terms of equity.  
 
5.6 Empirical epilogue 
What happened afterwards? On the one hand, the 1992 tax reform proved remarkably robust, 
as the core principles it introduced have not been abandoned. The broad lines of tax policy 
today are the same as they were in 1992. On the other hand, there were a number of minor yet 
consequential changes during the 1990s and a new major reform in 2006 that revised the 1992 
reform. 
    
Almost instantly after the reform in 1992, politicians started pecking away at the income-
splitting model. This model was the most vulnerable part of the tax system, as it represented 
the bridge between personal and corporate taxation. The model had already been alleviated 
during the reform negotiations. After the reform, a series of additional minor changes were 
passed, all of which served to facilitate the reclassification of income from the labor to the 
capital tax base. This made the income-splitting model increasingly ineffective. It allowed 
many individuals with high labor incomes to shift income so that they faced a considerably 
lower tax rate. An expression for this is that the proportion of corporations subject to income-
splitting fell from 55 percent in 1992 to 32 percent in 2000 (Christiansen 2004). Due to this, 
the tax system’s direct redistributive effect deteriorated somewhat during the 1990s. 
 
There were also other minor changes in the following years. In 1996, the bourgeois opposition 
in parliament passed a reform of shipping taxation that the government was forced to 
implement. The reform gave the shipping sector a large de facto tax break, as profits were 
exempt of taxation as long as they were kept in the company. In personal taxation, the Labor 
government introduced an extra bracket in the surtax in 2000, increasing the tax rate on the 
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highest labor incomes by 6 percent. This was subsequently reversed by the Conservative 
coalition in power from 2001 to 2005. 
 
In 2004, a new tax reform was passed, which entered into effect in 2006. This reform was in 
the spirit of the 1992 reform, but introduced novel solutions in areas where the 1992 reform 
had failed. Most importantly, it narrowed the gap between the effective tax rate on labor 
income and capital income for individuals. The income shifting motivated by this large rate 
gap had represented a headache for policy-makers ever since 1992.  
 
To deal with this, the 2006 reform replaced the income-splitting model with the so-called 
shareholder model. The shareholder model implies double taxation of dividends and stock 
profits above an imputed normal rate of return. This meant tightened taxation of capital, as 
personal capital income was now taxed first 28 percent at the corporate level and then an 
additional 28 percent of the remaining income at the personal level. In practice, however, this 
tightening has had little effect so far due to its timing. As the entrance values of stocks were 
calculated in 2005 when the stock market was at a peak, the calculated taxable income from 
this source has been modest. 
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Chapter 6: Analysis 
6.1 The analysis in brief 
What was the result of the Norwegian tax reform of 1992, and how can we explain this 
outcome? This chapter present the analysis of these questions, which is based on my empirical 
investigation and illuminated by the theoretical literature. To preview the main findings: The 
1992 reform was primarily characterized by rational updating rather than liberalization. This 
is discussed in section 6.2. Why was the Norwegian tax system move in a rational instead of a 
liberal direction? In section 6.3, I argue that this outcome depended on the process of change. 
Rational updating was possible only because a fundamental reform was passed.  
 
But why was large-scale reform feasible? In section 6.4, I analyze the structural, ideational 
and institutional preconditions for the reform. Section 6.5 explores the specific interactions 
between these factors and highlights the mechanisms that contributed to reform. 
 
6.2 The reform outcome: rational updating 
The first major finding of this study is that the Norwegian tax reform of 1992 was 
characterized by rational updating rather than liberalization. Tax policy did not take off in a 
liberal direction; it stayed on the social democratic ‘middle way’. The middle way was 
fundamentally recalibrated, though. The 1992 reform evened out the bumpy road of activist 
post-war tax policy, turning the Norwegian tax system into a smooth highway of neutral 
taxation. As a consequence, the Norwegian economy could accelerate, and the state could 
collect larger road tolls (that is, tax revenues). In other words, the 1992 tax reform did not 
mark the death of social democratic tax policy; it should rather be regarded as a crucial 
element in the modernization of the social democratic project.    
 
As shown in section 5.5, the 1992 tax reform was a success in terms of economic efficiency 
and growth. Tax reform generated a better allocation of resources and higher returns to 
capital, and its dynamic effects likely contributed to the strong economic growth in Norway in 
the 1990s. Greater efficiency, however, did not come at the expense of equality. The total 
ability of the tax system to generate outcomes of equality was reinforced by the reform, not 
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weakened. This matches the hypothesis of rational updating and contradicts the liberalization 
hypothesis. 
 
Most importantly, the reform strengthened the capacity of the tax system to raise revenue to 
pay for the welfare state. In particular, three features contributed to this: First, the elimination 
of deductions put an end to the revenue leakages of the old system; second, the dual income 
tax model ensured high revenues from labor income; and third, new rules made previously 
hidden capital income visible and liable to taxation. The reform did however maintain the 
generous tax treatment of owner-occupied housing, which implied forgone tax revenue. But 
on balance the reform made tax policy better able to fulfil its core function of raising revenue. 
This also constitutes the tax system’s most important contribution to redistribution, as welfare 
transfers account for three fourths of total redistribution in Norway. As such, the reform of tax 
policy allowed the continued expansion of the Norwegian welfare state. 
 
At the same time, the reform did not weaken the redistribution of income within the tax 
system. The oft-repeated accusation that the tax reform produced a surge in income inequality 
turns out to be based on a statistical artefact. What the statistical studies show is that the 
reform neither led to a clear increase nor decrease in economic inequality, even though the 
ineffective income-splitting model represented a growing problem in terms of equality. 
 
My findings do not support Swank and Steinmo’s (2002:643,651) contention that the tax 
reforms of the early 1990s implied a “shift in policy paradigm”. According to Hall (1993), a 
paradigm shift in economic policy involves a reformulation of the basic goals and ends of 
policy. In the Norwegian tax reform, however, the changes in policy means were far more 
important than the changes in policy goals. Revenue-raising remained the core objective of 
policy, and concerns about efficiency did not replace equity objectives. The investigation 
shows that equality and efficiency were equally important concerns behind the reform in 
1992. As such, my findings support to argument that “tax reforms did not fundamentally 
change the weighting of different tax policy goals (efficiency and equity) but tried to better 
achieve both goals” (Ganghof 2007:1066). 
 
Yet, my study suggests that Ganghof’s interpretation is a bit too simple, as it gives the 
impression of perfect continuity in objectives. This conclusion does not fit the Norwegian 
case, as the goal of economic efficiency was clearly more important in the 1992 reform than 
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before. The point is rather that instead of crowding out other core objectives, the goal of 
efficiency complemented the other goals. That is, tax reform was not a zero-sum game. The 
architects behind tax reform were more concerned about an efficient allocation of resources 
than previously, but they were not less preoccupied with equality and raising revenue. Thus, 
one could say that policy-makers became more concerned with raising revenue and 
redistributing income at a limited cost to the economy. 
 
However, there is reason to be cautious about the general scope of this analysis. Although the 
findings are relevant for the general understanding of the wave of tax reforms, they are most 
clearly applicable to the analysis of tax policy change in the Nordic countries. An important 
reason for this is that the Nordic countries all implemented dual income tax (DIT) models, 
which differed from the models chosen in other countries. In the closing chapter I briefly 
discuss the Norwegian case in a comparative perspective.  
 
6.3 Rational updating through large-scale reform 
6.3.1 Liberal inertia, rational reform  
Why was the Norwegian tax system subject to rational updating rather than liberalization? I 
argue that this outcome depended on the process of change. Rationalization was possible 
because a large-scale reform was implemented. Authoritative policy change appears to have 
been a necessary precondition for the rational updating of the tax system.   
 
Within-case comparison constitutes the main empirical basis for this claim. When we look at 
the development of tax policy in Norway from 1980 until today, there are several instances of 
policy change (or the lack thereof) and corresponding outcomes. These cases suggest a 
systematic relationship between processes of change and outcomes of change. When there is 
incremental policy change – or no change at all – the outcome is most often liberalization. 
Instances of large-scale policy change, on the other hand, result in rational updating.  
 
Let us first look at the periods of incremental policy change. During the 1980s, the lack of 
major policy change made the tax system increasingly deficient. The tax system was subject 
to more and more subversive action that undermined its ability to redistribute income and 
generate revenue, leading to de facto liberalization. The dynamics of tax policy in the decade 
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following the 1992 reform were slightly different. Almost instantly after the reform, 
politicians started pecking away at the system. Several minor changes were passed, most of 
them relating to the income-splitting model. These incremental changes represented 
alleviations of the tax rules, making it easier to reclassify income from the labor to the capital 
tax base. This undermined the tax system’s ability both to redistribute and to raise revenue. 
Thus, during both periods, incremental changes to tax policy implied liberalization.           
 
The three instances of large or medium-scale policy change, on the contrary, led to 
rationalization. First, the medium-scale 1987 tax reform introduced a limit on interest 
deductions, which increased the actual tax burden on the well off and strengthened the 
capacity to raise revenue. Second, the fundamental 1992 tax reform was mainly characterized 
by rational updating, as argued in section 6.2. Third, the comprehensive 2006 tax reform 
removed the incentives to reclassify income and tightened capital taxation by introducing 
double taxation of dividends.   
 
6.3.2 Institutional theory revisited  
These findings are incompatible with Pierson’s view (and more broadly the punctuated 
equilibrium model) of the relationship between processes and outcomes of change (see 
section 2.2.2). Pierson (2000) argues that incremental processes of change produce continuity 
in outcomes. His contention is that path dependent change precludes welfare state 
retrenchment/liberalization. However, my investigation of Norwegian tax policy shows that 
adjustments within the existing policy path generated discontinuity in outcomes in the form of 
liberalization. Path dependent change did not prevent liberalization, it actually promoted it. 
 
Pierson’s argument about path dependence is complemented with the argument about critical 
junctures. This says that at critical moments, radical shifts will occur that cause discontinuity 
in outcomes. Again, the present case seems to defy this logic. The early 1990s can be 
understood as a critical juncture in Norwegian tax policy, which produced major policy 
change that shaped the contours of the tax system for decades to come. Yet, this fundamental 
remaking of tax policy produced continuity in outcomes. At this critical moment, policy-
makers did not send tax policy off in a different (and liberal) direction; they reoriented the tax 
system towards its core objectives. More broadly, the critical junctures of 1987, 1991 and 
2004 were actually the only instances of policy change that produced continuity in outcomes. 
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All in all, my findings are consonant with Streeck and Thelen’s (2005) critique of the 
punctuated equilibrium model of change. Neither can incremental change be equated to 
continuity in outcomes, nor does abrupt change imply discontinuity in outcomes. Streeck and 
Thelen present an alternative view of the relationship between processes and outcomes of 
change, arguing that (most) often, incremental change is the source of discontinuity in the 
form of liberalization. The Norwegian tax policy case supports this alternative view.  
 
When the tax system was not tended to, it was subject to erosion through drift (cf. Hacker 
2005). The inability to update policies to an increasingly complex economic environment 
made the tax system falter. Policies drifted off from the core objectives of the tax system. To a 
growing extent, the old tax policy regime gave free play to the subversive actions of the firms 
and individuals with sufficient resources to engage in tax planning and avoidance. This 
weakened the capacity of the tax system to raise revenue and redistribute income, implying 
liberalization as here defined. 
 
Conversely, when the tax system was subjected to major changes, rational updating resulted. 
The 1992 reform is a striking example of the combination of drastic policy change and 
continuity in outcomes. Even though Streeck and Thelen do not elaborate on this type of 
institutional change, this finding is perfectly consistent with their argument. As they put it, 
“institutions require active maintenance; to remain what they are they need to be reset and 
refocused, or sometimes more fundamentally recalibrated and renegotiated, in response to 
changes in the political and economic environment in which they are embedded” (Streeck and 
Thelen 2005:24).  
 
The Norwegian tax reform of 1992 implied a fundamental recalibration of the tax system, 
which allowed it to effectively maintain its core objectives. Through reform, tax policy means 
were updated to handle the complexity of a modern economy. Given the new political-
economic context, the reform reunited policy means with objectives. As Ganghof (2007:1081) 
argues, drastic changes in tax rules were necessary to defend the underlying substantive status 
quo. Large changes were key to preserving the essential aim of tax policy, namely to finance 
the welfare state and redistribute income at a limited cost to the economy.  
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With reference to the discussion about path dependence, this case shows how a change of 
policy paths was a precondition for rational updating. The existing tax policy path turned out 
to be a dead end. As the economic environment changed, it became virtually impossible to 
achieve the core objectives of the tax system through adjustments within the existing path. In 
Norway, tax policy started to break off this path in 1987 with the passage of the personal tax 
reform, before the definitive rupture occurred in 1992. This shift of policy paths produced 
more rational tax policy and deterred liberalization. 
 
6.3.3 Mechanisms that link large-scale reform to rational updating 
Yet, this study also had the explicit aim of exploring the mechanisms underlying a potential 
relationship between fundamental reform and continuity in outcomes. What is it about large-
scale policy change that can make it conducive to rational updating? A discussion of the 
mechanisms at work in our case – the Norwegian tax reform of 1992 – can illuminate this 
general question. 
 
My investigation suggests three (more or less) general mechanisms that link large-scale 
reform to outcomes of rational updating. First, large reforms increase the participation of 
experts in policy-formulation. Second, fundamental policy change allows for more coherent 
solutions. Third, comprehensive policy change may shore up political opposition, since 
groups that lose from one reform measure will often benefit from another measure. 
 
A first characteristic of major reforms of the political economy is that experts have a more 
important role in the formulation of policy. Large-scale reform tends to privilege the 
participation of internal and external experts relative to that of politicians. This is especially 
true in the field of tax policy. While incremental changes can be made by politicians alone, 
larger changes per definition involve experts. That is, the probability that experts are not 
involved in policy-formulation will decrease with the size of policy change. 
 
Stronger expert involvement in policy-formulation can be expected to increase the rationality 
of policy solutions. The point is not that experts per definition will provide better solutions 
than politicians. But on average, expert influence will lower the probability of irrational 
policy changes. Hence, one possible link from large-scale reform to rational outcomes goes 
through the participation of experts in designing policy. (An important objection is that 
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outcomes will depend on the views of experts. Economic experts may for instance be strongly 
in favor of liberalization. Thus, it may be necessary to add a condition to the argument, 
namely that experts do not actively pursue a liberal agenda.)   
  
In the case of Norwegian tax policy, there are clear indications that such a mechanism is at 
work. Several incremental tax policy changes have been implemented by politicians against 
the advice of experts, and have led to liberalization. For instance, this was the case with the 
changes in the income-splitting model after 1992 and in shipping taxation in 1996. 
 
Second, instances of major policy change open for more coherent solutions. The remaking of 
an entire system (or large parts of it) allows policy-makers – both politicians and experts – to 
think more systematically about policy design. For instance, large reform gives policy-makers 
the opportunity to apply general principles to an entire policy area. This will privilege 
coherent policy solutions. Small changes appear to have the opposite effect, as they are 
conducive to ad hoc-solutions. 
 
Generally, we can expect coherent policy to imply more rational solutions. This is clearly the 
case in the area of tax policy. Coherence appears to be a prerequisite for good tax policy, as 
there are strong inter-linkages between different elements of the tax system. The effect of one 
tax rule or scheme is highly contingent upon other rules. For instance, high statutory tax rates 
do not imply high effective tax rates if they are combined with large deductions. In addition, 
the uniform application of general tax principles is in line with the economic idea about 
neutrality. The economic argument is that neutral taxation leads to efficiency in the allocation 
of resources. Hence, the second possible link from large-scale reform to rational outcomes 
goes through coherent policy solutions. 
 
Third, large reform means that policy-makers can make simultaneous changes to a large 
number of schemes. Incremental change, on the other hand, is usually limited to a single 
scheme. Isolated restrictive policy changes are bound to create some clear losers and are 
therefore often met with fierce opposition. But when measures are bundled together, gains and 
losses may be distributed pretty evenly. Changing many schemes at the same time may thus 
shore up political opposition, since groups that lose from one reform measure will often 
benefit from another. Thereby, large-scale reform can make it easier to gain acceptance for 
rational policy measures.  
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This logic was apparent in the case of Norwegian tax policy. Policy-makers found it difficult 
to eliminate or limit generous deduction schemes, since the groups that benefited from a 
particular tax deduction would always fiercely oppose such proposals. Major reform, 
however, meant that those who lost from the elimination of a deduction would benefit from 
other policy changes, such as rate cuts. On balance, few groups were clear losers, something 
that reduced political opposition. 
 
6.3.4 Beyond large-scale reform: the sources of rational updatin 
However, to explain the outcome of rational updating, it is also necessary to look beyond the 
general features of large-scale reform. The answer to why the Norwegian tax reform resulted 
in more rational policy (rather than more liberal policy) lies partly in the factors that caused 
large-scale reform in this case. These structural, ideational and institutional preconditions for 
reform are the subject of the next section. The influence of these factors on the outcome of 
rational updating can be summarized as follows: 
 
Firstly, the serious structural deficiencies of the existing tax regime gave policy-makers large 
room for rational updating of policy. Secondly, new tax policy ideas, taken from abroad and 
further developed by national experts, provided policy-makers with a blueprint for how to 
better achieve the core tax policy goals. Thirdly, the fact that large-scale reform was the 
product of broad political consensus – rather than strong government – ensured a balanced 
reform and precluded liberalization. Since broad-based compromise can largely be explained 
by the Norwegian institutional setting, this represents a link between Nordic-style political 
institutions and rational updating of policy.      
 
6.4 Explaining large-scale reform 
6.4.1 The preconditions for large-scale reform 
The large-scale tax reform of 1992 led to a rational updating of tax policy. But why was it 
possible for political actors to agree upon such a fundamental reform? My investigation 
suggests that there were three necessary preconditions. First, the huge problems of the 
existing tax system were a structural precondition for reform. A tax structure that was 
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deficient and increasingly harmful to the economy represented the reason why politicians 
wanted reform. Second, the development of new economic ideas about taxation constituted an 
ideational precondition for large-scale reform. These ideas provided policy-makers with the 
substance of reform. Third, Norwegian political institutions were an institutional precondition 
for large-scale reform. By shaping the preferences and strategies of the main political actors, 
these institutions generated the political agreement on reform. Figure 6.1 provides a simple 
model to illustrate how these factors influenced reform. 
 
In other words, structural, ideational and institutional factors are all necessary to account for 
the 1992 tax reform. In this section, I look at the role of each of them in turn. In section 6.5, I 
analyze how the specific interactions between these factors produced reform. It warrants 
emphasis, however, that these factors explain reform in the sense that they shape the 
preferences and actions of human agents. It is after all actors that perceive structural 
problems, pick up and spread ideas, and pursue political action within institutions. In this 
account, politicians from the Labor and Conservative parties, as well as economic 
bureaucrats, are the most important actors.   
 
 
Large-scale 
policy change 
Rational 
updating 
Norwegian political 
institutions 
Structural problems 
of extant tax system 
Development of new 
tax policy ideas 
Process/scale 
of change 
Outcomes of 
change 
Figure 6.1: Causal model of the 1992 Norwegian tax reform 
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6.4.2 Structural problems of the tax system 
In explaining developments in tax policy since the 1980s, the tax literature has put great 
emphasis on structural factors, especially those at the international level. It has become 
conventional wisdom that economic internationalization has imposed strong structural 
constraints on tax policy-makers (e.g. Swank and Steinmo 2002; Ganghof 2006). 
Interestingly, I find that international structural factors were not at all important for the 
Norwegian tax reform of 1992. The interviews reveal that international tax competition was 
not a major concern for Norwegian policy-makers during the 1980s. Ganghof misses the mark 
when he writes of the Norwegian reform that “[t]he most important reform goal was to 
achieve competitive […] capital income taxation” (Ganghof 2006:96). 
 
We can partly attribute the finding that economic internationalization was not important for 
the 1992 reform to the fact that the discussion about international capital mobility first really 
emerged at a later point in time. But another important reason is that under the Norwegian tax 
regime of the 1970s and 80s, the effective tax rate on capital was very low. The low effective 
taxes on capital were partly the result of an intentional policy aimed at stimulating production 
in businesses, and partly the unintended consequence of the many deduction schemes. Thus, 
mobile capital already carried very little of the tax burden, albeit for other reasons than the 
fear of capital flight. Because of this, there was no structural pressure to shift the tax burden 
from this income base to immobile income sources. 
  
The Norwegian tax reform was instead motivated by structural factors on the domestic level. 
That is, the structural problems of the extant Norwegian tax system represented the rationale 
for reform. This finding is consistent with Ganghof’s (2007) argument that the tax reforms of 
the 80s and 90s were first and foremost a response to the pathologies of the existing tax policy 
regimes.   
 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Norwegian tax system grew more and more deficient. 
From the outset, Labor saw the tax system as a problem in terms of equality and fairness, 
while the Conservatives regarded it as an impediment to production. However, during the 
1980s, policy-makers from both parties became increasingly aware that the existing ‘high 
rate, large deductions’ tax regime was ineffective both in terms of revenue-raising, 
redistribution, allocation of resources, and economic growth.       
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The inability of the tax system to achieve its core goals was the source of the desire for policy 
change among politicians. That is, it generated the demand for reform. Yet, an important 
reason why it took politicians so many years to agree on some kind of tax reform, was that 
this demand was much stronger in the Labor party than in the Conservative party. Labor party 
elites clearly wanted reform already in 1980, while in the Conservative party leadership a 
sceptical attitude to reform prevailed for a long time. Those in charge in the Conservative 
party did not become convinced that reform was needed until the late 1980s.  
 
When finally a strong common feeling emerged that something needed to be done about tax 
policy, it was because of the catastrophic macro-economic effects of the tax system from the 
mid-1980s onwards. First, the hyper-expansion of credit from 1984 to 1987 partly driven by 
generous interest deduction rules made politicians realize that personal tax reform was 
necessary. Second, the subsequent economic downturn convinced central policy-makers that 
the entire tax system needed deep-seated structural reform. This development confirms 
Tranøy’s (2000:87) predictions about the impact of crisis on reform. In the absence of crisis, 
policy-makers were unable to revise the tax system. Only when the economy was expanding 
uncontrollably or contracting dramatically were reforms effectuated.  
 
Taken together, the increasing structural problems of tax policy gave politicians strong 
reasons to want reform. Without this rationale, large-scale policy change would not have been 
possible. The inertia in the early 1980s showed that reform was not feasible in the absence of 
a strong common demand for change. In other words, structural problems were crucial for 
reform in the sense that they opened up a political space for large-scale policy change.  
 
Moreover, the serious deficiencies of the existing regime gave policy-makers large room for 
rational updating of policy. In this regard, the Norwegian case supports the point that 
rationalization of policy was possible partly because the old tax regimes “turned out to 
undermine efficiency, progressivity, and revenue-raising alike” (Ganghof 2007:1066).      
 
However, huge structural problems were not a sufficient condition for the 1992 reform. 
Although policy-makers were aware of the equity and efficiency problems of the tax system, 
they were for a long time neither able to ascertain the appropriate solutions nor agree on 
major policy changes. Even the strong economic downturn did not generate immediate 
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reform. This means that structural factors can only take us so far in accounting for reform. 
Structure needs to be complemented with ideas and institutions, which in the case of 
Norwegian tax reform were crucial explanatory factors. 
  
6.4.3 New tax policy ideas 
New economic ideas about taxation were a second necessary precondition for fundamental 
reform, as they provided its substance. Modern tax policy ideas originally emerged abroad, 
but were further developed, adapted and specified by experts on the national level. This 
process reached its climax in the 1989 Aarbakke public commission report. In the 1992 
reform, policy-makers adopted its conclusions more or less wholesale. The reform introduced 
the particular version of the dual income tax (DIT) model recommended by the Aarbakke 
commission. Thus, new ideas about tax policy made up the content of reform. 
 
The observation that ideas provided the substantive prerequisite for policy change speaks to a 
more general discussion. Lieberman argues that “institutional approaches in political science 
are limited in their capacity to account for the substantive course of politics […] Ideas … can 
fill this explanatory gap [as] they constitute much of the substantive raw material upon which 
institutional theory feeds” (Lieberman 2002:697). The case of tax reform in Norway shows 
the relevance of this point. Any account of the reform that ignored the role of ideas would 
have been incomplete. 
 
The kind of fundamental reform that was passed in 1992 would not have been possible 
without the novel tax policy ideas. The development of ideas that proceeded throughout the 
1980s effectively pushed the possibility frontier for tax reform. When Finance Minister 
Sigbjørn Johnsen presented the tax reform in 1991, he said: “This reform came ten years too 
late”. However, a reform of this calibre would have been unthinkable only a decade earlier. 
 
This finding supports Blyth’s argument that new economic ideas are the “prerequisite of 
radical policy changes”. Novel ideas allow policy regimes to break out of the normal logic of 
incremental change: “While it is true that policy changes in advanced capitalist states tend to 
be incremental, nonetheless the espousal of critical economic ideas is clearly related to 
periods of deep-seated institutional reform” (Blyth 1997:246). The logical implication of this 
argument would be that the outcome of such fundamental reform is conditioned by the 
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character of the critical ideas. As such, the adaptation and further development of tax policy 
ideas by Norwegian experts is part of the explanation for why rational updating was the 
outcome of the large-scale Norwegian tax reform. 
 
Ideas represent an independent explanatory factor for the 1992 reform. They were neither the 
product of structural conditions nor institutional processes. However, the role of new tax 
policy ideas must be understood in relation with both structure and institutions. The influence 
of ideas on policy was contingent upon, on the one hand, their ability to respond to structural 
problems, and on the other hand, their constitution and transmission within political 
institutions. These relationships will be discussed in section 6.5. 
 
6.4.4 Norwegian political institutions  
Political institutions capable of generating political consensus represented the third 
precondition for fundamental tax reform. Norwegian political institutions structured politics in 
a way that favored broad agreement on reform. In our case, there was both growing demand 
for reform and eventually a supply of solutions. But decision-making institutions were crucial 
for bringing about reform as they moulded and joined demand and supply. The institutional 
setting both stimulated convergence in preferences among political actors around expert 
solutions, and facilitated the pursuit of cooperative political strategies.  
 
In particular, institutions influenced the strategies of the Conservative party, which had an 
ambivalent attitude to reform. Institutional features tipped the balance in favor of the 
reformist strategy in the Conservative camp, by lowering the costs of working for 
fundamental policy change relative to working against it. This made it possible for politicians 
to reach a reform compromise.  
 
The Norwegian tax reform of 1992 would not have been possible without this positive 
influence from political institutions. Or more precisely, a reform as fundamental, well 
founded and broadly agreed upon as the 1992 reform could not have resulted without the 
intervention of these institutional factors. 
  
These findings are of particular theoretical interest. It supports the hypothesis that Nordic-
style political institutions provide an environment that is conducive to authoritative policy 
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change, at least under certain conditions. In the institutionalist literature on change in 
advanced political economies the central argument is that the dynamics of political 
institutions make large-scale reform difficult (Pierson 2000; Streeck and Thelen 2005). For 
instance, American institutions are found to provide high institutional barriers to reform and 
give political actors disincentives to pursue reform strategies (Hacker 2005).  
 
Norwegian decision-making institutions, however, can be argued to have the opposite effect. 
In the case of tax policy, political institutions facilitated large-scale updating reform. 
Institutional features lowered the barriers to reform and encouraged political actors to commit 
to fundamental policy change, rather than block it. The clearest expression for this is the 
actions of the Conservative party, for whom this choice was very real. While Hacker (2005) 
argues that American political institutions gave conservatives in opposition to the welfare 
system incentives to work against reform, I find that the Norwegian institutional setting 
induced conservatives sceptical of taxation to work for tax reform.          
 
More generally, the findings confirm the main theoretical expectations regarding political 
institutions in the Nordic countries, namely that they produce consensual politics that generate 
rational and stable policies. In our case, political institutions generated consensus both 
between politicians and experts and among political parties. (Although unions and employers 
were not as central as expected, also they were party to the reform compromise.) Consensus 
along these two axes produced a balanced reform that was robust both economically and 
politically. 
 
Thus, the fact that large-scale reform was the product of broad political consensus appears to 
have privileged the outcome of rational updating. Liberalization seems a far more likely 
outcome when implemented by a strong government acting alone, than when it is based on 
broad consensus among political actors. This argument suggests a link between Nordic-style 
political institutions and rational updating of policy. The consensual character of these 
political systems appears to make them conducive to large-scale updating reform.  
 
Lastly, the importance of institutional factors relative to other explanatory factors warrants 
discussion. Although institutions were crucial for the outcome, they cannot explain reform 
alone. The institutional generation of reform agreement was based upon both the rationale for 
reform provided by structural problems and the substantial reform solutions stemming from 
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novel tax policy ideas. And the context of economic crisis represents at least part of the 
explanation why decision-making institutions could produce large-scale reform. 
 
Such an understanding of the relationship between structure, ideas and institutions helps us 
explain why the Norwegian decision-making system was not able to generate tax reform 
before 1992. Institutional factors alone cannot explain this fact, as the institutional setting was 
more or less constant through the 1980s and early 1990s. What changed, however, was the 
structural and ideational input. In the late 1980s, increasing structural problems had generated 
a common feeling in the Labor party and important parts of the Conservative party that reform 
was needed, and experts had developed highly sophisticated tax policy ideas. This provided 
the necessary raw material out of which institutions could shape tax reform.  
 
6.5 The mechanisms behind reform 
6.5.1 Interaction between structure, ideas and institutions 
In the preceding section, I discussed the influence of respectively structural, ideational and 
institutional factors on the 1992 tax reform. In this section, I look at the specific mechanisms 
through which these factors produced large-scale policy change. That is, I explore the causal 
pathways that connect these variables to the reform. The interaction between structural, 
ideational and institutional variables is at the core of this account.  
 
I first discuss the relationship between ideas and structure (6.5.2). New economic ideas were 
influential on policy because they ‘fit’ well with the structural environment. Second, I look at 
the interaction between institutions and ideas. On the one hand, ideas responded well to the 
deficiencies of the tax system partly because they were constituted within Norwegian political 
institutions (6.5.3). On the other hand, institutional features increased the ideational influence 
on policy by stimulating the transmission of new tax policy ideas between actors (6.5.4). 
Finally, I discuss how features of Norwegian political institutions made it easier for political 
actors to pursue cooperative strategies (6.5.5).  
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6.5.2 Structure and ideas 
The linkage between structural and ideational factors was crucial for the 1992 tax reform. The 
importance of each factor for reform was contingent upon the presence of the other. Neither 
factor was important in isolation. But together, they had profound influence on reform. 
  
However grave they were, the structural problems of the tax system did not in themselves 
bring about large-scale policy change. Rather, we can say that the dissatisfaction with the 
existing tax system opened up a political space. This space needed to be filled. In our case, 
ideas took on this role. While structural problems generated the demand for reform among 
political actors, ideas supplied them with the solutions. 
 
This observation supports Blyth’s (2001) argument about the relation between structural and 
ideational factors. In the tax case, structural factors only bring us halfway in explaining policy 
regime change. While structural problems account for the instability of the extant regime, they 
tell us nothing about what a new regime would look like. That is, structural explanations are 
indeterminate regarding the outcome of reform.  
 
Therefore, ideas are crucial components of explanations of policy regime change. New 
economic ideas provided the substance of the tax policy regime established by the 1992 
reform. The sophisticated dual income tax (DIT) model that was introduced was the product 
of idea development. As such, ideas constituted the crucial link between the deficiencies of 
the old system and the tax reform meant to improve it. Thus, we can understand economic 
ideas as “key mediating variables” (Blyth 2001:5) between structural change in the economic 
sphere and policy regime change in the political realm. 
 
Yet, the political space created by structural problems could not have been filled with any 
kind of ideas. The “responsiveness of ideas to particular problems” (Berman 2001:236) is 
crucial. New ideas about taxation became an important mediating variable because they 
responded well to the deficiencies of the tax system, as perceived by the main political actors.  
 
First, these ideas provided a cognitive framework that illuminated why the existing tax regime 
was unable to achieve its goals. They presented a theoretical explanation for many of the 
economic problems experienced by policy-makers. Second, the ideas projected solutions that 
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could answer these problems. The DIT blueprint clearly outlined the changes needed to make 
the tax system more effective. As a consequence, policy-makers came to regard these ideas as 
relevant for tax policy. 
 
In other words, novel tax policy ideas were influential since they ‘fit’ the structural 
environment. The effect of ideas was contingent upon their applicability to actual, structural 
problems. It appears that policy ideas without this strong attachment to the structural reality 
would not have had nearly the same influence. 
 
Relevant to the general tax literature, it appears that the DIT model responded particularly 
well to the structural problems faced by Norwegian policy-makers. This supports Ganghof’s 
(2005:82) argument that the DIT model is attractive because it matches the structural 
constraints and incentives confronting policy-makers. Yet, it is important to note that it was 
the responsiveness to domestic structural problems that made the DIT model attractive in the 
first place. Later on, however, the model has also proven to be beneficial in the context of 
stronger international tax competition (cf. Ganghof 2005).         
 
6.5.3 Institutions and the constitution of ideas 
It is important to recognize, however, that the relationship between ideas and structure was 
constituted within an institutional context. Structural problems were perceived through 
political institutions, and the development of tax policy ideas also partly took place within 
these institutional confines. In our case, political institutions were important in shaping the 
relationship between structural and ideational factors, as they forged the link between the 
problems of the tax system and the solutions provided by economic experts. 
 
Why ideas responded well to structural problems is in part explained by institutional factors. 
Ideas fit partly because they were thoroughly processed at the national level. Tax ideas from 
abroad were further developed, adapted and specified by experts within the confines of 
Norwegian political institutions. This resembles the process of “imitation and innovation” 
found by Westney (1987) in her study of the transfer of Western organizational models to 
Japan. The development of tax policy ideas took place in public commissions and in the 
Ministry of Finance. This work greatly enhanced the relevance of new tax policy ideas for the 
Norwegian system. 
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Moreover, this process brought tax policy ideas into line with existing ideology. That is, the 
further development of economic ideas within the Norwegian institutional context produced 
tax policy solutions that were more compatible with the social democratic ideology held by 
the majority of Norwegian politicians. The presence of strong social democratic norms in the 
Norwegian economic bureaucracy appears to constitute part of the explanation for this. 
 
More specifically, the dual income tax model that was developed put particular emphasis on 
objectives of equity and revenue-raising. This made the new tax policy ideas appealing to 
social democrats in search of new ideas that could better advance their project of equity and 
growth. That the ideas provided an answer to equity concerns made them acceptable 
politically, which was a condition for their influence on policy. Thus, the influence of ideas 
was also contingent upon their fit with the existing, institutionalized ideology. 
 
We can conclude that the ideational influence on reform was contingent upon the constitution 
of tax policy ideas within the Norwegian institutional setting, since this increased their fit with 
both the structural and ideological environment.    
 
6.5.4 Institutions and the transmission of ideas 
The interaction between ideas and institutions was consequential for reform in another way as 
well. Ideas can only influence policy if they are taken up by the actors who decide on policy. 
Thus, the effect of ideas on policy is contingent upon their diffusion, first from experts to 
politicians, but also from political elites to regular party members and the general public 
(Blyth 2001:237). As our case shows, political institutions shape this diffusion. New 
economic ideas could exert considerable influence on tax reform only because institutional 
features stimulated their transmission. The institutional setting generated convergence in 
political preferences around these ideas, thereby forging both the substantive and the political 
basis for reform. Three mechanisms accounted for the transmission of ideas. 
 
First, commission reports were crucial for the spreading of novel ideas about taxation from 
economic experts to politicians. These reports applied new economic ideas directly to the 
Norwegian tax system and developed concrete policy proposals. Thereby, they influenced the 
opinions of political elites, making central actors in both the main parties regard new tax 
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policy ideas as appropriate solutions to the problems of the tax system. Thus, the preferences 
of political elites converged towards the views of economic experts. 
 
Second, ideas were transmitted from experts to politicians through their close cooperation in 
the Ministry of Finance. Intense interaction with bureaucrats exposed political actors from 
both sides to rationalist arguments about tax policy design. This shaped the views of 
politicians, generating political consent to new policy ideas. 
 
Third, economist politicians played an important role in the transmission of tax policy ideas 
from political-administrative elites to the broader parties and the public. These individuals 
actively translated economic arguments about tax policy into politically comprehensible 
terms. This translation increased the acceptance for new, often counterintuitive tax policy 
ideas. It was thus essential for building broader political support for the reform.  
 
6.5.5 Institutions and political strategies  
Convergence in political preferences around expert solutions was a necessary, though not 
sufficient condition for reform. As simple game-theoretic models will tell you, compatible 
preferences do not ensure actual cooperation. Political actors still needed to work together to 
arrive at a reform compromise. Thus, the ability to pass reform depended on the strategies of 
political parties.  
 
While the Labor party could be counted on to cooperate for reform, this choice was far less 
obvious for the Conservative party, even in the late 1980s. The Conservative leadership 
wanted tax reform, but not at any price. As the reform outcome was uncertain, Conservatives 
were reticent to pursue reform wholeheartedly. The gains from a better tax system had to be 
weighted against the potential losses from a more strict tax system and from losing their no. 1 
political issue.  
  
In this situation, the influence from the institutional setting on the strategies of the political 
parties was crucial. Features of Norwegian political institutions facilitated the pursuit of 
cooperative strategies by reducing both the transaction costs of the reform process and the 
uncertainty related to the reform outcome. It appears that this tipped the balance in the 
Conservative party in favor of moving towards reform. The result was collective political 
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action for reform. In other words, political institutions contributed to reform by shaping not 
only preferences, but also strategies.  
 
More specifically, three institutional mechanisms generated political agreement: First, 
commission reports served as a focal point for cooperation. They provided a ‘neutral’ solution 
that both Labor and Conservative politicians could rally around. The reports reduced the 
uncertainty about what would be the outcome of a reform process, thereby making it easier 
for the political actors to engage in reform work.   
 
Second, the production of official political documents under alternating government worked 
as a commitment mechanism. While power shifted between Labor and Conservatives, both 
parties actively used official documents to signal their positions. That is, the institutionalized 
production of documents allowed them to commit to a broad reform solution. This reduced 
the uncertainty about where the other player stood in the tax question, making it easier for 
both to move towards reform.  
 
Third, parliamentary committee work induced actors to cooperate to arrive at a final reform 
deal. The committee for financial questions represented an environment of deep mutual trust 
generated by repeated interaction and personal relations. Trust facilitated collective action. 
The committee work thus allowed political opponents to work out a comprehensive, ‘win 
some, lose some’ reform compromise. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions 
7.1 Summary of the main findings 
Since the research questions have already been thoroughly answered in chapter 6, this closing 
chapter only offers a brief recapitulation of the main findings: Firstly, the empirical 
investigation shows that the Norwegian tax reform of 1992 was characterized by rational 
updating of policy rather than liberalization.  
 
Secondly, it appears that this outcome was contingent upon the large scale of policy change. I 
find three mechanisms that link large-scale reform to rational updating: the large role of 
experts in policy-formulation, the possibility of coherent policy solutions, and the even 
distribution of wins and losses.  
 
Thirdly, the close-up investigation of the reform process reveals that there were three major 
preconditions for large-scale tax reform: The huge structural problems of the existing tax 
system; the development and adaptation of new tax policy ideas; and the consensus-
generating features of Norwegian political institutions. The interaction between these factors 
brought political actors to agreement on a deep-seated reform of the Norwegian tax system.  
 
The rest of this chapter is devoted to the broader substantive and theoretical implications of 
these findings. I first discuss the 1992 tax reform as an integral element of social democratic 
modernization in Norway. Then I look at the findings from the Norwegian tax reform in a 
comparative perspective, raising the question of whether the Scandinavian tax regimes exhibit 
a particular development. Finally, I spell out the implications of this study for theory on 
institutional change in advanced political economic. I also indicate important areas for further 
research. 
 
7.2 Social democratic modernization 
In the introduction, I stated that this study was motivated by an interest in the transformation 
of the Norwegian welfare state regime since the 1980s. Did Norway abandon its social 
democratic welfare state model in this period, or was the model rather updated to the political 
and economic environment of a new era? My investigation of the most significant tax reform 
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in this period supports the latter hypothesis. I find that tax policy continued along a new and 
improved social democratic ‘middle way’ rather than take off in a liberal direction. 
 
This finding is consonant with Jon Erik Dølvik’s contention that the changes in the 
Norwegian political economy the last quarter of a century are best summarized as “social 
democratic modernization” (Dølvik 2007:291, my translation). The transformation of the 
Norwegian political economy, he argues, has been characterized by “the combination of 
economic modernization, institutional continuity and a relatively egalitarian income 
distribution” (Dølvik 2007:289).  
 
The Norwegian tax reform of 1992 should be regarded as a crucial precondition for this 
development. Not only did the reform stimulate economic activity by levelling the playing 
field for businesses and unlocking capital. It simultaneously strengthened the capacity to 
finance the welfare state and maintained the direct redistribution in the tax system. These 
important implications of the tax reform for the Norwegian welfare state regime more than 
suggest that welfare state scholars need to be more attentive to issues of tax policy. 
 
Although the 1992 tax reform was largely successful in these regards, we should not be blind 
to its shortcomings and more problematic implications. One important area that escaped the 
rational updating of policy was the taxation of owner-occupied housing. This issue proved so 
politically sensitive that policy-makers were unable to implement changes. Hence, the tax 
system continues to privilege income from housing capital over other types of capital income. 
This represents the greatest inefficiency of the Norwegian tax regime. On the other hand, 
taxation of housing is Norway’s largest unexploited reserve of tax revenue, which may prove 
valuable for future policy-makers. 
 
Moreover, the 1992 tax reform laid the ground for the growing financialization of the 
Norwegian economy. Gerda Krippner defines financialization as “a pattern of accumulation in 
which profits accrue primarily through financial channels rather than through trade and 
commodity production” (Krippner 2005:174). The reform’s introduction of uniform capital 
taxation and the removal of tax incentives for lock-in of capital in businesses stimulated the 
free flow of financial capital. In light of the breakdown of the financial system in 2008 and 
the current economic crisis, this development can be regarded as problematic. Yet, it would be 
wrong to say that tax reform contributed to uncontrolled financial capitalism, as the reform 
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actually introduced a corporate tax regime that implied more effective regulation and 
monitoring of capital. 
 
On balance, I would argue that these problems were clearly outweighed by the benefits of the 
1992 tax reform for the Norwegian economy. The tax reform appears to represent part of the 
background for Norway’s strong economic and social performance the last 15 years. The 
present study backs up the argument that “[a]n important precondition for the comeback of 
the Nordic models was the restructuring of the political-economic regimes that took place in 
connection with the crisis at the beginning of the 1990s” (Dølvik 2007:288). 
 
But what made this fundamental restructuring possible? My study of the 1992 tax reform also 
provides an analysis of this question. I find that political actors were able to agree on reform 
partly because Norwegian political institutions stimulated consensus. Institutions both 
generated convergence in preferences among political actors around expert solutions, and 
facilitated the pursuit of cooperative political strategies. In the context of economic crisis, this 
was enough to produce a broad-based reform compromise. This supports Tranøy’s (2000) 
assertion that in times of crisis the consensus-oriented Norwegian system is conducive to 
large-scale updating reform. Yet, this issue requires more systematic investigation. How and 
under what conditions the Norwegian political system may favor reform is an important topic 
for further research. 
 
7.3 Tax reform in a Scandinavian perspective 
The finding that the Norwegian tax reform of 1992 led to rational updating resonates well 
with recent analyses of tax policy change in Sweden (Steinmo 2002) and Denmark (Ganghof 
2007). In all the Scandinavian countries, the tax reforms of around 1990 appear to have 
updated policy to a new economic environment rather than shift policy in a liberal direction. 
These tax reforms have neither put an end to the welfare state or the ambition of equality.  
 
One important explanation for this is that the Nordic countries all implemented dual income 
tax (DIT) models, which differed from the models chosen in other countries. (Denmark, 
however, reverted to a hybrid model in 1993.) Ganghof (2005) argues that the DIT model is 
less neo-liberal than other tax models, as it combines efficiency with a strong capacity to raise 
revenue and leaves room for some redistribution. My investigation supports this argument. 
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The ability of the 1992 Norwegian tax reform to reconcile efficiency and equity goals owed 
partly to the choice of the DIT model.  
 
Thus, there appears to be a particular affinity between this model and the egalitarian goals of 
social democracy. Pushing the argument even further, one could say that the DIT model is the 
incarnation of modern social democratic tax policy. Identifying social democracy with a tax 
model that explicitly discriminates against labor income may seem odd. Yet, I believe this 
illustrates the inherent pragmatism of contemporary social democratic policy in the Nordic 
countries. To be able to achieve a set of goals that is much the same as before, policy-makers 
have introduced policy means that are less conventional, but more effective.     
 
This suggests that the Scandinavian countries represent something of an exception in the field 
of tax policy. Although greater efficiency and market-conformity was the common tune of tax 
policy change all across the world, tax reforms in the Scandinavian countries appear to have 
been particularly sensitive to concerns about revenue and redistribution. This conclusion 
echoes much of the literature on changes in welfare state regimes: Rather than converge in a 
liberal direction, Scandinavian tax policy regimes seem to follow a particular development 
trajectory. 
 
Yet, we should be cautious not to exaggerate the similarities. The tax systems of Norway, 
Sweden and Denmark all have important particularities. Moreover, tax policy developments 
in recent years suggest a partial divergence. The right-wing government in Denmark 
introduced a ‘tax freeze’ in 2002, which implied that no tax rate could be increased. The 
Danish government is also currently planning a large-scale tax reform that critics describe as 
strongly liberal. Compared to this, the Norwegian tax reform of 2006 seems to have had a 
more egalitarian profile. In Sweden, the tax system has not been subjected to major reform 
since 1991. These different Scandinavian development paths show that further investigation is 
necessary. Comparative analysis of the modern evolution of tax policy in the Scandinavian 
countries stands out as an important task for future research. 
 
7.4 Implications for theory 
The findings of this study also contribute to the broad theoretical debate about institutional 
change. The investigation of the Norwegian tax reform revealed an outcome that was 
139 
qualitatively different from liberalization, which is usually regarded as the dominant trend in 
advanced political economies (Streeck and Thelen 2005). The reform was instead 
characterized by continuity in basic objectives and updating of policy means. I have referred 
to this as ‘rational updating’. Yet, this term is chosen in want of better theoretical concepts.  
 
In the literature on institutional changes in advanced political economies, the 
conceptualization of changes that are not characterized by liberalization has been somewhat 
neglected. Usually, changes of this kind are defined negatively, for instance as “non-liberal” 
(Streeck and Thelen 2005:33) or as “lack of retrenchment” (Pierson 2001). Yet, to develop the 
theoretical understanding of such changes, it is essential to determine what they are, not just 
what they are not.  
 
Pierson (2001) has made perhaps the most significant effort in this regard, by developing 
dimensions of welfare state restructuring. In particular, his notion of ‘recalibration’ is relevant 
for the understanding of updating policy change. However, we need stronger theoretical 
concepts that are applicable to changes in the whole political economy, not only to welfare 
state restructuring. 
 
Further, the preconditions for continuity in the outcomes of policy should be subjected to 
closer investigation by scholars. The conventional wisdom is that continuity in outcomes is 
produced by incremental, path dependent change (Pierson 2000). Contrary to this view, my 
study suggests that fundamental policy change may be necessary to ensure continuity in 
outcomes. Just as small changes or no changes can produce discontinuity (Streeck and Thelen 
2005; Hacker 2005), large changes may be conducive to continuity. The present study points 
out some features of large-scale reforms that may account for such a relationship (see section 
7.1). Yet, these are only tentative statements about mechanisms. The relationship between 
deep-seated policy change and rational updating of policy should be explored in much greater 
detail. 
 
However, it would be an illusion to think that the scale of change by itself can explain the 
outcome of rational updating. Deficient tax systems and novel ideas about taxation gave rise 
to large tax reforms all across the world in the 1980s and 90s. The outcomes differed: In some 
countries it was close to a liberal policy shift, in other places it was mainly a rational updating 
of policy.  
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My investigation strongly suggests that the outcome of large-scale reform is contingent upon 
institutional factors. In Norway the rational updating of policy was a function of political 
institutions in at least two ways. For one, broad political consensus ensured a balanced reform 
and precluded clearly liberal solutions. For another, the institutional setting shaped the 
development of tax policy ideas. Ideas that were largely liberal at the outset were moulded 
into a tax model that reconciled efficiency concerns with objectives of revenue-raising and 
redistribution. Other institutional settings likely shaped tax reform outcomes in a different 
manner. Therefore, future research ought to explore whether political institutions 
systematically condition the shape of the relationship between processes and outcomes of 
policy change. 
 
Lastly, it is appropriate to point out one important limitation of this study. There is reason to 
believe that dynamics of change will vary somewhat from one issue area to the other, 
depending on the structure of interests and the character of the issue. For instance, in areas 
where interests are concentrated and constituents well organized, changing the status quo will 
be very difficult (Pierson 2001). The present study has not explored the potential implications 
of the particular features of tax policy. One hypothesis is that interests in tax policy are so 
widely dispersed that change would be relatively easy. An alternative hypothesis is that tax 
policy issues are so politically sensitive that large changes are prohibitively difficult. Needless 
to say, this issue requires further investigation. 
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Appendix 1: Interview guide 
 
Topic 1: Personal role in tax policy-making 
• Background and knowledge of tax policy? 
• Formal position? 
• How did you participate in tax policy-making? 
• Which decision-making processes were you part of? 
 
Topic 2: Norwegian tax policy in general 
• What are the particular features of Norwegian tax-policy? 
• What have been the core objectives of tax policy in Norway, and how have they been 
weighted against each other? 
• How would you describe the relation between the tax system and the welfare state? 
• To what degree does the tax system contribute to redistribution? 
 
Topic 3: The background for reform: the development in tax policy  
• What characterized the post-war Norwegian tax policy regime? 
• How did tax policy evolve in the 1970s and 80s? 
• What were the most important problems of the old tax policy regime? 
 
Topic 4: Ideas and inspiration for reform 
• To what extent did ideas inspire the 1992 tax reform? 
• What was the source of these ideas? 
• To what extent was Norwegian inspired by reforms abroad? 
• To what extent did international structural pressures motivate the reform? 
 
Topic 5: The political process leading up to reform in 1992 
• Who were the main actors in the political process that led to reform, and what role did 
they play? 
• How would you describe the tax policy views of the key political parties, unions and 
employers? 
• Which factors made the 1992 tax reform possible? 
• What characterized the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats? 
• What characterized the relationship between the key political actors? 
 
Topic 6: The objectives and outcomes of the 1992 reform 
• What were the most important objectives of the 1992 reform? 
• How did the reform balance objectives of efficiency and equality? 
• Was there continuity or discontinuity in goals? 
• Did the reform imply liberalization or rather updating of existing policy? 
• In your opinion, did the reform achieve its basic objectives? 
• How did the reform influence efficiency, growth, redistribution and the capacity to 
raise revenue? 
 
Topic 7: The evolution of tax policy since 1992 
• How did tax policy develop after the reform? 
• How was the 2006 reform related to the 1992 reform? 
